Of the many terrorist groups operating in South Asia, Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) is among the most potent. Founded in Pakistan in the mid-1980s, LeT was generously supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a proxy in its protracted conflict with India. Since then, LeT has built a substantial infrastructure running schools and social services throughout Pakistan, while simultaneously carrying out deadly, sophisticated attacks throughout India and Afghanistan. From its founding, LeT’s ambitions were global in nature, and the group now boasts a presence in some twenty-one countries. After the November 2008 massacre in Mumbai, India—a terrorist attack which claimed the lives of over 180 people and specifically targeted foreigners—the international community has broadly acknowledged that LeT represents a global threat.
AUGUST 2021 UPDATE
LeT has been comparatively quiet since the February 2020 jailing of Hafiz Saeed, an influential Islamist who has been accused of masterminding the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, by Pakistani authorities. However, the organization is widely understood to remain viable and retain operational strength, both in the contested state of Jammu & Kashmir and more broadly.
History & Ideology
Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), variously translated from Urdu as “Army of the Pure,” “Army of the Righteous,” or “Army of the Good,” is the armed wing of the radical Pakistani Islamist charitable group Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), or “Society for Preaching.” Prior to the 2008 Mumbai attack, LeT was viewed primarily as an actor in the ongoing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Since it was formally founded in 1990, LeT voiced global ambitions and viewed undermining Indian rule in J&K as essential to the ultimate reinstatement of Muslim rule over the Indian sub-continent and beyond.1
Hafiz Mohammed Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, a pair of professors at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore, founded JuD in 1985 as a small missionary group dedicated to spreading the Ahl-e-Hadith (AeH) interpretation of Islam. LeT’s embrace of AeH is unusual for Pakistan-based militant groups, most of which adhere to the Deobandi interpretation of Islam. AeH is closely related to the Wahhabis of the Arabian Peninsula and is a minority sect within Pakistan.2
In 1986, JuD merged with an organization that facilitated the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. This new organization was called Markaz al-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), or “the Center for Preaching and Guidance.”3 Among MDI’s cofounders was Osama bin Laden’s religious mentor, Abdullah Azzam.4 Hafiz Saeed became the emir of MDI and subsequently of LeT, when the latter was established as MDI’s armed wing.5
LeT is unique among the AeH affiliates in Pakistan because it holds dawa (preaching) and jihad as equal components of Islam. LeT’s charitable wings work to convert Pakistanis to their interpretation of Islam. Many LeT recruits undergo military training, and some are sent to fight for LeT in J&K, or more recently, Afghanistan. At the same time, LeT’s armed operations help its recruitment and outreach efforts by inspiring disaffected Pakistanis.6
LeT’s first front was Afghanistan, but by the time LeT was founded, the war against the Soviets was waning. According to one report, only five LeT operatives were killed fighting in Afghanistan before LeT withdrew from the conflict as different factions of the Afghan mujahideen turned on each other.7
When the people of J&K rebelled against India in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence agency (ISI) sought to take advantage of this turmoil and destabilize its neighbor. One of the lessons Pakistan’s generals had drawn from the Afghan war was how to use proxy forces against a more powerful enemy without provoking a full-scale war.8 Initially, Pakistani strategists supported the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, but found that organization supported an independent Kashmir, rather than Kashmiri absorption into Pakistan. In turn, Pakistan shifted its support to Islamist groups that the ISI believed would be more effective and easier to control.9 In this regard, LeT was an ideal proxy because it was ideologically committed to jihad, had an ethnic composition similar to that of the Pakistani military, swore its loyalty to the state, and represented a minority sect within Pakistan.10
For its part, LeT readily shifted its focus to J&K. Despite this local focus, however, LeT’s ultimate goal was the establishment of Muslim rule of the Indian subcontinent. To facilitate plausible deniability for Pakistan’s role in fomenting violence in Jammu and Kashmir, the ISI urged MDI to split its operations, formally establishing LeT as the organization’s militant wing.11
The earliest known LeT operation in India took place in 1990, when LeT operatives ambushed a jeep carrying Indian Air Force personnel.12 In 1993, LeT attacked the army base in Poonch, a major coup in terms of its ability to carry out attacks against hard targets.13 However, the group’s presence was not publicly recognized until early 1996, when a group of LeT terrorists killed 16 Hindus in Kashmir’s Doda district.14 This attack was the first of many massacres that targeted ethnic and religious minority communities such as Sikhs and Hindus within J&K and were intended to provoke ethnic strife.15 Perhaps the most notable of these massacres occurred on March 20, 2000, on the eve of then-U.S. President Bill Clinton’s official visit to India, when LeT terrorists (along with members of Hizbul Mujahideen, another Pakistan-backed terrorist organization) killed 35 Sikhs at Chattisinghpora in Anantnag.16
Besides its deadly massacres, LeT has targeted Indian government and military installations and disrupted elections by intimidating voters and targeting political leaders. LeT built IEDs to target Indian army vehicles and adeptly mixed high and low technology to communicate and carry out operations.17
The focus on J&K did not mean that LeT lost interest in Afghanistan in the 1990s, however, although Kashmir became its main operational focus. According to LeT expert Stephen Tankel, several possible factors—from LeT’s Ahl-e-Hadith background to Pakistani intelligence seeking to separate LeT from other terror groups—could explain why LeT’s activities were constrained in Afghanistan during the 1990s.18
One of LeT’s signature tactics has been fidayeen (“those who sacrifice themselves in order to redeem themselves”) attacks: small, heavily armed and highly motivated squads strike significant or symbolic targets in an effort to cause mass casualties and humiliate the enemy. LeT has carried out dozens of such fidayeen attacks over the years. In November 1999, a team of LeT terrorists infiltrated the headquarters of India’s 15 Corps at the Badami Bagh cantonment in Srinagar (the capital of J&K) and killed the detachment’s Public Relations Officer and seven of his staffers. The attackers fought off Indian soldiers for almost 10 hours before being killed.19 A month later, LeT terrorists attacked the Police Special Operations Group Headquarters and killed a dozen Indian security personnel. In January 2001, six LeT operatives attempted to enter Srinagar Airport, and in August 2001, three LeT fidayeen killed 11 people inside the Jammu Railway station.20 And although violence in Kashmir has declined substantially since the mid-2000s, LeT has remained active in the region.21
From its beginnings, LeT sought to target India. As early as 1992, Hafez Saeed sent Azam Cheema, a top LeT commander, to India to recruit Indian Muslims. Taking advantage of Hindu-Muslim communal tensions, Cheema had some success, and his network carried out a number of low-level bombings across India.22 Karim Abdul Tunda, who was arrested on the Indian-Nepal border in August 2013, was one these early LeT recruits. He is suspected of involvement in over 40 terror cases in India, both directly and coordinating operations from Pakistan.23 Indian police arrested LeT operatives in the 1990s, but LeT was not well known at the time and Indian authorities did not realize the extent of the group’s operations.24
Just as the ISI supports LeT as a proxy in order to maintain plausible deniability, LeT fosters proxies in India among radical Islamist militias there. LeT’s most important ally within India is the Indian Mujahideen (IM). IM’s members are primarily drawn from the ranks of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).25 LeT, along with several other Pakistani terror groups, provided support to IM, including training, cash, weapons, explosives, and false travel documents. One of IM’s founders, Mohammed Sadiq Israr Sheikh, is believed to have traveled to Pakistan on a legitimate Pakistani passport supplied by ISI through LeT; he met with LeT leaders in Pakistan, attended a LeT training camp, and recruited other Indian Muslims.26
Some analysts argue that IM is little more than an outgrowth of LeT and the ISI, established when Pakistan reduced its support for armed operations in J&K.27 These analysts contend that IM was born of “The Karachi Project” which brought together a number of Pakistani militant groups including LeT to attack India.28 Other analysts view IM as an independent organization, but allied with LeT.29
More of IM’s numerous deadly attacks throughout India took place before 2012. While the group’s specialty has been IEDs made with pressure cookers packed with ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (a markedly different tactic from LeT’s use of fidayeen), LeT training and support helped IM build the necessary organizational capabilities to carry out attacks. Indian officials have cracked down hard on IM in recent years, and in March 2014 they claimed to have arrested the group’s entire top leadership.30 Since then, IM has not been particularly active.
LeT runs a vast network of offices, schools, medical centers, and media outlets within Pakistan to proselytize LeT’s Ahl-e-Hadith theology as part of the group’s belief in dawa. LeT’s headquarters are located at a 200-acre compound in Muridke designed to be a “pure” Islamic city with a madrassa, a hospital, a market, residences, and farmland. To demonstrate the purity of the city, televisions and pictures are banned, with entertainment limited to cassettes of warrior songs.31
LeT runs a network of primary and upper-level schools that serve over 18,000 students. They are not, technically, madrassas; while LeT pushes its view of Islam, the schools also teach other subjects. However, LeT’s worldview is infused into every component of education. The former head of LeT’s education department explained that in the basic reader the alphabet is used to emphasize jihad, “’Alif’ for Allah, ‘Be’ for Bandooq (gun), ‘Te’ for toop (cannon) and so on.” Because of the poor state of Pakistan’s public education, LeT schools are an attractive alternative. LeT also subsidizes the fees for those who cannot pay.32
LeT is a major healthcare provider, running hospitals, mobile medical centers, and an ambulance service. Over 2,000 doctors volunteer their services part-time and are trained to use their contact with patients as an opportunity to proselytize. LeT believes these activities are necessary to counteract the influence of NGOs and Christian missionaries. As in LeT’s education system, the organization is providing a service desperately needed by many impoverished Pakistanis.33 LeT has also been on the forefront of disaster relief; LeT was one of the first organizations to respond to the 2005 Kashmir earthquake34 and delivered aid to refugees displaced by the fighting in the Swat Valley in 2008 and the 2010 floods.35
The effectiveness of the LeT and JuD as a shadow state cannot be overstated. Consider that, as early as 2005, LeT’s assets included a 190-acre campus in Muridke that featured 500 offices, 2200 training camps, 150 schools, 2 science colleges, 3 hospitals, 11 ambulances, a publishing empire, a garment factory, an iron foundry, and woodworks factories. Salaries were in some cases 12 to 15 times greater than those offered for similar jobs in the civilian state sector.36
LeT has an extensive media arm, publishing several magazines in Urdu, English, and Arabic that target specific communities such as women and students. The flagship publication, Majalah al-Dawa, is an Urdu-language monthly that, as of 2010, had a circulation of about 60,000.37 Jihad is a regular theme in these publications, and they regularly feature testaments to LeT operatives killed in the service of jihad.38 LeT has used the internet to propagate its message, broadcasting an internet radio show and maintaining websites and Facebook pages. However, international scrutiny has led the Pakistani government to shut down these sites. LeT also holds conferences and rallies throughout the country despite the group supposedly being banned.39 The rallies often feature speeches by Hafez Mohammed Saeed, notwithstanding the $10 million bounty on him under the U.S. Rewards for Justice program.40
LeT’s large social service and paramilitary operations are expensive to operate. However, the organization has been both creative and systematic in its fundraising. According to one report, donation boxes for the jihadi groups are present in “countless” shops across the country.41 LeT publications include calls for donations. LeT also raises money from wealthy supporters in the Arabian Peninsula and from the global Pakistani expatriate community. Often these donations are channeled through a variety of international Islamist charities, such as the International Islamic Relief Organization and the al-Rashid Foundation.42
One notable LeT fundraising operation is collecting the skins of sacrificial animals after holidays and selling them to tanneries. In 2010, JuD reportedly collected 100,000 skins, netting a profit of $1.2 million.43 LeT uses a range of low and high-tech means to involve people in this campaign. For example, within Pakistan, LeT announces this campaign via loudspeaker; internationally, it allows individuals to contribute to the purchase of a sacrificial animal online and then donate the skin to LeT.44
Besides the ISI stipend, the Pakistani civilian government has also contributed to LeT. In June 2010, the Punjab provincial government allocated 80 million rupees (about $1 million) to LeT-affiliated schools and hospitals.45 In 2019, under pressure from the Financial Action Task Force, a global watchdog that monitors terrorist financing and sanctions countries that it deems not to be combating it, the Pakistani government led by Prime Minister Imran Khan went in a different direction and banned both JuD and its charity wing, the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation.46 However, when Pakistani governments have banned LeT- and JuD-affiliated entities in the past, new groups have sprung up with different names.
Another possible source of support for LeT’s operations in India is D-company, the organized crime group led by Dawood Ibrahim. Ibrahim’s criminal network extends well beyond India and the Subcontinent and into the Middle East. Ibrahim is believed to be a major donor to LeT, with his heroin trade and smuggling networks purportedly used to help LeT move operatives in and out of India.47
LeT has allied with other Islamist groups around the world (including al-Qaeda) and has developed its own fundraising and logistical support network. LeT has also become a magnet for Islamists worldwide seeking training. Finally, and most worrisome, LeT is increasingly fighting NATO and Indian military forces in Afghanistan.
LeT statements have long vilified a coalition of Hindus, Jews, and Christians, colorfully termed the “Brahmanic-Talmudic-Crusader” alliance,48 that seeks to destroy the international Muslim community.49 LeT rhetoric frequently targets Israel and at one point called for Pakistan to deploy a hydrogen bomb to “make the USA yield before Pakistan.”50
LeT’s affiliation with the global Islamist terror movement is deep and extensive. LeT’s links to al-Qaeda, for instance, are rooted in their respective foundations and the legacy of Abdullah Azzam, who was instrumental in the creation of both al-Qaeda and the MDI. LeT has sheltered and trained many notable al-Qaeda figures, including Ramzi Yusuf, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and nephew of 9/11 organizer Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.51 After 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, LeT assisted with the exfiltration of al-Qaeda personnel from Afghanistan, providing safe houses, safe passage, travel documents, and logistical support.52 Several al-Qaeda operatives trained with LeT. Richard Reid, the notorious “shoe bomber” terrorist, is known to have trained with LeT prior to joining al-Qaeda. Two of the 2005 London subway bombers, Mohammad Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, may also have received training from LeT.53
Many LeT members were embedded in an international network of Islamist organizations, and the group has long offered support to other extremists battling perceived enemies of Islam. For instance, LeT has offered rhetorical – and occasionally financial – support to Islamists in Chechnya, Gaza, the Philippines, and the Balkans.54 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group working to overthrow the Uzbek regime and to replace it with a sharia-based government, has long-standing ties to LeT.55 LeT is also plugged into the international networks of Islamist fundraisers such as the Al Akhtar Trust or the Al Rashid Trust, which were founded to fund militant groups.56
When al-Qaeda’s training infrastructure in Afghanistan was destroyed, LeT’s camps were largely untouched due to Pakistan’s protection; thus, the camps took up the mantle of training international Islamist movement militants.57 This training support is provided to militants from numerous organizations in South Asia, such as Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI), and the Taliban, among others.58 Furthermore, radical Muslims worldwide are known to have travelled to Pakistan to train with the LeT.
LeT has safehouses and supporters in Bangladesh, Nepal,59 and the Maldives60 that facilitate the infiltration of operatives into India. It has supporters in the Gulf region who raise funds, but also recruit Indians working there and coordinate travel to Pakistan for training.
LeT’s attacks in Afghanistan are consistent with its willingness to serve as a proxy for Pakistani intelligence, which is deeply concerned that increased Indian influence in Afghanistan will leave Pakistan surrounded. At first, LeT’s support for the Afghan Taliban in their fight against NATO forces was informal, granting LeT fighters leave to travel to Afghanistan and join the Taliban on their own initiative. In 2004 and 2005, however, LeT began to formally support its members traveling to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban.61 LeT fighters played a significant role in an attack on a U.S. base in Wanat, Nuristan wherein insurgents nearly overran the base.62 Additionally, some analysts believe LeT carried out a number of high-profile strikes against Indian targets in Afghanistan, including a July 2008 car-bombing of the Indian Embassy and a February 2010 fidayeen attack on Kabul guesthouses hosting Indians.63
There is evidence that LeT opened an office in Lodi, California, and counterterrorism officials “cite evidence in recent years of fundraising or recruiting efforts in Canada, Britain, Australia and the United States.”64 LeT has also been active in Germany,65 a cell that raised money and was armed with explosives was arrested in Spain,66 and the group maintains an active presence in France.67
Lashkar-e-Taiba currently finds itself in a difficult position. Unlike many other Islamist groups in Pakistan, it has remained loyal to the Pakistani state, and even serves Pakistan’s government as an intermediary to other radical groups.68 At the same time, LeT’s primary arena for jihad, Jammu and Kashmir, has been increasingly closed off to it. Regional violence has decreased from hundreds of civilians killed annually by terrorists only a decade ago to only a handful today.69 J&K remain restive, however, and LeT as well as other Pakistani extremists continue to attempt to wage their battle there. Yet LeT has received far less support from the Pakistani government in recent years, as a result of pressure on Islamabad from the international community.70
Additionally, LeT has been unable to capitalize on new developments in the global jihadist sphere. When the Islamic State announced plans for a franchise in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region in early 2015, some observers noted that LeT could be a logical regional partner, given that both groups adhere to the Salafist sect of Sunni Islam. By contrast, most South Asian terror groups—from the Taliban to the sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)—belong to the Deobandi sect, which ISIS rejects. Observers contended that some renegade LeT members, frustrated with their group’s less active role in Kashmir and across India, could jump ship to ISIS.71
Instead, ISIS has chosen to partner with other local militant groups, particularly LeJ. ISIS clearly prefers working with groups in South Asia that share its targeting preferences—LeJ, like ISIS, frequently targets Shia Muslims—even if they don’t share the Islamic State’s Salafist worldview. Another reason for ISIS’ lack of interest in LeT is the latter’s ties to the Pakistani state, which ISIS wants to destroy. However, one cannot rule out the possibility of a temporary marriage of convenience motivated a common enemy. Still, even these theoretical collaborations would likely only have a limited impact on LeT’s capacities.
Several attacks that either involved or were directly executed by LeT in J&K and broader India in 2015 and 2016,72 but that pace of activity has declined. There were relatively few LeT attacks in 2018 and 2019. Local police in the Kashmiri town of Baramulla blamed the group for an attack that killed three people in April 2018.73 Otherwise, India and J&K have not suffered any major terror attacks involving LeT since 2016. On the whole, LeT has become notably less relevant; however, it still remains a threat, and Indian officials continue to view it as such 74 and carry out operations against LeT operatives infiltrating Kashmir.75
JeM, meanwhile, has significantly elevated its profile in recent years—an emergence that coincided with the return of JeM leader Masood Azhar, who was silent for nearly a decade until 2014. JeM claimed responsibility for several attacks in J&K in early 2019. The reemergence of the “other” India-focused terror threat, marked by a high-profile attack in Kashmir on Valentine’s Day 2019 that killed more than 40 Indian security forces, represents a turning point for the region. Indeed, LeT was essentially forgotten during the crisis—and it was JeM, not LeT, that was causing the most concern for India.
Over the course of 2018 and 2019, new pressure prompted Islamabad to crackdown on LeT and JuD. In early 2018, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—a global watchdog for terrorist financing—placed Pakistan on a gray list for not sufficiently countering terror finance. Countries placed on FATF’s gray list may have trouble conducting business abroad or securing foreign investment. While Pakistan had been put on this gray list in the past, Islamabad is now suffering from a major balance of payments crisis, making the potential designation a significant concern for the country’s ailing economy. As a result, the new Pakistani government led by Prime Minister Imran Khan announced a ban on JuD in early 2019 (even though JuD had already technically been banned before).76 Subsequently, Pakistani police arrested dozens of jihadists and shut down their facilities. These steps will pose new challenges for LeT and its affiliates. However, such crackdowns typically do not last long, and shuttered militant charities are reopened under new names.
Despite these setbacks and threats, LeT continues to operate openly in Pakistan. Recent LeT protests have focused on NATO transport vehicles traveling through Pakistan, U.S. drone strikes, Indian water policies, and improved trade relations with India. LeT has spearheaded a coalition of Islamist groups who opposed these efforts known as the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (Defense of Pakistan).77
LeT chief Hafez Muhammed Saeed has continued to travel throughout Pakistan and speak at rallies, despite a $10 million bounty under the U.S. Rewards for Justice program. Saeed also regularly gives academic lectures at colleges in Punjab. Several top LeT leaders are being tried in Pakistan for their role in the Mumbai attacks. But the country’s extremely slow judicial process suggests that the Pakistani government is not committed to seeing justice served.78 Indeed, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, a top LeT leader implicated in the Mumbai attacks, has been out on bail since 2015. Saeed, meanwhile, has been rotating in and out of house arrest for years. When Saeed was released in November 2017, he delivered a fiery sermon in which he labeled Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s prime minister from 2013 until 2017, a traitor for pursuing peace with India. Saeed also vowed to maintain the struggle to “free” Kashmir.79 And in early 2019, he filed a formal petition with the United Nations requesting that his UN terror designation be removed (his request was refused).80
The timing of Saeed’s release was notable for two reasons. First, it came several days after the U.S. Congress delinked LeT from aid certification requirements—in other words, Washington decided that it would not need to certify that Pakistan was taking robust action against LeT before releasing aid monies to Pakistan.81 Why the United States chose to delink LeT is unclear.
Saeed’s release was also notable because it came a few days before the 9th anniversary of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. For many relatives of the tragedy’s victims, the release of Saeed on a date so close to the anniversary was deeply upsetting.82
In November 2019, an anti-terrorism court announced that Saeed would be indicted on terrorist financing charges.83 He was subsequently arrested in a rare indication of the country’s willingness to take concrete legal action against the LeT leader. However, this move was likely made in response to FATF pressure, based on past precedent when it comes to Pakistan’s handling of terrorists.
For its part, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration has shown little interest in improving India’s relationship with Pakistan. Modi is a Hindu nationalist whose party has expressed anti-Pakistan views. Due to this point of conflict, LeT’s anti-India extremism may continue to resonate with large segments of Pakistani society, particularly in the Punjab province where the group is based. In 2016, Modi threatened to revisit, or even revoke, the Indus Waters Treaty—a water-sharing accord that ensures the Indus, a critical water source for Pakistan, flows downstream unencumbered.84 Modi’s threat provided more ammunition for LeT propaganda, which has long used India’s alleged “water theft” as a prominent talking point. India-Pakistan relations were plunged into deep crisis in 2019 – first after a mass casualty attack on Indian security forces in Pulwama, Kashmir, in February, and especially after New Delhi revoked the autonomy of India-administered Kashmir in August. The Indian government insists it will not agree to formal dialogue with Islamabad until Pakistan cracks down conclusively against LeT and its ilk.
Ultimately, LeT considers jihad a central tenet of its ideology. The organization may again seek to launch large scale terrorist operations, and possibly do so in more distant places than Kashmir. Alternately, frustrated LeT cadres may begin to plot their own attacks. As a whole, LeT remains ideologically committed to violence and maintains the resources and skills needed to launch major, deadly terror attacks. Revelations that it is embracing technological innovations – including a new mobile application that secures its communications in J&K – highlight the group’s willingness to adapt to changing global circumstances.85
 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects,” New America Foundation, April 27, 2011, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/policy-papers/lashkar-e-taiba/.
 Yoginder Sikand, “Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of Lashkar-e-Taiba,” in Aparna Rao, Michael Bollig and Monika Bock, eds., The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence (London: Berghahn Books 2007).
 Wilson John, “Lashkar-e-Toiba: New Threats Posed By An Old Organization,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 4, May 5, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=314.
 Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba.”
 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan, Saba Ansan, trans., (Pakistan: Mashal Books, 2006), 298-300.
 Ibid., 317-18.
 Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004 (London: Routledge, 2007), 145.
 Ibid., 170-80.
 Joshua Adlakha, The Evolution of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Road to Mumbai, Unpublished dissertation for Georgetown University, 2010.
 A. Abbas, “In God We Trust,” The Herald, January 2002.
 Sikand, “Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of Lashkar-e-Taiba,” 206.
 South Asian Terrorism Portal, “Incidents and Statements involving Lashkar-e-Toiba: 1996-2007,” n.d., http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba_lt2007.htm.
 Praveen Swami, “Turning the Snow Red,” Frontline 17, no. 17 (August 19–September 1, 2000), http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1717/17170160.htm.
 Barry Bearak, “A Kashmiri Mystery,” New York Times Magazine, December 31, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/31/magazine/a-kashmiri-mystery.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
 Peter Chalk & C. Christine Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayyiba leads the Kashmiri insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 14, no. 10, October 17, 2002, 1-5.
 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” New America Foundation Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, February 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-Taiba_in_Perspective.pdf.
 Praveen Swami, “A growing toll,” Frontline, 16, no. 24, November 13-26, 1999, http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1624/16240390.htm.
 For an in-depth chronology of LeT operations, see South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Incidents involving Lashkar-e-Toiba: 1996-2007,” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba_lt2007.htm.
 “Siege ends at Lal Chowk; 2 militants gunned down,” ExpressIndia.com, January 7, 2010, http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/karnatakapoll08/story_page.php?id=564467.
 Praveen Swami, “Pakistan and the Lashkar's Jihad in India,” The Hindu, December 9, 2008.
 Dwaipayan Ghosh, “Tunda fed IM sleeper cells via border operations,” Times of India, September 4, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-09-04/kolkata/41764390_1_indian-mujahideen-terror-attacks-delhi-police.
 Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba.”
 C. Christine Fair, Students Islamic Movement of India and the Indian Mujahideen: An Assessment, (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2010).
 “13/7 Accused Haroon Naik met Osama, Lakhvi in Pak: ATS,” The Hindu, February 7 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/137-accused-haroon-naik-met-osama-lakhvi-in-pak-ats/article2869467.ece.
 Vicky Nanjappa, “How the Indian Mujahideen was formed,” Rediff.com, July 29, 2008, http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/29ahd9.htm.
 Unnithan, Sandeep, "The Karachi Project," India Today, March 17, 2010, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/20100301-the-karachi-project-742101-2010-02-18.
 Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 144.
 Rahul Tripathi, “Entire Top Indian Mujahideen Leadership Nabbed in 8 Months,” Indian Express, March 30, 2014, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/im-impounded/.
 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 114.
 Arif Jamal, “From Madrasa to School,” News, December 15, 2002.
 Shushant Sareen, The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making (India: Observer Research Foundation, 2005), 243-46.
 Praveen Swami, “Quake came as a boon for Lashkar leadership,” The Hindu, November 17, 2005.
 Saeed Shah, “Pakistan floods: Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Islamists linked to India’s Mumbai attack, offer aid,” Christian Science Monitor, August 4, 2010.
 Neil Padukone, “The Next Al-Qaeda? Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Future of Terrorism in South Asia,” World Affairs Journal, November/December 2011, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210445?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
 Everything You Want to Know About LeT,” Hindustan Times, February 20, 2010, http://www.hindustantimes.com/Everything-you-want-to-know-about-the-LeT/H1-Article1-511059.aspx.
 Mariam Abou Zahab, “’I shall be waiting for you at the door of paradise’: The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba,” in Rao, Bollig and Bock, eds., The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence, 167.
 Amir Mir, “The Gates are Open,” Outlook India, January 19, 2009, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?239500.
 Annie Gowen, “Pakistan, India spar in Kashmir in worst border violence in years,” Washington Post, September 12, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-12/world/41982669_1_indian-controlled-kashmir-india-and-pakistan-muslim-majority-pakistan.
 Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects.”
 Sareen, The Jihad Factory, 290-93.
 “Banned Outfits Raise Cash from Sacrifice Day,” Dawn (Karachi), November 24, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/2010/11/24/banned-outfits-raise-cash-from-sacrifice-day.html.
 Sareen, The Jihad Factory, 298.
 “Pakistan ‘Gave Funds’ to Group on UN Terror Blacklist,” BBC, June 16, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10334914.
 “Imran Khan Government Banks Hafiz Saeed’s JuD, Its Charity Arm as India Pushes to Put Pak on Terror Blacklist,” News 18.com, February 22, 2019, https://www.news18.com/news/world/pakistan-bans-hafiz-saeed-led-jud-and-its-charity-wing-fif-2044527.html.
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 C. Christine Fair, testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, March 11, 2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT320/.
 Friday Times, November 21-27, 1998, cited in Sareen, The Jihad Factory, 310.
 Evan Kohlmann, “Expert Witness: Synopsis of Testimony, Regina v. Mohammed Ajmal Khan, Palvinder Singh, and Frzana Khan, Exhibit EK/1” (UK: Snaresbrook Crown Court, 2006).
 Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 42.
 Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba.”
 Tankel, 162-66.
 Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the secret world of Osama Bin-Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001).
 Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda video highlights fighting in Ghazni," Long War Journal, July 13, 2013.
 South Asian Terrorism Portal, “Al-Rashid Trust,” n.d., www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al-Rashid_Trust.htm.
 Tankel, "Lashkar-e-Taiba.”
 Neil Padukone, "The Next Al Qaeda? Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Future of Terrorism in South Asia," World Affairs, November/December 2011, 67-72.
 Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 144.
 Animesh Roul, “Jihad and Islamism in the Maldive Islands,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, February 12, 2010, https://jamestown.org/program/jihad-and-islamism-in-the-maldive-islands/.
 Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 194.
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 Josh Meyer, "Extremist group works in the open in Pakistan," Los Angeles Times, December 18, 2007.
 Mohit Joshi, "Lashkar-e-Taiba members in Germany, interior minister says." TopNews, December 12, 2008.
 Jesus Duva, Monica Ceberio Balaza, and Jorge A. Rodriguez, "Three Al Qaeda members detained in Spain," El Pais, August 2, 2012.
 Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 165.
 Abou Zahab, “‘I shall be waiting for you at the door of paradise:’ The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba,” 114.
 South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence 1988-2013,” n.d., http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm.
 Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 174-177.
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 Arif Rafiq, “The Emergence of the Difa-e-Pakistan Islamist Coalition,” CTC Sentinel, March 22, 2012.
 Richard Leiby, “Pakistani militant Hafiz Mohammad Saeed seeks protection from bounty hunters,” Washington Post, April 22, 2012.
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