

American Foreign Policy Council

ARGENTINA

QUICK FACTS

Population: 43,886,748 (July 2016 est.)

Area: 2,780,400 sq km

Ethnic Groups: white (mostly Spanish and Italian) 97%, mestizo (mixed white and Amerindian ancestry), Amerindian, or other non-white groups 3%

Religions: nominally Roman Catholic 92% (less than 20% practicing), Protestant 2%, Jewish 2%, other 4%

Government Type: presidential republic

GDP (official exchange rate): \$541.7 billion (2015 est.)

Map and Quick Facts courtesy of the CIA World Factbook (Last Updated January 2017)

OVERVIEW

Argentina is home to one of the largest Muslim populations in Latin America.¹ A growing percentage of the community is made up of Argentine converts to Islam, many of whom have been recruited and radicalized by Islamist operatives working throughout the country.

The Argentine Muslim community has gone largely unnoticed since its establishment in the 19th century, but national scandals such as Carlos Menem's controversial administration and bombings in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s—the largest terror attacks in the region at the time—brought it into the national spotlight. Since then, the community has been stigmatized for its connection to radical Islamist networks tied to Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah. Through use of these networks, Iran has used intelligence operatives to infiltrate Muslim society and recruit members from a community that shows signs of increasing radicalization.

These networks pose significant danger to Argentina, whose policy towards Iran and other Arab states has often been ambivalent and inconsistent. Moreover, Argentina's failing economy and its strained relationships with Western allies during the Fernández de Kirchner made it even more vulnerable to Iranian advances and activities in the region.

ISLAMIST ACTIVITY

Radical Islamist activity has been growing throughout Argentina since at least the early 1980s, when the Iranian Revolution was “exported” to the Americas.² Iran has maintained a presence in the hemisphere since the 1850s, when it first sought U.S. assistance in keeping European powers at bay and later built diplomatic relationships with other countries in the region such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.³ However, Iran’s political objectives changed with the 1979 Revolution, resulting in a break in ties with the United States and an eventual shift toward Latin America, particularly toward countries antagonistic to “American imperialism.”⁴

According to Alberto Nisman, the special prosecutor for the AMIA attack, Iran and Hezbollah saw Argentina as a land of opportunity⁵ for spreading radical Islam due to the large number of Muslim communities in the region, particularly the Tri-Border Area at the crossroads of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.⁶ Nisman cited documents seized from Iranian operatives identifying high-density areas of Muslim population to be used “as centers of penetration of Islam” throughout South America.⁷ Since then, Argentina in particular has served as one of the main hubs through which radical Islamists have developed an extensive network of terrorists, clergymen and recruiters, money launderers, and other operatives all dedicated to “exporting the revolution” throughout the region.⁸

The result of this growing network was the execution of Latin America’s most notorious Islamist terrorist attack—the July 18, 1994 bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina of the *Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina* (AMIA) that killed 85 civilians and injured hundreds more. Two years earlier, on March 17, 1992, a similar attack had been carried out against Israel’s embassy in Buenos Aires, murdering 29 people and injuring over two hundred.⁹ These twin attacks awoke Argentina to the real threat of Islamist activity within and around its borders.

According to Nisman, Iran’s Islamist terrorist network in Argentina was first established in 1983 with the arrival of Iranian operative Mohsen Rabbani. Originally sent to Argentina ostensibly as a commercial representative of the Iranian meat industry,¹⁰ Rabbani quickly established himself as a leader within the country’s Shi’ite Muslim community and began leading prayers at the At-Tauhid mosque in the Floresta neighborhood of Buenos Aires.¹¹ In his role as a prayer leader, he was able to address

believers at will, inserting radical political rhetoric into his sermons and developing relationships with young “disciples” who would later become operatives within his evolving terror network.

The network Rabbani established throughout the Shi’ite Muslim community in Buenos Aires grew to include more than 40 Islamic associations, including schools, media outlets, and charity organizations that are used today as backdoor channels through which the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah perform intelligence and covert operations.¹² It spans across state borders, allowing Iran and its proxies to pursue various terror operations in the region as a part of their political expansion. The most well-known of these operations is the 1994 AMIA attack in Buenos Aires, of which Nisman identified Rabbani as “the mastermind.”¹³ Though Rabbani escaped justice in Argentina by leaving the country in 1997, Interpol has since placed him on a “red alert” list, barring his travel to the region. However, the Islamist terror network he established continues to grow under the supervision of his many radical disciples.

According to a recent report by the Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS), Rabbani’s Argentine disciples can be broken down into three different types of actors: shadow facilitators, “super fixers,” and “fixers.”¹⁴ While prohibited from entering Argentina, Rabbani still acts as a shadow facilitator from Iran, providing guidance and funding to various Islamist activities in Argentina.¹⁵ His disciples act as “super fixers,” moving across countries throughout Latin America and acting as point persons for the “fixers,” or local Argentine agents who have access to or knowledge of targeted communities in the country. Perhaps the two most infamous Rabbani disciples and “super fixers” are Abdul Karim Paz and Edgardo Ruben “Suhail” Assad. According to Nisman, Karim Paz is Rabbani’s first convert and has been described as his “right-hand man” and immediate successor as the Imam of the At-Tauhid mosque.¹⁶ Similarly, Suhail Assad is known as a prominent leader in the local Shi’a community, with strong connections to the government of former Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.¹⁷ Some of these connections come from Suhail Assad’s cousin, Jorge Alejandro “Yussuf” Khalil, who was accused by Nisman of conspiring with the Fernández de Kirchner regime to cover up Iran’s involvement in the AMIA attack through a controversial agreement signed between both countries in 2013. Yussuf Khalil is currently the General Secretary of the At-Tauhid Mosque.¹⁸

Together, Yussuf Khalil, Abdul Karim Paz and Suhail Assad serve as Iran’s “informal ambassadors” in Argentina, continuing to recruit and radicalize Islamic communities to join the revolution.¹⁹ Under their supervision, the radical Islamist network in Argentina grows stronger and more expansive behind its façade of Muslim community and religious centers, cultural associations, and seemingly innocuous development of diplomatic and trade relations with Argentine leaders. So does its influence on the local Muslim population, susceptible to radicalization and recruitment to Islamic extremism through proselytizing in mosques, schools, and cultural events in Argentine society.

Rabbani and his disciples have paved the way for other extremist groups to target Argentina, most notably the Islamic State. In September of 2016, Secretary of National Security Eugenio Burzaco mentioned the possibility of ISIS operatives in Corrientes. While he later announced that national security forces had investigated and found no evidence of an ISIS cell in the region, he maintained that the Argentine government remained worried that Argentines who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS might return to form terrorist cells within Argentina.²⁰ President Mauricio Macri has also received threats from individuals possibly linked to ISIS, implying that Argentina is under threat of imminent attack.²¹ While these individuals may be acting independently and the threats have so far not materialized, they nonetheless reflect an alarming degree of infiltration and activism by Islamist elements—a level of activity influenced and encouraged by the inroads created by Mohsen Rabbani and his network.

ISLAMISM AND SOCIETY

The date of Islam's first appearance in Argentina is unknown, as the first Argentine censuses regarded Muslims as "other" rather than specifically categorizing them, as was done with Jews and Catholics. Some believe the first Muslims to arrive in Argentina were descendants from the Moors who came to the Americas with the Spanish conquistadors, though this theory has not been verified.²² However, the first official data on Arab/Islamic migration to Argentina indicates a wave of Syrian and Lebanese immigrants arriving in the mid- to late-19th century. This population continued to grow through the 20th century to an estimated 700,000 Muslims, mainly of Arab descent.²³ In 2010, the Pew Forum estimated Argentina's Muslim community to have grown to almost 1 million people, a total of 2.5 percent of the country's population of approximately 41 million.^{24,25} Approximately 70% of the population is Sunni, with the Shiite community making up the remaining 30%.²⁶ However, within the Muslim community, the Arab population is starting to shrink as immigration from Arab countries like Syria and Lebanon is replaced by increasing immigration from West Africa.²⁷ Furthermore, the current growth of Islam in Argentina owes less to immigration from Arab states and more to converts from within Argentina itself,²⁸ thus changing the cultural demographic of the country's Muslim community from primarily Arab to a more diverse group.

Islam's spread to populations beyond the Arab community can be credited to the proliferation of Islamic centers and schools established since the late 20th century. Though the Arab immigrant community originally established organizations and centers focused on preserving cultural rather than religious identity (Jews and Christians of Arab origin also participated in these groups), certain centers devoted exclusively to "preserving the religious legacy" also were established. The foundation of the *Centro de Estudios Islámicos* (Center of Islamic Studies), headed by Imam Mahmoud Hussein, initiated the process of "diffusion of Islam" in 1973 and began to attract

converts of non-Arab origin.²⁹ Since then, several mosques and Islamic centers have emerged throughout Argentina, though the Islamic community remains overwhelmingly concentrated in Buenos Aires.

One such mosque is the King Fahd mosque in Palermo, the largest mosque and Muslim cultural center in Latin America. Inaugurated in 2000, the mosque is notable for the fact that the approximately \$15 million in building costs were paid for by King Fahd himself, and the land, formerly property of the Argentine state, was donated to King Fahd in the mid-1990s by ex-President Carlos Menem.^{30 31} Despite the presence of multiple mosques and Muslim cultural centers in Buenos Aires, the Argentine Congress passed a bill approving the construction of the mosque, which drew criticism from members of the community who cited it as an example of Menem's tendency to favor pro-Arab or pro-Muslim ventures in Argentina, while failing to support other faiths with donations in cash or land.

Despite its size and international connections, until Menem's election as president in 1989, the Muslim population went largely unnoticed by the rest of Argentine society. Though Menem maintained his identity as a Catholic convert, his Arab background and family's continued ties to Islam brought the Muslim community into the public eye. As Menem raised the Muslim community to political prominence by adding members of the community, including his own family, to high-ranking positions within his cabinet, scandal and controversy also dominated his administration, resulting in a rejection of the Muslim community by certain sectors of Argentine society.³²

After the bombings in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s, anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment within Argentine society intensified. Argentina, which had until then considered itself safe from international terrorism, turned against the Islamic population.³³ Muslims and Arabs were stigmatized for their community's ties to the perpetrators of the AMIA attack,³⁴ most notably the leader of the Shi'ite Muslim community in Argentina, Mohsen Rabbani. Muslims in Argentina also faced considerable public discrimination following the September 11, 2001 attacks, according to Alexis El-Sayer of the *Centro Islámico de la República Argentina* (CIRA).³⁵ At that time, Muslims often hesitated to identify themselves publicly, though by 2012 the community had largely "overcome" this challenge and continued to practice Islam in peace, despite widespread ignorance about the Islamic faith and community in Argentina.³⁶

Though the Islamic community remains a small minority within larger Argentine society, the Arab community continues to grow and is now the third largest community in Argentina after Italians and Spaniards. Islamic leaders hope that the proliferation of Islamic/Arab cultural centers and increased Islamic influence on society, particularly in Buenos Aires, will help "create a new bond between Islam and Latin America"³⁷ and help spread a positive, unbiased image of Islam.

The Argentine government also makes an effort to help the Muslim community feel like a part of Argentine society. The Argentine Secretariat of Worship under the Office of Foreign Affairs maintains a close relationship with leaders of the Islamic community and seeks to promote religious harmony by sending government officials to religious celebrations of all faiths.³⁸ The Islamic community has seen the attendance of government officials, including ex-President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, at Muslim celebrations and events as “recognition... of our existence within Argentine society.”³⁹

The familiarity with which the Fernández de Kirchner administration treated the Muslim community can be attributed to the presence of a major cultural organization known as the *Federación de Entidades Arabes*, or FEARAB. Originally founded in 1972 to represent Muslim immigrant communities in Latin America,⁴⁰ the organization has offices throughout the region and its leaders maintain strong relationships with local governments. In Argentina especially, FEARAB leadership was successful in developing relationships with the federal government during the Fernández de Kirchner era.⁴¹ This access to high-ranking Argentine officials allowed FEARAB to supersede its original social and cultural spheres and become a political entity. This ascent is cause for concern because at least some of the leaders of FEARAB, the ranks of which include Abdul Karim Paz and Yussuf Khalil, maintain connections with Mohsen Rabhani’s Islamist network.⁴² A series of Argentine government wiretaps reveal that these individuals took advantage of the organization’s access to top Argentine officials to implement Iran’s political agenda and further extend Iranian influence in Argentine politics—resulting in the Kirchner government’s introduction of a controversial Memorandum of Understanding in 2013, under which the two countries agreed to work together to investigate the perpetrators of the 1994 AMIA attack.⁴³

ISLAMISM AND THE STATE

Argentina’s policy towards Arab or Middle East states has historically been rather ambivalent, particularly on controversial issues such as the Israel/Palestine conflict. As early as 1947, Argentina showed itself unwillingly to pick a side in the conflict, choosing to abstain from voting on the UN resolution that would partition Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state. This decision was most likely motivated by a desire to balance the interests of Jewish and Arab populations within the country and maintain Argentina’s position in international systems at the time. This was also seen in later policies in favor of Palestine in order to avoid oil embargos from OPEC nations and the subsequent adoption of more moderate positions toward Israel after public outcry from the Argentine Jewish community. Since, Argentina has typically sought to balance every gesture of support for Palestine with the same for Israel.⁴⁴

This duality of Argentina's stance toward Arab/Muslim and Jewish/Western issues became even more pronounced during the presidency of Carlos Menem, who offered to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict and extended links to Israel by becoming the first Argentine president to visit the country,⁴⁵ despite his ties to the Arab/Muslim community both in Argentina and abroad. Official attitudes toward Arab and Islamic elements were further confused by the revelation that Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi had contributed \$4 million to Menem's electoral campaign⁴⁶ and the president's "donation" of state property, valued at \$10 million, to the Saudi Arabian Islamic Affairs Department for the construction of what is today the Fahd center in Buenos Aires.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, Menem had terminated Argentina's cooperation with Iran's nuclear program in 1992,⁴⁸ the same year that the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed by a group linked to Iran and Hezbollah⁴⁹ and two years before the 1994 AMIA attack that led to a break in diplomatic ties between Argentina and Iran.

Argentina's relationship with Iran is one of the longest-standing in the region, beginning in 1902, but the 1992 and 1994 terror attacks in Buenos Aires resulted in a cooling of diplomatic relations between the two countries as Argentina sought extradition of the high-ranking Iranian officials linked to the attacks.⁵⁰ With the advent of the Kirchner government (2007-2015), however, Argentine policy shifted dramatically, abandoning its traditional pro-Western, pro-United States orientation in favor of warmer ties with anti-US regional governments such as Cuba, Venezuela and other "Bolivarian" states, as well as with Iran.

Energy deficits and mounting debt alienated Argentina from its formerly friendly Western allies, nudging the Kirchner administration toward "friendlier" governments in Venezuela and Cuba. The Chávez administration in particular served as a new political ally and source of economic support to Argentina and provided further incentive for Fernández de Kirchner to distance herself from the U.S.⁵¹

Iran took this shift as an opportunity to re-open relations with Argentina. In 2007, then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad allegedly asked Venezuela's Hugo Chávez to reach out to Kirchner with the aim of "changing Argentine policy and allowing Iran access to Argentine nuclear technology."⁵² The result was a gradual re-establishment of diplomatic ties between Argentina and Iran, a development that allowed Iran to increase its trade opportunities in the region and further strengthen its proxy terrorist network in the country.⁵³

As part of this process, then-Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman broke with the Argentine Jewish community in 2012 in order to pursue ties with Iran,⁵⁴ and Fernández de Kirchner offered to freeze the longstanding federal investigation into the AMIA bombing in exchange for expanded bilateral trade with the Islamic Republic.⁵⁵ This move was partly motivated by Argentina's increasing political and economic desperation, and its growing dependence on alternative sources of trade.⁵⁶ It had the effect of making Argentina one of Iran's largest trade partners in the hemisphere, providing

the Islamic Republic with long sought-after agricultural commodities.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, Argentina's dependence on oil and gas, which make up 90 percent of the country's primary energy sources, intensified its dependence on imports from Iran.⁵⁸ This warming of ties culminated with the announcement of the 2013 Memorandum of Understanding between Argentina and Iran,⁵⁹ which further normalized relations between the two countries.

This normalization proved to be short lived, however. Just half a year later, Argentina voted against Iran at the UN Human Rights Council,⁶⁰ and in 2014 Fernández de Kirchner announced the abrogation of the Memorandum due to lack of progress and internal opposition. A series of back and forth maneuvers followed, with Kirchner alternately courting the country's Jewish community and contesting a decision by the country's Federal Criminal Appeals Court that declared the MOU unconstitutional.⁶¹ This inconsistent attitude toward Iran remained in place until the end of her tenure in 2015.

Meanwhile, Argentina continued to develop relationships with other anti-Western Arab nations. In 2010, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad visited Buenos Aires and was warmly received by the President, who never acknowledged him as a dictator.⁶² In the years following, Foreign Minister Timerman would make various trips to Aleppo to meet with Syrian officials, arranged by pro-Iran Ambassador to Syria Roberto Aghad. This rapprochement and Argentina's reluctance to denounce the Syrian Civil War in late 2012 demonstrated an effort to maintain a positive relationship with a Syrian government closely allied to Iran.⁶³

The election of Mauricio Macri to the Argentine presidency in late 2015 signaled yet another change in Argentina's rather disjointed policy toward Iran. Macri expressed disgust at Iran's involvement in the AMIA case and the relationship Fernández de Kirchner's administration had developed with the Islamic Republic.⁶⁴ In the first weeks of his presidency, he ordered the withdrawal of the appeal filed by his predecessor's government regarding the federal ruling of the MOU's unconstitutionality.⁶⁵ Additionally, Macri called for the use of Mercosur's Democracy Clause to expel Venezuela from the economic bloc for its human rights abuses, thus striking another blow to Iranian influence in the region.⁶⁶ This signified a clear break from the previous administration's policies towards Iran and its anti-Western allies and set a precedent for Argentina's realignment with the United States, Europe, and Israel.

However, Macri's attitude towards other Middle Eastern and Arab states, particularly the Gulf States, has not been as clear. In the year since Macri took office in late 2015, the most notable of his actions toward the Middle East have included the signing of a controversial commercial treaty with Qatar, aimed at encouraging and protecting bilateral investment,⁶⁷ and the announcement that Argentina would accept at least 3,000 Syrian refugees in cooperation with the European Union.⁶⁸

This announcement did not indicate any intention to divert from the previous administration's policy toward the Syrian conflict. In fact, it built upon the creation of *Program Siria* (Syria Program) by the previous administration, in which Syrians affected or displaced by the country's civil war were granted residency in Argentina for up to two years.⁶⁹ Palestinian nationals that had been residing in Syria were also eligible to participate in this program.⁷⁰ Under Macri's administration, the refugee acceptance program has been augmented by the creation of the *Gabinete Nacional del Programa Siria* (National Cabinet for the Syria Program), an inter-departmental entity whose main goal is establishing guidelines for the country's reception of refugees and facilitating their social integration.⁷¹

Like his predecessors, Macri has demonstrated a certain level of ambivalence in his policies toward Arab and Muslim nations, attempting to balance criticism of one with support for another. His decision to accept Syrian refugees into Argentina is a continuation of that of the administration before him, which tended to favor the interests of its Arab and Muslim communities. The knowledge that Iranian terror agents have been operating within these communities and have used them to gain access to government officials, radicalize and recruit members, and raise funds puts Macri's decision in the spotlight as a potential security risk. However, his condemnation of Iran's influence and activity under the Fernández de Kirchner administration and his efforts to lessen the Islamic Republic's presence in Argentina since his election are cause for hope. Argentina is not yet free from the threat of radical Islamist terrorism, nor are its Arab and Muslim communities rid of the terror network still operating in their midst today, but Macri's reversal of a pro-Iran agenda and his rapprochement with Israel and Western allies is a step in the right direction.

ENDNOTES

[1] The Argentine national census does not record religious data, so statistics vary by source, with some reports citing Argentina as home to the largest Muslim population in Latin America (1,000,000 members) and others citing Brazil (35,000 to 1.5 million members). For more information, see the US Department of State International Religious Freedom Report for 2015, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper>.

[2] As described in the 2013 Nisman Dictum, the "export of the revolution" is Iran's official policy of extending its political-religious view beyond its borders. Alberto Nisman, Report on Terrorist Networks in Latin America, pg. 10, May 2013, accessed October 12, 2016, <http://albertonisman.org/nisman-report-dictamina-on-sleeper-cells-full-text/>.

[3] Stephen Johnson, Iran's Influence in the Americas (Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2012), accessed October 27, 2016, http://csis.org/files/publication/120223_Johnson_IranInfluence_ExecSumm_Web.pdf.

- [4] Ibid.
- [5] Alberto Nisman, 2013 Dictum, op cit., p. 59, 72, 180-181.
- [6] Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nisman, Office of Criminal Investigations: AMIA CASE; Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General (Argentina), October 25, 2006, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://www.peaceandtolerance.org/docs/nismanindict.pdf>.
- [7] Matthew Levitt, "Exporting Terror in America's Backyard," Foreign Policy, June 14, 2013, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/14/exporting-terror-in-americas-backyard/>.
- [8] Ibid.
- [9] US Department of State. "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992," accessed October 27, 2016, http://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/chron.html.
- [10] Nisman's report indicates that this role was merely a front; Rabbani was already a member of Iran's intelligence bureau upon his arrival in Argentina.
- [11] Alberto Nisman, 2013 Dictum, op cit., p. 56, 58-59.
- [12] Douglas Farah, Back to the Future: Argentina Unravels (Inter-American Institute for Democracy, 2013), 75.
- [13] Alberto Nisman, 2013 Dictum, op. cit.
- [14] Douglas Farah, Fixers, Super Fixers and Shadow Facilitators: How Networks Connect, (International Assessment and Strategy Center, April 23, 2012), accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20120423_Farah_FixersSuperFixersShadow.pdf.
- [15] Joseph Humire, After Nisman: How the death of a prosecutor revealed Iran's growing influence in the Americas, (Center for a Secure Free Society, 2016), 17.
- [16] Alberto Nisman, Complaint of Criminal Plot, p. 96, 2015, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://albertonisman.org/nisman-complaint-denuncia/>.
- [17] Humire, op cit., p. 19-20.
- [18] Ibid, 17.
- [19] Ibid.
- [20] El Día. "Eugenio Burzaco descartó presencia de miembros de Isis en Argentina," September 11, 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://www.eldia.com/el-pais/el-gobierno-detecta-argentinos-formados-por-el-estado-islamico-164431>.
- [21] Jerry Nelson, "ISIS to Argentina: We're Coming to See You," Huffington Post, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/isis-to-argentina-were-coming-to-see-you_us_57dfb7d0e4b0d5920b5b3054.
- [22] Pedro Brieger, "Muslims in Argentina," ISIM Newsletter 06/00: 33, accessed October 27, 2016, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17433/ISIM_6_Muslims_in_Argentina.pdf?sequence=1.
- [23] Chris Moss, "Latin America's First Mega-Mosque," Hispanic Muslims, accessed May 16, 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://hispanicmuslims.com/articles/other/openseyes.html>.

- [24] “Table: Muslim Population by Country,” (The Pew Center, January 27, 2011), accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/?utm_expnid=53098246-2.Lly4CFS-VQG2lphsg-Koplg.0.
- [25] The World Bank cites Argentina’s population at 41,222,875 people in 2010. For more information, please see World Bank population data, accessed December 9, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2010&locations=AR&start=2010&view=bar>.
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- [28] Rosemary Pennington, “Is there Islam in Latin America?,” Muslim Voices, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://muslimvoices.org/islam-latin-america/>.
- [29] Brieger, *op.cit.*, 33.
- [30] Moss, *op.cit.*
- [31] Clarín. “Se inaugura la mezquita más grande de Sudamérica,” September 9, 2000, accessed December 9, 2016, <http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2000/09/25/s-03801.htm>.
- [32] Brieger, *op.cit.*, 33.
- [33] Moss, *op.cit.*
- [34] Brieger, *op.cit.*, 33.
- [35] The Argentina Independent, *op.cit.*
- [36] *Ibid.*
- [37] Moss, *op.cit.*
- [38] “Argentina,” International Religious Freedom Report 2010 (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, November 27, 2010), accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148731.htm>.
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- [41] For more information on the FEARAB relationship with the Argentine government, see Humire’s special report *After Nisman*, *op. cit.*
- [42] *Ibid.*
- [43] *Ibid.*, 24.

- [44] Cecilia Baeza, "América Latina y la cuestión palestina (1947-2012)," *Araucaria Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades* 14/28 (2012): 111-131.
- [45] *Ibid.*
- [46] Brieger, "Muslims in America," 33.
- [47] Moss, "Latin America's First Mega-Mosque."
- [48] Noriega, *op.cit.*
- [49] The United States Department of State, "The Year in Review," *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992*, April 30, 1993, accessed October 11, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/review.html.
- [50] Ilan Berman and Joseph M. Humire, *Iran's Strategic Penetration of Latin America* (London: Lexington Books, 2014), 35, 81.
- [51] Berman and Humire, *op.cit.*, 82.
- [52] Roger F. Noriega, *Argentina's Secret Deal with Iran?*, (American Enterprise Institute), accessed May 16, 2016, <https://www.aei.org/publication/argentinas-secret-deal-with-iran/>.
- [53] Berman and Humire, *op.cit.*, 86.
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- [59] *Ibid.*
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- [63] *Ibid.*
- [64] Dana Chocron, "Argentina: A New Foreign Policy?," *Young Diplomats*, accessed October 10, 2016, <http://www.young-diplomats.com/argentinas-promised-foreign-policy/>.

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