In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the United Arab Emirates has come to be identified as significantly, if indirectly, involved in Islamic terrorism. Two of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were residents of the UAE, while another resided there.1 Nearly a decade after those attacks, much of the Arab world is in a state of upheaval, and the governments of two of the UAE’s Arabian Peninsula neighbors, Bahrain and Yemen, are facing severe challenges to their authority. Yet the UAE, to all appearances, remains calm. This is due in large part to the cultural setting in which the interpretation and practice of Islam have evolved in the UAE, as well as to the nature of the country’s leadership since its independence in 1971. The “father” of the UAE (and its president from the country’s founding in 1971 until his death in 2004), Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahyan, promoted and personified a conservative but moderate interpretation of Islam, which helped to legitimate government efforts to check and contain Islamic extremism. Since 9/11, the UAE has devoted serious efforts to countering Islamic terrorism, the extreme forms of belief that promote it, and the financial support that facilitates it. Yet while these efforts have been overwhelmingly successful, international concerns remain that terrorist plots could be carried out from or through the UAE, and that some terrorist financing taking place within the country remains hidden or unacknowledged.
The activity of Islamists in the UAE has been constrained by several factors, among them the generally moderate and non-political nature of the religion there, and the government’s close monitoring of Muslim organizations, especially those with political agendas. Moreover, the largest cohort of Muslims in the country are South Asian expatriates, who have been drawn there for job opportunities and are subject to expulsion for any behavior deemed threatening to state security. Finally, astute government distribution of the country’s vast hydrocarbon wealth has been effective in blunting the kind of discontent which might promote grassroots adherence to Islamism that challenges the writ of the state.
The Muslim Brotherhood
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood, although never recruiting more than a relative handful of members, had a degree of influence in the UAE, principally in educational institutions, which were staffed in large part by Egyptians. By the 1990s, however, whatever influence the organization exercised had largely dissipated.2 The 2008 defeat of the Brotherhood’s candidates in the Kuwaiti parliamentary elections reflected a general setback for the group in its attempts to gain a foothold in the Gulf, even as it continued to be ineffectual in the UAE. An Islamist commentator lamenting negative developments for the Brotherhood recently observed that, in the UAE, “despite some interesting developments among the cadres and the youth of the MB, intense security obstacles prevented them from doing much by way of renewing their thought or engaging in popular actions.”3 Indeed, indications are that the UAE government views the Brotherhood as a political entity whose true aim is to establish a theocracy; thus, the organization is outlawed.4 Given the stringent government controls imposed on it and the generally unpromising milieu in which it operates in the UAE, the Brotherhood is unlikely to exercise any considerable influence in the foreseeable future. As one analyst observed, “Islamist movements in the UAE, including those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, are generally non-violent and perform social and relief work.”5 Nevertheless, there are several other Islamist movements that operate or seek to operate in the UAE, which are potentially menacing.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted links between the UAE and the group responsible, al-Qaeda. Two of the operatives who carried out the attacks were Emiratis, another had resided there during the planning for the attacks, and the planners of the operation had frequently transited the UAE. A further connection stems from the UAE being one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (the others were Pakistan and Saudi Arabia).
Since 9/11, there have been no attacks carried out in the UAE or launched from its soil by al-Qaeda, but fairly numerous and credible threats have been discovered, although not always with a high level of certainty. The presence of al-Qaeda operatives has, however, been established. In November 2002, the suspected ringleader of the team that had attacked the USS Cole two years earlier in Aden, Yemen was captured in Dubai. In the same year, credible reports claimed that considerable numbers of al-Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan were UAE nationals and that welfare associations in Dubai and Fujairah had been encouraging young men to join terrorist groups. These associations were also accused of sending money to radical groups in Afghanistan and South Asia. Arrests occurring in 2004 suggested that Dubai continued to be a through point for al-Qaeda operatives.6 In July 2005, a new group calling itself “The al-Qaeda Organization in the Emirates and Oman” issued a strong threat against the rulers in the UAE if U.S. military installations in the country were not dismantled immediately.7
Three years later, the British government issued warnings of the risk of terrorist attacks in the UAE, likely connected to threats from al-Qaeda. The warnings prompted discussions in jihadi internet forums, which speculated about a possible secret understanding between al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with the UAE, whereby the latter would turn a blind eye to those organizations maintaining contacts and raising money in the UAE.8 American officials confirmed a report in 2009 that UAE authorities had broken up a major terrorist ring in Ras al-Khaimah that spring, which had been plotting to blow up targets in Dubai. In September of the same year, a Saudi tip led to interception in Dubai of explosives which operatives of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed to have placed on UPS and FedEx flights.9 Finally, in 2010, there were reports that a network of “semi-legal” mosques dominated by Salafi preachers posed a jihadi threat and suggested a threat from al-Qaeda. The reports, though coming from backers of Shaikh Khalid bin Saqr Al Qassimi, who is contesting the succession as ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, appeared credible, and fit a pattern of al-Qaeda linkage with the emirate initiated by Marwan al-Shehhi, the 9/11 hijacker and continued with the 2009 incitement noted above.
Despite these plots and threats, no terrorist group has succeeded in carrying out an operation in the UAE. Interestingly, some jihadi internet forum discussants have suggested that al-Qaeda’s failure to strike the UAE reflects lack of support for the organization, owing in part to the non-militant nature of Emirati fundamentalists, which in turn constrains al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit locals.10
The Taliban and Haqqani Network
Islamist activity involving South Asian residents in the UAE is significant, and reportedly has included support of terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. In October 2008, for example, a plot involving several individuals, including an Afghan, to provide funds to the Taliban was uncovered by national authorities. The U.S. government believes that the Taliban and the affiliated Haqqani Network are funded in part by donors in the UAE, drawing their support from the large Pashtun community there. The Taliban is also known to extort money from Afghan businessmen based in the UAE.11 However, neither the size of voluntary contributions to the Taliban nor the scope of forced aid extorted by them is publicly known.
The Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba reportedly received large amounts of money from Gulf-based networks, including funders in the UAE.12 There likewise appears to be a linkage between the UAE and terrorist activities carried out by the group against India; an investigation of the August 2003 bombings in Mumbai revealed a Dubai link, through which Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives in that emirate colluded with cells in India. Other urban terrorist attacks in India revealed a similar linkage. An important part of the equation is the set of operational ties between the Student Islamic Movement of India and militant student groups in the UAE, as well as elsewhere in the Gulf. Lashkar-e-Taiba developed out of the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, which has roots in both the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent.13
Of the UAE’s estimated population of just over 5 million, less than a fifth is made up of native Emiratis. Citizens are overwhelmingly Muslim, approximately 78 percent of them Sunni and 22 percent Shi’a, with a small Ahmadiyya Muslim community as well. About four percent of the total population is non-Muslim, made up of about 250,000 Christians and smaller numbers of Hindus, Buddhists, and others.14 The country’s constitution allows for freedom of religious practice “in accordance with established and accepted procedures, provided it does not disturb public peace or violate public morals.”15 The State Department has reported that “Non-Muslim religious leaders from within and outside the country regularly praised the country’s governmental and societal attitudes toward allowing all persons to practice their religions freely.”16 Sunni Emiratis adhere to the Maliki school of Islamic law, which is officially recognized in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and the Hanbali school that predominates elsewhere (except in Fujairah, where the Shafi’i school holds sway).17
Attitudes toward Islamic groups in the UAE are difficult to discern since there is no significant direct popular participation in government by these elements. While the constitution mandates freedom of speech, public assembly and association are still subject to government approval. Although the press is among the freest in the Arab world, it exercises self-censorship on sensitive issues, and the broadcast media are government-owned. Thus, attitudes concerning Islamic groups and their activities can be assessed mainly by inference rather than by consideration of explicit expressions of opinion.18 (The first step toward representative government was taken in 2006, when elections were held for selection of some of the members of the Federal National Council. The FNC’s powers are advisory and only a tiny percentage of UAE citizens, who themselves constitute under 20 percent of the total population, were eligible to vote).
Moreover, the identification of Islamist groups is itself somewhat problematic, because there is considerable overlap in the missions of organizations, notably in the areas of philanthropic and religious concern. Curiously, the government identifies fewer than three percent of associations in the UAE as religious.19 Many of the groups placed under the headings “cultural,” “folklore,” and “human services” are to one degree or another Islamic in orientation. 16.5 percent of associations are defined as “foreign.”
The sampling of Islamic groups examined below is broadly representative of those that are active in the UAE. This strata includes both organizations that are part of native Emirian society and those that belong to various expatriate Muslim communities. To the extent that UAE organizations are identified with the promotion of Islamic objectives, they generally reflect the conservative nature of Islam in the country. However, differences exist; organizations in Dubai tend to reflect the cosmopolitanism of that emirate, with its very large expatriate population, including more than 150,000 from Europe and the United States, while in Abu Dhabi they exhibit a generally more conservative nature in keeping with its character, and in Sharjah they reflect the ruler’s commitment to upholding the strong Islamic norms of that emirate.
Emirati Islamic Groups
The Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation was launched in 2007 by the prime minister and ruler of Dubai, who also serves as vice president of the UAE, with his personal donation of a $10 billion endowment (one of the largest charitable donations in history). Also in keeping with Dubai’s personality, the mission of the foundation is expansive—to be a knowledge hub in the Arab world with the ultimate aim of bridging the gap between the Arab region and the developed world, thereby promoting job creation and economic development. The Islamic component of the foundation’s mission is not explicit, but it is nonetheless significant. In the speech that launched the foundation, Sheikh Mohammed called for governments, business leaders, educators and others to promote an understanding of Islam’s tolerance and commitment to intellectual debate.20 In addition, a central element of the foundation is the Bayt ul-Hikma, designed to disseminate knowledge in the Arab world and named for the House of Knowledge that represented the apogee of Islamic science and learning in the Abbasid Empire of the Middle Ages.21
In Abu Dhabi, the more modestly funded Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation was established in 1992 with a $100 million endowment, and has a 2011 budget of $31 million. Its mission is more overtly aimed at advancing Islamic goals than that of the Al Maktoum Foundation, including the support of mosques, educational and cultural institutions, and hospitals and clinics, both in the UAE and in Islamic countries and communities overseas.22 (This foundation is not to be confused with the Zayed Center for Coordination and Follow-Up, created in 1999 as the think tank of the Arab League, and closed by Sheikh Zayed in 2003 after an international outcry over revelations that it had provided a platform for the expression of anti-Semitic and extreme anti-Israeli views).
The Tabah Foundation is a non-profit institution established in 2005 in Abu Dhabi that seeks to promote a more effective contemporary Islamic discourse to advance Islamic values and counter negative images of Islam. Funded by various institutions and individuals in the UAE, Tabah has recently entered into an agreement with the Diwan (Council of State) of the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to develop the Zayed House for Islamic Culture. Its most significant initiative would appear to be the work of its media department, comprising both a television and documentary film division.23 It also provides advice and consultation to other organizations. In 2010, the foundation published “Beyond Flak Attack,” a sophisticated essay directed at Muslim activists and scholars who seek to engage the mass media to try to balance its “predominantly negative” reporting on Islam and Muslims.24
In Sharjah, promotion of Islamic activities extends beyond the philanthropic to the commercial sector. Citing the importance of Islamic banking institutions, the chairman of the Sharjah Chamber of Commerce and Industry remarked that “It is important to reinforce Islamic trade all over the world and introduce diversified commercial products, Islamic funding and banking, and halal foodstuff. These all comply with sharia, which has gained greater global prominence.25
Islamic groups serving the Indian and Pakistani communities in the UAE
The very large Indian and Pakistani communities in the UAE are served by numerous organizations, each associated with varying degrees of Islamic activity. Estimates of the number of Indians in the UAE vary; the State Department has estimated as much as 1.75 million,26 although this seems quite high. A recent report indicated that there are some 60 social and voluntary organizations serving the predominantly Muslim Indian community. Reflecting the challenge of securing funding for the support of Indian organizations, the UAE Indian Islamic Centre, founded in 1971, was unable to initiate construction of a building until 2008 (it was dedicated in 2011). Despite the center’s name and predominantly Muslim membership, it involves all religious communities in its activities.27 By contrast, the Dubai Indian Islamic Centre, located in the emirate with the greatest number of Indian residents, while committed to promoting a wide range of non-religious goals, is more narrowly focused on its Islamic mission. Its members are exclusively Indian Muslims, and an important part of its mission is to “promote and propagate the ideal teachings of Islam,” apolitically and free of sectarian bias, through religious teaching centers, where modern subjects are included with religious education. Lacking an endowment, the center provides services through the financial support of sponsors who adopt specific projects.28 Finally, the Indian Islahi Centre in the Emirate of Ajman, established in 1979, is still more explicitly dedicated to advancing the cause of Islam. It is an “Islamic Da'wa (Call)” organization, working particularly among Indians from Kerala, conducting a range of activities designed to spread the message of Islam among both Muslims and non-Muslims.
By contrast, there are few Islamic organizations in the Pakistani community in the UAE. Most Pakistani organizations in the country are business or financial associations or are devoted to providing aid to earthquake and flood victims in Pakistan. However, there is an Ismaili Centre in Dubai, dedicated in 2003 by the Aga Khan, spiritual leader of the Ismaili community, whose followers in the UAE are Pakistani and Indian expatriates. The site for the center was a gift of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, ruler of Dubai. The Ismaili Centre, which opened in 2008, is meant to serve, in the tradition of Muslim piety, by promoting enlightenment and mutual understanding among the various elements of the Muslim world community. To that end, it carries out a program of cultural and educational activities.29
As the above descriptions suggest, there is little if any political aspect to the missions and activities of the Islamic organizations in the UAE, both those serving the Emirati community and those serving the large expatriate Muslim communities. None could be characterized as extreme in any sense. All would appear to fit well within the mainstream of moderate Islamic activity.
Sporadic signs of extremist activity do exist, however. In April 2010, the Federal Supreme Court sentenced five UAE nationals and an Afghan on charges of funding the Taliban, and government officials indicated that those individuals had also planned to establish an al-Qaeda network in the UAE. At the end of the year, two Pakistanis were put on trial, charged with collecting money and recruiting individuals for al-Qaeda.30 However, the scope of terrorist linkage with South Asia would appear to be limited, and the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula, while it cannot be dismissed, has failed to manifest itself as a credible danger to the state.
The government of the UAE funds or subsidizes nearly all Sunni mosques in the country, while about five percent are privately endowed. It employs all Sunni imams, and provides guidance to both Sunni and Shi’a clergy. Shi'a mosques are considered private, but may receive funds from the government upon request. The Shi’a community is largely concentrated in the emirates of Dubai and Sharjah, with the bulk of its members in the former.31 A number of new mosques have been built, or are under construction throughout the country. Notable among them are mosques in Fujairah and Ajman. The Shaikh Zayed Mosque of Fujairah, although located in one of the smallest and poorest of the emirates in the UAE, will be the second largest in the country when it is completed in 2012. Funded by the Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation of Abu Dhabi at a cost of $52.1 million, it follows in the mold of its namesake, the massive Shaikh Zayed Mosque in Abu Dhabi and the Grand Mosque in Dubai as an expression of local pride and the ruling family’s commitment to Islam. By contrast, the much more modest mosque recently opened in Ajman (designed to hold 1,500 worshippers, as compared to the Fujairah mosque’s 28,000) is being funded by a donation from Mr. Hamad Ghanem Al Shamsi, member of a distinguished and wealthy Ajman family.32
In December 2010, plans for four new Shi’a mosques were unveiled by the Khoja Shi'a Ithna-Ashari Jamaat (KSIMC) of Dubai, a private Shi’a religious philanthropy, with the sites for the structures given by the government of Dubai. The members of the Shi’a community, through a Shi’a endowment fund, the Awqaf Al Jafferiah, will raise the funds to construct the mosques.33 There is no evidence that political or extremist motives play a role in promoting the creation of new mosques in the UAE.
From its birth in 1971, the UAE has been supportive of moderate, apolitical Islamic activities, while opposing those that might pose a threat to the government. Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the father of the UAE and its president from inception until his death in 2004, embodied that philosophy both in his rule and in his personal life. He was generous in his support of religious leaders, thus arming himself and the state against attacks from secular or religious quarters.34 (It should be recalled that the chief threat to the UAE in the first years of its independence was secular radicalism in the region, especially as given expression by the Marxist government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PRDY), or South Yemen, and the guerrilla movements supported by the PDRY in their efforts to overthrow the government of the Sultanate of Oman, the UAE’s immediate neighbor.) Because of Zayed’s close and positive relations with the UAE religious leadership, and the lack of extremist Islamic activity in the UAE before the events of September 11, 2001, the UAE’s connections with those events was shocking and deeply embarrassing to Zayed and the UAE government.
Post-September 11, the government reacted promptly (albeit cautiously) to the threat posed by al-Qaeda. While the generally moderate nature of Islamic belief and practice in the Gulf and the UAE precluded broad support for the ideology of al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, popular antipathy for some U.S. government actions in the Middle East has somewhat complicated the government’s cooperation with the United States against Islamic terrorism.35 In 2002, under Zayed’s leadership, a contingent of UAE troops was deployed to Afghanistan to help in the struggle to unseat the Taliban, whose government the UAE had recognized before 9/11. Also in 2002, UAE authorities announced that they had arrested Abd al-Rahim al-Nashri, the apparent mastermind behind the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden.36
Following these early actions, in the past few years the UAE has taken significant steps to counter Islamic terrorism, generally winning praise from the U.S. government for its efforts. The State Department noted that the UAE’s preferred approach to the problem of Islamic extremism was to deny them a foothold rather than permit their participation in the political process.37 Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed also cited a threat from Islamic extremism to the country’s educational system, and sought to counter this by devoting considerable resources to modernizing curricula. Following the electoral victory of Hamas in 2006, the UAE informed the U.S. that it considered Hamas a terrorist organization and would not fund it unless Hamas renounced violence. However, it appears that funds continue to find their way from the UAE to Hamas to support housing projects, particularly the rebuilding of homes demolished by the Israeli army. A sense of the amount of financial support is conveyed by a March 2006 transfer of $20 million to Mahmoud Abbas to cover Palestinian Authority salaries and a commitment of $100 million for a Shaykh Khalifa housing complex, as part of humanitarian assistance promised in 2005. The UAE has long honored a commitment to provide financial assistance to the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza.38
There is also concern that the UAE, while acting promptly when provided with evidence of a terrorist threat, does not have a proactive strategy for dealing with it.39 The UAE likewise has exhibited considerable concern over the threat of Shi’a extremism, prompted largely by fears of infiltration by Iranian agents and Iran-linked sleeper cells that could sabotage critical UAE sectors, including energy and transportation. The existence of both was reportedly revealed in 2007 by a former Iranian consul in Dubai. Actions were taken in 2009, not against Iranians but against Lebanese accused of links to Hezbollah, Lebanon’s powerful Iranian-supported militia. The UAE deported 44 Lebanese men, who had worked both in the public and private sectors, for sending small amounts of cash to groups affiliated with Hezbollah. The UAE government denied that the action reflected anti-Shi’a discrimination, noting that it was denying government jobs to anyone with “ties to any suspect Islamic group", including those with links to “ideologically strident Sunni groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.”40
The case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which was infiltrated and used for criminal money laundering and terrorist financing before its collapse in 1991, foreshadowed the complex and difficult problems that gained prominence after 9/11, when the UAE, with U.S. support and urging, tackled the problem of the financing of Islamic terrorism. Al-Qaeda was able to use a correspondent banking network to transfer funds from the Dubai Islamic bank to accounts in the United States for use by the 9/11 hijackers.41 After 9/11, the UAE Central Bank took steps to counter money laundering. While refusing to ban the traditional hawala system of money exchange in wide use between South Asian expatriates in the UAE and their home countries, it imposed strict regulations on it and, in 2004, the bank hosted the Second International Hawala Conference to discuss with delegates from around the world more effective monitoring of informal money flows.42 While the UAE’s efforts against money laundering and terrorist financing have been significant, cause for worry remains. Particular attention focuses on Dubai and its large Free Trade Zone, because of its potential facilitation of a variety of criminal and terrorist activities, including the use of front companies, fraud, and smuggling, as well as exploitation of the hawala and banking systems. In 2011, the UAE reported that there had been a significant increase in the number of suspicious activity reports submitted by companies to the central bank for 2010 as compared to 2009. While this very likely reflects an improvement in the monitoring of money-laundering practices, the volume itself is cause for concern.43
 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 162, 231, and 168.
 “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis in the Gulf, July 2010,” on Web site of Almesbar.
 Marc Lynch, “MB in the Gulf,” Abu Aardvark blog, June 10, 2008, http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2008/06/mb-in-the-gulf.html.
 Samir Salama, “Muslim Brotherhood is Political and not Religious,” Gulf News, September 22, 2008.
 Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 2.
 Christopher M. Davidson, “Dubai and the United Arab Emirates: Security Threats,” British Journal of MiddleEastern Studies, 36, no. 3, December 2009, p. 444.
 Ibid., 446; reacting to the berthing of U.S. aircraft carriers in Dubai, after their planes had carried out missions to “bombard the Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan,” the organization stated that the UAE’s ruling families would “endure the fist of the mujahideen in their faces” if their demand was not met.
 Abdul Hamied Bakier, “An al-Qaeda Threat in the United Arab Emirates?” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus 5, iss. 25, July 1, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5025.
 “Terror Network Dismantled in U.A.E.,” Global Jihad, September 17, 2009; “AQAP Unlikely Behind UPS Plane Crash - US Officials,” Reuters, November 11, 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/11/11/idINIndia-52846520101111.
 Bakier, “An al-Qaeda Threat in the United Arab Emirates?”
 “US Embassy Cables: Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network Using United Arab Emirates as Funding Base,” Guardian (London), December 5, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/242756.
 Animesh Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network Targets India from the Gulf States,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 7, iss. 19, July 2, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35221.
 The Muslim sectarian breakdown and population estimate is 5,148,664, based on extrapolation from the UAE’s 2005 census. While estimates of the total population vary, most are close to this figure. See “United Arab Emirates,” Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, February 22, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html.
 The statement on religious tolerance in the UAE is from U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, November 17, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/index.htm.
 Malcolm C. Peck, The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 60.
 This may soon change since, in the fall of 2010, through an agreement with the Crown Prince Court, the Gallup Organization opened a new research center in Abu Dhabi to conduct inquiries into attitudes of Muslims around the world. While the initial report which it issued looks broadly at the state of Muslim-West relations, the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center will also perform research specifically on attitudes in the UAE.
 In 1998, the country’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs listed 103 associations, with only three described as “religious.” See Munira A. Fakhro, “Civil Society and Democracy in the Gulf Region,” 11th Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar: Security and Development in the Gulf Region, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Doha, Qatar, November 26-28, 2005.
 Speech of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, May 19, 2007, http://www.sheikhmohammed.co.ae/vgn.
 For a description of the foundation’s activities and the budget and endowment figures, see http://goodgate.org/causes/view/the-zayed-bin-al-nahayan-charitable-and-humanitarian-foundation.
 See Tabah’s newsletter, Clarity, iss. 1, Fall 2010, for a discussion of its programs.
 Nazim Baksh, “Beyond Flak Attack: A New Engagement with the Newsroom,” Tabah Foundation Tabah Essay Series no. 2, 2010|.
 Quoted in Islamic Research and Information Center, “Sharjah to Host the Islamic Trade Exhibition and Islamic Countries‘ Private Sector Consortium,” February 13, 2011, http://iric.org/newsdetail.asp?id=780.
 See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: United Arab Emirates,” March 16, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5444.htm.
 The number of organizations is given in “Indian Voluntary Organizations in UAE to Be Regularized,” February 24, 2011, http://thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/indian-voluntary-organizations-in-uae-to-be-regularized_100506770.html, and the Indian Centre opening is described in “Pratibha Patil Opens New Indian Islamic Centre Building in UAE,” Pravasi Today, November 19, 2010, http://www.pravasittoday.com/new-Indian-Islamic-centre-building-in-use.
 “Dubai Indian Islamic Centre,” n.d., http://diic.org/diic/content/about-us.
 Aga Khan, “Speech at the Foundation Laying of the Ismaili Centre in Dubai,” by His Highness the Aga Khan, December 13, 2003, http://www.iis.ac.uk/view_article.asp?ContentID=101003.
 “UAE Sentences Six Convicted Taliban Agents,” World Tribune, April 29, 2010, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_gulf0354_04_29.asp; See also “UAE Tries Two Pakistanis on Qaeda Links: Report,” Al Arabiya (Baghdad), December 28, 2010, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/12/28/131278.html.
 “United Arab Emirates,” in U.S. Department of State, 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom.
 See “Large Mosque Rising in Fujairah,” Fulairah in Focus blog, June 6, 2010, http://fujairahinfocus.blogspot.com/2010/06/large-mosque-rising-in-fujairah-uae.html; See also General Authority of Islamic Affairs & Endowments, “A New Mosque for 1500 Worshippers in Ajman,” March 15, 2011, http://www.awqaf.gov.ae/Newsitem.aspx?Lang=EN&SectionID=16&RefID=1092.
 See KSIMC of Dubai, “Awqaf Al Jafferiah Launches Fund Raising for 4 New Mosque Projects in Dubai,” December 14, 2010, http://dubaijamaat.com/latestnewsbloglayout/general-news/591-awqaf-al-jafferiah-launches-fund-raising-for-4-new.
 See Malcolm C. Peck, “Zayed bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan,” in Bernard Reich, ed., Political Leaders of the Middle East and North Africa (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1990), 517-518.
 See Malcolm C. Peck, Historical Dictionary of the Gulf Arab States, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2008), 144.
 Sultan Al Qassemi, “The Sacrifice of Our Troops and a Need for Civil Society,” The National (Abu Dhabi), February 28, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/the-sacrifice-of-our-troops-and-a-need-for-civil-society; Mohammed Nasser, “Military Expert: Al Qaeda Present in the Gulf... but not Active,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), December 29, 2010, http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=23598.
 “US Embassy Cables: Abu Dhabi Favours Action to Prevent a Nuclear Iran,” Guardian (London), November 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/59984.
 U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi, “Scenesetter for Counterterrorism Coordinator,” April 29, 2006, http://dazzlepod.com/cable/06ABUDHABI1725/2/.
 Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Sleeper Cells and Shi’a Secessionists in Saudi Arabia: A Salafist Perspective,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 7, iss. 18, June 25, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35182.
 See Peck, Historical Dictionary of the Gulf Arab States, 297; Steve Barber, “The ‘New Economy of Terror:’ The Financing of Islamist Terrorism,” Global Security Issues 2, iss. 1, winter 2011, 5, 9.
 Ibid.; “Middle East and North Africa Overview,” in U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 28, 2006), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64344.htm.
 “Huge Global Problem, Small UAE Improvement,” Money Jihad: The Blog Exposing Jihadist Financing, February 10, 2011, http://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/2011/02/10/huge-global-problem-small-uae-improvement/.