Tablighi Jama`at, or “[Islamic] transmission group,” is a vast, transnational Islamic propagation and re-pietization organization. As of the early 21st Century, it is estimated to be active in at least 165 nations. Its annual assembly in Tongi, Bangladesh, is larger than any other in the Islamic world except for the Hajj itself;1 and estimates of TJ’s membership range from 12 to 80 million.2 Officially apolitical and preferring word-of-mouth instruction to public written or online communiqués, TJ has heretofore flown largely under the analytical radar, unlike other pan-Islamic groups such as Hizb al-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood, which are much more political, higher-profile and overt. But TJ’s global presence and growing influence in both Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries make it arguably the modern world’s most dynamic Islamic group.
Tablighi Jama’at, or TJ, germinated in British-ruled India, emerging from the Islamic Deoband movement active in South Asia.3 From its inception in 1867, the Deoband movement fused some aspects of Sufism with the study of the hadith and strict adherence to sharia, as well as advocating non-state-sponsored Islamic da`wah (missionary activity).4 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Muslim minority in British India felt itself caught between the Scylla of the resurgent Hindu majority and the Charybdis of the small but British-supported Christian missionary agenda.
TJ’s founder, Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944), graduated from the central Deoband madrassa in 1910 and, while working among the Muslim masses of Mewat, India (just south of Delhi) came to question whether education alone could renew Islam.5 He eventually decided that “only through physical movement away from one’s place could one leave behind one’s esteem for life and its comforts for the cause of God.”6 Indeed, some have even described his movement, TJ, as the missionary arm of the Deobandis.7 Other Muslim groups in the subcontinent, notably the Barelvis,8 had previously developed the idea of itinerant missionary work—tabligh9—in order to counter Hindu (and Christian) conversions of Muslims, but it was Ilyas’ genius to teach that tabligh should be the responsibility of each and every individual (male) Muslim.10 He aimed to recapitulate the alleged piety and practice of Muhammad and his companions in the 7th century AD, and as such was concerned not just with Hindu or Christian inroads into the Muslim community but with stemming the rising tide of Westernization and secularization. Unlike other contemporary Islamic renewers, Ilyas did not believe that Islam could be reconciled with Western science, technology and political ideologies.11
Ilyas, in the mid-1920s, enjoined upon his followers the practice of gasht, “rounds” in Persian: going to those Muslims who lived near a mosque and summoning them to Quran study and prayer. Eventually (by the mid-1930s) a more detailed program of belief and praxis was promulgated by Ilyas; it included, above and beyond the five pillars of Islam,12 and belief in the usual Islamic doctrinal staples,13 the following:
- Islamic education (especially of children, at home),
- Modest Islamic dress and appearance (shaving the moustache and allowing the beard to grow long),
- Rejection of other religions,
- High regard for other Muslims and protecting their honor,
- Propagating Islam,
- Self-financing of tabligh trips,
- Lawful means of earning a living, and
- Strict avoidance of divisive and sectarian issues.14
The missionary methodology of TJ incursion into new territories is a fairly set one: an initial “probing mission” is followed by TJ entrenchment into several local mosques which are increasingly controlled by the organization and eventually either taken over by TJ or, barring that, supplanted by TJ-built or -controlled mosques.15 From these mosques the TJ teams teach their beliefs and practices to local Muslims, approaching first local religious leaders, then intellectuals and professionals, then businessmen and, finally, the lower levels of society.16
There is a typology of Islamic renewal/reform movements as either 1) emulative (adopters of Western ideas); 2) assimilationist (attempting to reconcile Islamic and Western concepts and practices); or 3) rejectionist (allowing only strictly Islamic answers to the challenges of personal and collective life).17 Tablighi Jama`at is clearly in the latter category, based on its promulgation of strict adherence to the Quran and sharia, as well as its emphasis on emulating the lifestyle of Islam’s founder, Muhammad. However, while undeniably conservative, even puritanical, whether TJ serves as an incubator for jihad remains the subject of some debate.
The movement teaches jihad primarily as personal purification rather than as holy warfare.18 This may be because, following Deobandi doctrine, TJ takes the utilitarian approach that martial jihad is not wise when the umma is weak, rather than because it disavows violent jihad altogether.19 In any event, because TJ eschews jihad of the sword currently, it has met with the disapproval of Saudi clerics, with TJ missionaries banned from preaching in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and a number of online Wahhabi fatwas listing TJ as a “deviant” group, along with Shi`ites.20 However, practical connections between TJ practitioners and acts of terror (such as the attacks in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi), as well as anecdotal evidence that Ilyas himself believed he was “preparing soldiers” for jihad,21 paint a more complex—and threatening—picture of the organization.
The available data today indicates that TJ, at least in the preponderance of locations around the world where it is found, can be considered ipso facto a passive supporter of jihadist groups via its reinforcement of strict Islamic norms, intolerance of other religious traditions and unwavering commitment to Islamizing the entire planet. TJ is thus both like and unlike its major transnational Islamic rivals: Hizb al-Tahrir (HuT) (dedicated to re-establishing the Caliphate); the Muslim Brotherhood (focused on expanding sharia’s scope in both the Muslim and non-Muslim world); and the Gülen Movement (devoted to re-establishing Turkish power in the Islamic, and greater, world in order to advance Islam). TJ is much less political than any of the above, and much more focused on personal Muslim piety. However, its eschewal of politics (at least publicly) has enabled TJ, in most venues, to escape suppression by wary government organs. Whether TJ ever decides to risk this virtual immunity from interdiction by transforming into an active supporter of jihadist movements remains to be seen.
Under Mawlana Yusuf (d. 1965), Ilyas’ son, TJ expanded out of India and Pakistan to much of the rest of the world, and expanded its mission from simply re-pietizing Muslims to making some efforts to convert non-Muslims to Islam.22 Most of the Muslim-majority nations of the world saw the infusion of some TJ presence between the end of World War II and the 1960s, with the exception of Soviet Central Asia.23 It would not be until the end of the Cold War, post-1991, that the “Stans” opened up to TJ teams. TJ has been perhaps most successful in Africa, where it is at work in at least 35 of the continent’s 52 countries.24
Tiny Gambia, in West Africa (whose 1.5 million people are 90 percent Muslim), may very well be the hub of TJ activity in that part of the continent.25 Present there since the 1960s, TJ did not gain much popularity until the 1990s, when its missionaries’ knowledge of English (spoken prevalently in Gambia as well as in India and Pakistan) and the global Islamic resurgence made many Gambian Muslims, especially its youth, more receptive to the organization’s agenda. Currently, some 13,000 Gambians are estimated to be involved with TJ, and the organization’s growth is worrisome enough to some Muslims leaders, steeped as they are in West Africa’s heavily Sufi tradition, that they have expressed fears of TJ coming to dominate the country.26
In 99-percent-Muslim Morocco, TJ was introduced in 1960 under the name Jama`at al-Tabligh wa-al-Da`wah (JTD), although it was not recognized by the government until 1975.27 While working on convincing Moroccan Muslims to re-Islamize their lives, JTD also (perhaps in emulation of Christian missionary groups, before their recent repression in the country) makes hospital calls upon sick Muslims. But TJ’s main focus is on increasing ritualized conduct—persuading Moroccans to eat, drink, prepare for bed and sleep, go to the market and even bathe in proper ways emulating the Prophet Muhammad.
TJ has also committed a number of teams to Mali, Mauritania and Niger,28 a three-country region of some 26 million people, the vast majority of them Muslim. In fact, the organization has become, arguably, one of the three most important foreign actors in the region (the others being al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, and the U.S. military). TJ has made a comeback from its low standing in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when the South Asian nature of the group led many in the Maghreb region to shun them for fear of inciting American retaliation. In fact, the government of Mali extradited 25 TJ members not long after the 9/11 attacks.29 Since then, however, TJ contacts have been made among some Touareg tribal leaders, who in turn have hastened to point out that the group’s activities are totally unconnected to global jihad.30
South Africa would seem an unlikely part of Africa for TJ work, considering that 80 percent of the nation’s 50 million people are Christian. But South Africa shares with India and Pakistan a legacy of British rule, and some two million of its people are of South Asian stock, of whom perhaps half are Muslim. TJ’s “Sufi-lite” orientation and its Deoband origins give it legitimacy with many South African Muslims—although the more Salafi/Wahhabi groups dislike any hint of Sufism and denigrate TJ for “un-Islamic” practices such as asking for Muhammad’s intercession and promoting the reading of books in tandem with the Koran. Many Muslims in South Africa, egged on by TJ, also became disenchanted with majority black (Christian) rule after rules were relaxed on abortion, prostitution and other “immoral” activities. All in all, the polarization of the Muslim community in Africa’s southernmost country was exacerbated, if not caused, by TJ.31
Eastern Africa is the continent’s main TJ stage, partly because of geographical proximity to the subcontinent but also because, like South Africa, there are substantial expatriate Indo-Pak communities there, particularly in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Perhaps one-third of Tanzania’s 44-million-person population is Muslim (but 90 percent or more on the islands of Zanzibar32 and Pemba). Kenya is home to about four million Muslims (out of a population of almost 40 million, mostly Christian) and Uganda’s 32-million-person population is also majority Christian, with some 12 percent of it Muslim. Uganda’s Allied Democratic Force, a Muslim separatist group, is alleged to have recruited from TJ.33
But TJ has been most visible in Tanzania, particularly on Zanzibar, where its message of “return to Islam” has been received as complementary to Wahhabi/Salafi ideology. These two strains of Islamic renewal have come together in the preaching of militant TJ members such as Zahor Issa Omar, who, from his base on Pemba, travels to mainland Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda to advocate jihad, reportedly supported by Saudi Wahhabi money and even khutbah (“sermon”) outlines.34 More traditionalist Tanzanian Muslim leaders consider TJ to be an intruder bringing a foreign brand of Islam, mainly because of the group’s opposition to full-blown Sufism.35 In fact, anecdotal claims that TJ serves as a conveyor belt, even indirectly, to Islamic terrorism,36 do gain some empirical support by the fact that two of the al-Qaeda terrorists indicted in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi—Khalfan Khamis Mohammad and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—were Zanzibaris previously involved with TJ.37
There is conflicting data on the relationship between the neo-Wahhabi al-Shabaab militia which controls much of southern and central Somalia and TJ. In 2009, a story surfaced that al-Shabaab had attacked a TJ mosque, killing at least five of its members.38 However, in mid-2010 Indian media cited at least one terrorism analyst who claimed that TJ “has been very active in Somalia, including sending terror fighters to Al Shabaab.”39
Aside from Africa, one of TJ’s major theaters of operations has been Southeast Asia—so much so, in fact, that the organization’s members active in the region no longer use Urdu or Hindi to communicate, but rather rely on the Malay or Indonesian languages.40 TJ has been active in Indonesia since 1952, and in its far-eastern province of Irian Jaya (West Papua, the western half of the island of New Guinea) since 1988.41 Originally a phenomenon of the large urban areas’ working classes there, it has increasingly penetrated the smaller cities, towns and villages.42
TJ has tried, with limited success, to exploit the Jakarta-supported transmigration of thousands of Muslims from the rest of Indonesia to heavily-Christian West Papua; as of 2009, only perhaps 1,000 Muslims had joined TJ there.43 TJ teams are stymied by indigenous Papu customs (especially the affinity for pork) and the large Christian missionary presence.44 TJ has ironically, and counterintuitively, been more successful in majority-Buddhist Thailand.45 In 2003, some 100,000 Muslims from Southeast and South Asia came to a mass TJ gathering at Tha Sala in Nakhon Si Thammarat province.46 In two decades, TJ has made inroads not only among the five percent of the country’s 66 million citizens who are Muslim, but even among Buddhists—one effective strategy has been to play up the Sufi, mystical side of TJ while also practicing asceticism similar to that of Buddhist monks. However, TJ activities have also polarized the Thai Muslim communities; many traditionalist Muslims quite dislike the long absence of husbands and fathers on TJ mission treks, while more modernist Muslims denigrate TJ members as “fanatic mullahs” who neglect their families and have given up on the world. However, TJ in Thailand gives every indication of being well on its way to creating an independent mosque network that can serve as an alternative to the existing national Muslim association created by the Thai government.
In TJ’s subcontinental home of Pakistan, at least one full-blown terrorist group, Jihad bi al-Sayf, appears to have developed directly from TJ influences.47 Furthermore, besides decades-old allegations that senior government and military leaders are members (and that CIA agents attempting to penetrate the group were actually converted to Islam),48 more recent stories suggest that the Pakistani Taliban are forcing singers and actors to join TJ—indicating, if true, a troublesome intersection between South Asian Islamic militancy and ostensibly peaceful Islamic missionaries.49
In the West, there may be as many as 150,000 TJ members in Europe, mainly in the UK (where they tend to be of South Asian descent) and France and Spain (where TJ members from North Africa predominate).50 TJ in the UK was behind the scuttled plans to build a mega-mosque in London near the site of the upcoming 2012 Olympics.51
In the United States, some analysts claim that there may be as many as 50,000 Muslims affiliated with TJ,52 and that the influential Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) cooperates with, and hosts, TJ teams and activities.53 TJ’s North American headquarters is alleged to be either at the al-Falah Mosque in Queens, New York,54 or at the Masjid al-Noor in Chicago.55 It is also asserted that TJ receives funds from Saudi Arabia, and that a number of prominent American Muslims have been linked to TJ (including “American Taliban” John Walker Lindh, the “Lackawanna Six” and al-Qaeda operative José Padilla).56
Upon Mawlana Yusuf’s death in 1965, Ilyas’ grand-nephew Mawlana In`am al-Hasan assumed leadership of TJ, and subsequently directed the group’s activities for the following three decades. Then, beginning in 1995, and for the next decade or so, the organization was supervised by a collective leadership based at Nizamuddin, New Delhi and consisting of Mawlana Sa`d al-Hasan (grandson of Yusuf), Zubayr al-Hasan (son of In`am) and Izhar al-Hasan (another relative of Ilyas’).57 In recent years, Mawlana Sa`d has moved to the fore, once again giving TJ a single spiritual leader.58 Yet it is also noteworthy that the world’s most famous TJ personality, officially, is not Sa`d but the group’s amir next door in Pakistan, Hajji Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab—who, according to Oman’s Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, is the 16th most influential Muslim on the planet.59
Despite the fact that “the Tablighis have apparently moved from a fringe phenomenon to the mainstream of Muslim society in South Asia,”60 they engender no small measure of opposition from other Muslims on their home ground. From one side, TJ is attacked by Barelvis, whose mystical Sufi leadership deems the group “a thinly disguised front for the Wahhabis”61 and is not above orchestrating armed attacks on TJ members. Some Barelvi propagandists even accuse TJ of being a tool of the British, Americans and Indians, employed to drain Muslims of jihadist zeal.62 From the other side, the Ahl-i Hadith groups charge TJ with abandoning the concrete concerns of the world for a vacuous mysticism.63 And Jama`at-i Islami, the Islamic political organization established by Sayyid Abu ala `Ali Mawdudi (d. 1979), considers TJ a threat to its own powerful position in Pakistani society, and disparages TJ’s alleged lukewarm attitude toward establishing a caliphate.64 At least some Islamic groups outside of South Asia appear even more ill-disposed toward TJ, evidenced by the fact that in October 2010 Pakistani intelligence was reporting that “four foreign militants have been assigned by their commanders to assassinate two prominent leaders of Tablighi Jamaat.”65
Finally, TJ does not always succeed in its attempts at winning foreign hearts and minds for strict Sunni Islam. In early 2010, almost a hundred members of the organization were arrested in Tajikistan and given lengthy jail sentences for running afoul of that country’s laws against miscreant versions of Islam.66 In perhaps the most famous example of a TJ setback, the group’s rather grandiose plans for a 40-70,000-person-capacity “mega-mosque” in Abbey Hills, Newham (adjacent to the 2012 London Summer Olympics site) were first scaled back, then abandoned, in the face of fierce opposition.67
Ultimately, TJ is perhaps the modern world’s most effective Islamic group at fostering pan-Islamic identity—one only has to be a Muslim to join and enter a “virtual transnational space” where every Muslim is immediately part of the Dar al-Islam.68 As such, TJ is both a help and a hindrance to more political and “extremist” Islamic groups—the former because it promotes and reinforces the entire non-Muslim world as “Other;” the latter because TJ can provide a feeling of Muslim solidarity sans sharia or the sword.
Yoginder Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama`at, 1920-2000: A Cross-Country Comparative Survey (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2002), 2-12.
 PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life, “Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe: Tablighi Jama`at,” September 15, 2010, http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Muslim-Networks-and-Movements-in-Western-Europe-Tablighi-Jamaat.aspx.
 Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama`at, 1920-2000, 2-77; See also Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., Travelers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama`at Movement as a Transnational Movement for Faith Renewal (Leiden: Brill, 2000), esp. “Introduction” and Chapter One, “The Growth and Development of the Tablighi Jama`at in India.”
 Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 725-26.
 Masud, Travelers in Faith, 6.
 Ibid., 7.
 Shireen Burki, “The Tablighi Jama`at: Proselytizing Missionaries or Trojan Horse?” Journal of Applied Security Research 8, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2013), 101.
 Founded by Ahmad Riza Khan Bareilly (1856-1921), the Ahl al-Sunnat (“Family of the Sunnah”) movement—popularly known as Barelvis or Barelwis—advocated Islamic renewal much as did the Deobandis, although Barelvis were (and are) “more inclined toward the emotional or magical,” according to Usha Sanyal, Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi: In the Path of the Prophet (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 129.
 In Arabic-speaking Islam, the word usually employed for such work is da`wah; but in Urdu, in India and, later, Pakistan, tabligh (“transmission, communication, propaganda”) came to be substituted.
 Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama`at, 1920-2000, 48.
 Ibid., 66ff.
 Profession of faith (“there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger”), fasting during the daytime during Ramadan, praying at the appointed five daily times, zakat (tithing 2.5 percent) and going on the Hajj once in a lifetime.
 Such as the infallibility of the Koran, the existence of angels and djinn, the standard eschatological doctrines about the Mahdi, the Dajjal, and the apocalyptic struggles at the end of time.
 Masud, Travelers in Faith, 10-11.
 Farish A. Noor, “The Arrival and Spread of the Tablighi Jama`at in West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies RSIS Working Paper, February 10, 2010, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP191.pdf.
 Masud, Travelers in Faith, 134-35.
 This paradigm is adapted from Albert M. Craig, et al., eds., The Heritage of World Civilizations. Volume II: Since 1500. Seventh Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice-Hall, 2006), 812-816.
 Barbara Metcalf, “‘Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” Social Science Research Council/After September 11, November 1, 2004, http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/metcalf.htm.
 Burki, “The Tablighi Jama`at: Proselytizing Missionaries or Trojan Horse?” 102-03.
 Yoginder Sikand, “A Critique of the ‘Tablighi-as-Terrorist Thesis,” n.d., http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/TablighiCritique.htm.
 Masud, Travelers in Faith, 106.
 Ibid., 121.
 Ibidem, 125-130.
 As extracted from http://tablighijamaat.wordpress.com/2008/05/13/worldwide-tablighi-markaz-address/.
 Marloes Janson, “The Prophet’s Path: Tablighi Jama`at in The Gambia,” Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World Review 17 (Spring 2006), 44-45.
 Ibid., 45.
 Masud, Travelers in Faith, 161-173.
 Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007), 141-166.
 Ibid., 151.
 Ibidem, 155.
 Goolam Vahed, “Contesting Orthodoxy: the Tablighi-Sunni Conflict among South African Muslims in the 1970s and 1980s,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23, no. 2 (October 2003), 313-334; See also Masud, Travelers in Faith, 206-221.
 Zanzibar was the power base of the Omani Sultans who had taken control of the coastal areas of East Africa and the lucrative Muslim slave trade in the late 17th century and in 1856 was made the capital of the Omani Sultanate there; as such Zanzibar has been, under German, British and then independent Tanzanian rule, a hotbed of Islamic political thought and aspirations.
 Gregory Pirio, African Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of Africa (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2007), 167ff.
 For example, Maalim Mohammad Idriss has stated that TJ and Wahhabism both pervert Islam and wrongly undermine Sufi traditions and practices. Ibidem, 168.
 Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “Tablighi Jamaat: An Indirect Line to Terrorism,” STRATFOR, January 23, 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/tablighi_jamaat_indirect_line_terrorism.
 Pirio, Radical Islam in the Greater Horn of Africa, IAQ, Inc., February 2, 2005, http://www.dankalia.com/africa/0101205023.htm.
 “Somalia: 5 Pakistani Preachers Killed Outside Tawfiq Mosque,” Huffington Post, August 12, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/12/somalia-5-pakistani-preac_n_257257.html.
 “Indian Jihadis in Qaida’s Somalia Arm?” The Times of India, August 23, 2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indian-jihadis-in-Qaidas-Somalia-arm-/articleshow/6399366.cms.
 Farish Noor, “On the Permanent Hajj: the Tablighia Jama`at in South East Asia,” South East Asia Research 18. no. 4 (Dec. 2010), 729-30.
 Noor, “The Arrival and Spread of the Tablighi Jama`at in West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia,” 1-10.
 Ibidem, 18.
 Ibidem, 14, 16, 22.
 Alexander Horstmann, “Inculturation of a Transnational Islamic Missionary Movement: Tablighi Jamaat al-Dawa and Muslim Society in Southern Thailand,” SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 22, 1 (April 2007), 107-131, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3413/is_1_22/ai_n29344399/.
 Burki, “The Tablighi Jama`at: Proselytizing Missionaries or Trojan Horse?” 106.
 B. Raman, “Dagestan: Focus on Pakistan’s Tablighi Jamaat,” South Asia Analysis Group, September 15, 1999, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers%5Cpaper80.html.
 “Taliban Threatens Pakistani Singers and Actors with Death,” Telegraph (London), March 15, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/4992107/Taliban-threatens-Pakistani-singers-and-actors-with-death.html.
 Pew Forum, “Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe: Tablighi Jama`at.”
 “Muslim Group Behind ‘Mega-Mosque’ Seeks to Convert All Britain,” Times of London, September 10, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article2419524.ece.
 Burton and Stewart, “An Indirect Line.”
 Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,” Middle East Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 3-11, http://www.meforum.org/686/tablighi-jamaat-jihads-stealthy-legions.
 Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, “What Is Tablighi Jamaat,” Family Security Matters, June 4, 2010, http://familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.6384/pub_detail.asp.
 Thomas Gugler, “Parrots of Paradise—Symbols of the Super Muslim: Sunnah, Sunnaization, and Self-Fashioning in the Islamic Missionary Movements Tablighi Jama`at, Da`wat-e Islami, and Sunni Da`wat-e Islami,” July 2007, 1, http://www.zmo.de/mitarbeiter/gugler/parrots%20of%20paradise.pdf; See also “Fact Sheet on U.S. Treasury Endorsement of Sharia Compliant Finance,” n.d., http://usastopshariah.wordpress.com/background/.
 Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat.”
 Gugler, “Parrots of Paradise—Symbols of the Super Muslim,” 1; Dietrich Reetz, “The ‘Faith Bureaucracy’ of the Tablighi Jama`at: An Insight into their System of Self-organization (Intizam),” in Gwilym Beckerlegge, ed., Colonialism, Modernity and Religious Ideologies: Religious Reform Movements in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 98-124.
 Reetz, “The ‘Faith Bureaucracy’ of the Tablighi Jama`at,” 109.
 Joseph Lumbard and Aref Ali Nayed, eds., The 500 Most Influential Muslims 2010 (Amman, Jordan: Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, 2010), 58-59.
 Ibid., 121.
 Yoginder Sikand, “The Tablighi Jamaat’s Contested Claims to Islamicity,” n.d., http://www.indianmuslimobserver.com/2010/06/issues-tablighi-jamaats-contested.html.
 “Intelligence Report: Foreign Militants Tasked to Assassinate Tablighi Jamaat Leaders,” Middle East Media Research Institute, October 29, 2010, http://www.thememriblog.org/urdupashtu/blog_personal/en/31633.htm.
 “Tajikistan: Jail Terms and Massive Fines—But for What Crimes?,” FORUM 18 News Service, May 19, 2010, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1446.
 Daniel DeHanas and Zacharias P. Pieri, “Olympic Proportions: the Expanding Scalar Politics of the London ‘Olympics Mega-Mosque’ Controversy,” Sociology 45 (2011), 798ff; “Rejected: the Mosque Plan That Grew So Big It Attracted the Wrong Sort of Crowd,” Independent (London), December 5, 2012.
 Noor, “On the Permanent Hajj: the Tablighia Jama`at in South East Asia,” 722, 732