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The August 2017 attacks in Catalonia were the first jihadist attacks on Spanish soil since the Madrid train bombing of March 11, 2004.1  Prior to the Catalonian attacks, the Spanish population had a perhaps-unwarranted sense of security. In the wake of the Barcelona car attack and the Cambrils attack several days later, that sense of security has vanished.   

Spain has increased its efforts to apprehend jihadists before they strike, both domestically and abroad.  Spain’s location as the gateway of the Mediterranean renders it a prime destination for immigrants from North Africa and for foreign radical elements embedded among them. To many such individuals, al-Andalus—the territory of the Iberian Peninsula lost by Islam in the fifteenth century—is no longer simply an abstract cause, but rather a concrete jihadist objective.2 

Level of Islamist Activity: 
Low
Islamist Activity: 

Until the late summer of 2017, Spain had not suffered a direct jihadist attack on its soil since the 3/11 train bombing in Madrid. This relative calm may have been due to the preventative efforts of Spanish law enforcement. Whatever the cause, this peaceful period ended in August 2017, when a group of jihadists attacked La Rambla in Barcelona and the village of Cambrils, causing Spain’s sense of security to evaporate overnight. 

The threat of radical Islamism has been present in the background of Spanish public affairs since the 2004 Madrid train bombing. Since that attack, 691 people have been arrested for crimes connected to jihadism, and over 90 percent of them have been charged with glorifying terrorism.3 However, a wide range of Islamist activity continues to exist in Spain. It includes a broad collection of Salafist actors; elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, and extremists affiliated with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. 

Numerous studies and investigations commissioned by city councils and the Mossos d'Esquadra (the autonomous regional civilian police of Catalonia) chronicle the advance of the Salafist movement in Spain.4 Salafists are generally concentrated in the regions of Catalonia and Murcia and their surrounding areas. Local newspapers in these areas have reported cases of Salafi imams publicly advocating for a radical, violent ideology in their communities. In one such instance, nine men in Reus sentenced a woman accused of adultery to death by stoning. The woman managed to escape, and the men were arrested by the local Mossos d’Esquadra.5 

Often, the most radicalized groups on Spanish soil maintain ties with different groups working in North Africa; for instance, the perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid train bombings were Salafists who received training abroad from the Moroccan Islamic Group (GICM). These connections open pathways to larger terrorist networks, including AQIM.6 In other instances, Spain has served as an important hub for foreign Salafist organizations, including the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), whose members frequently interact with the GICM as well as with radicals in Catalonia. 

The Muslim Brotherhood also has a significant presence in Spain. It became one of the more solidly-established Islamist organizations in the nation through its 1971 affiliation with the Spanish Muslim Association. Radical Muslim Brotherhood elements were especially active in Spain at the turn of this century; Abu Dahdah’s network, an al-Qaeda hub based in Madrid, provided funding to the Brotherhood while coordinating logistics for recruits transiting Europe.8 The Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEE) notes that the network played a significant part not only in the 9/11 attacks, but also in the attacks in Morocco in 2003 and Madrid in 2004.9 Although their activity has faded from the media spotlight, the Brotherhood maintains a serious presence in Spain, largely in the regions of Andalusia, Valencia, and Madrid.10

As can be easily inferred, the level of threat against Spain has not as been low as many believed simply because no attack has occurred since 2004. In reality, the intensity and persistence of jihadist threat has been quite high. This is due to two reasons: first, the relevance within jihadist ideology of the figure of al-Andalus, a territory that encompasses the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) and parts of Southern France. The region was under Muslim control from 711 to 1492, and is perceived as a golden moment in Muslim history. Second, and more prosaic, is the fact that Spain is the only western European nation with a land frontier with a majority-Muslim nation, thanks to the two Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Africa. Consequently, Spain looms in the collective jihadi imagination. 

In part due to this cultural interest, Spain faces a variety of threats affiliated with more directly violent groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS). First, both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have demonstrated a renewed interest in the Iberian Peninsula (known as al-Andalus when it was under Muslim governance between the early 700s and the late 1400s).  In January 2017, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri denounced the Spanish occupation of the North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla. He compared Ceuta and Melilla to other Muslim-majority regions under non-Muslim control, such as the Palestinian Territories (occupied by Israel), Kashmir (occupied by India), the Caucasus (occupied by Russia), and Xinjiang (occupied by China).11 This audio recording was al-Zawahiri’s first address since September 2015, and many analysts interpreted it as an attempt to challenge the Islamic State’s vehement discourse. 

The Islamic State has also indicated an interest in al-Andalus. In 2017, Rumiya, ISIS’s magazine, highlighted the prominence of Abdallah ibn Yassin, the founder of the Almoravid dynasty that ruled the region in the late 1000s and early 1100s. The April 2017 featured The Ruling of the Belligerent Christians, which exhorted present-day Muslims to remember the errors of rule in al-Andalus that allowed Christians to conquer the region.12 Furthermore, Amaq, ISIS’s public relations arm, launched a Spanish-language channel on Telegram, as did Al Haqq, also involved in ISIS’s public relations. Al Haqq likewise launched a website and a Twitter account in Spanish.  

The Department of National Security warned in its 2016 report that Spain has been directly threatened by ISIS on social media, which serves a recruitment tool, and that ISIS is looking for Spanish translators to spread its propaganda among Spanish speakers. The Ministry of Interior published information on the various places throughout Spain where jihadists had been arrested between 2012 and October 2016.13 The data set offered several interesting insights.  First, out of a total of 186 people arrested, one third of the arrests happened in the autonomous region of Catalonia, and 50 of that group were arrested in Barcelona. Madrid came in second in total number of individuals arrested, at 26. The autonomous city of Ceuta had 24 arrests, Valencia had 18, and Melilla had 10. In that period, there were also 10 detainees in the autonomous Community of Andalusia and 7 in the Basque Country.14

Jihadi activity in Spain has varied widely. Domestically, Spain has a small population of jihadists recruiters and financiers, as well as jihadis who planned attacks on Spanish soil. On the international stage, Spain has contributed foreign fighters to the conflict in Iraq and Syria, some of whom have returned to Spain. 

Recruiters work either within the Muslim community or online. In February 2016, Hamed Abderrahman Ahmed, the only Spanish national to be detained in Guantanamo, was arrested along with three of his followers. Another group took over the dismantled cell and its new participants were arrested in November 2016. One of the participants was commissioned by ISIS to recruit children as “Cubs of the Caliphate” (Ashbal al-Khilafa).15 This was not the only recruitment effort to specifically target children. In October 2016, the Civil Guard in Ibizia arrested two Moroccan imams for radicalization and activities in support of ISIS. Their efforts targeted children at Maslid el-Fatah, a facility registered as religious center in the town of Sant Antoni de Portamany.16 In November 2016, Moroccan Mohammed Akaarir was imprisoned for self-indoctrination for terrorist ends.17 The National High Court’s Third Chamber for Criminal Matters sentenced him to two-and-a-half years for his support of ISIS on social media. After serving his sentence, he will also be expelled from Spain for six years.18 In November 2016, 26-year-old Fouad Bouchihan in Roda del Ter (Barcelona) and 19-year-old Ilyass Chentouf in Madrid were sent to prison for social media activity in support of ISIS.19

A February 2017 CNP report describes the case of a 41-year-old Moroccan who was a veteran of jihadi wars in Chechnya and Syria, and who recruited people for Jabhat al-Nusrah and Syria. He was eventually arrested, and his last recruit joined ISIS in 2015.  Furthermore, the Civil Guard arrested two Moroccans, aged 25 and 27, accused of indoctrination and enrollment via the Internet, successfully recruiting several people willing to journey to the Caliphate.20 In April 2017, the CNP arrested a 29-year-old Spaniard in Ceuta, nicknamed. The Poison, for being a member of ISIS. His wife and three other individuals had been arrested in November 2016, all four accused of radicalizing and indoctrinating minors. At the beginning of July 2017, a 31-year-old Moroccan man was arrested by the Civil Guard in Operation Tahmil in Madrid. He was accused of propaganda work on the Internet and social media that included terrorist manuals.21 Finally, in July 2017, the CNP arrested a Spaniard, of Palestinian descent, in Barcelona for glorifying terrorism and participating in a terrorist organization.22

There are jihadis who go beyond recruitment and raise money for terrorist organizations. The Civil Guard arrested two of the El Jelaly brothers on these grounds in July 2016, and a third in March 2017. The brothers had raised funds for ISIS.23 The Civil Guard also dismantled a complex business network dedicated to jihadist financing in June 2017. Using 24 Danish shell companies with subsidiaries in Melilla, amassed nearly eight million euros in recent years. The network has sent at least ten jihadis from Spain, Denmark, and Germany to conflict areas.24 

Some Spanish jihadists have sought to attack Spain domestically. The Civil Guard arrested two jihadis in January 2017 in connection with their possession of a submachine gun and three machetes.25 In May 2017, a joint operation of National Police Corps (CNP) and the Moroccan intelligence service arrested three would-be jihadis. Two other men were sentenced to jail time later that month, in part due to one’s intention of becoming a suicide attacker.26 In June 2017, the CNP arrested Moroccan Rachid El Omari over his plans to organize a massacre inspired by the Manchester attacks. At the time of his arrest, he had 27 of ISIS’s manuals, one of them entitled Combatant Inghimasi and Suicide Operations, which prepares jihadis for martyrdom.27 A four-member ISIS cell was dismantled in Majorca in June 2017, as it crafted a plan to stab pedestrians in public.28 

In August 2017, one jihadi successfully attacked La Rambla, a major street in Barcelona. Moroccan Younes Aboyaaqoub drove a van into a crowd, killing 14 and injuring 130 others. Abouyaaqoub fled the attack on foot, then killed another person as he stole the victim’s car. Four days later, police killed him in Subirats, a village near Barcelona.

Spain, like many countries around the world, has had a problem with its citizens traveling to Iraq and Syria to become foreign fighters. Comparatively, Spain’s problems with foreign fighters have been more limited than other European nations. The Soufan Group estimates that 204 Spaniards have left Spain and gone to Iraq or Syria.29  In March 2015, the Spanish Criminal Code was reformed to criminalize any attempt to travel abroad for terrorist purposes, including destabilizing institutions in other countries or for training.30 This reform gave law enforcement agencies new flexibility in handling foreign fighters. 

Finally, despite the efforts of law enforcement services, some individuals do reach Iraq or Syria and then return to Spain. Given the returnees’ training and combat experience, the police arrest any returning fighters immediately. In January 2017, the Civil Guard arrested a Dutch jihadist and extradited him to the Netherlands. Later that month, the CNP arrested two Moroccan returnees with the help of the Moroccan Territorial Security Directorate (DGST).31 A number of other returnees have been arrested, as have the wives of jihadis. Assia Ahmad Mohamed, widow of ISIS jihadist Mohamed Hamduch, arrived in Spain after her arrest in Turkey as she attempted to return to Europe. 

 

Islamism and Society: 

According to the Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España (Union of Islamic Communities in Spain, or UCIDE), Spain’s Muslim population as of December 2016 numbered 1.9 million.32 Of this population, 41 percent are ethnic Spaniards, 39 percent are ethnically Moroccan, and the remainder comes from  immigrant communities throughout the Middle East and Africa.33 The largest Muslim populations reside in Andalucía in the south, Valencia in the east, Cataluña in the south, and Madrid in the center of Spain.34 Cataluña’s population is the biggest, at over 500,000. Perhaps consequently, there have been some tensions over the role of Muslim citizens in the community. A dozen Catalan towns became the first locales in Spain to ban the burqa and the niqab in municipal buildings. Lleida, a city in Western Catalonia whose population is a full 25 percent Muslim, is at the epicenter of this movement. Beyond banning the niqab, its mayor shut down the city’s lone mosque because there were allegedly too many Friday worshippers. In February 2012, angry townspeople began accusing Lleida’s Muslims of poisoning dogs in revenge.35 Such regional strife has only been magnified by Catalonia’s historic secessionist attitudes and Spain’s recent economic woes. 

Intense friction over access to mosques is not limited to Catalonia, however. Rather, it is widespread among rural Spanish communities. Between the mid-1990s and 2012, there were 60 registered disputes between Muslim communities and their Spanish neighbors over the construction of mosques.36 Riay Tatary, president of UCIDE, has angrily protested what is perceived as a segregationist movement to “exile” mosques by relocating them to areas outside of city and residential neighborhoods.37 The most publicized incident of this nature occurred in 2012 in Torrejon, a town of 120,000 (of which Muslims comprise nearly 10 percent). The Muslim citizens of the town purchased land to expand the city’s mosque, at the time located near the town’s center. However, angry protests and petitions from the rest of the town’s residents, as well as a demonstration by the anti-immigration Platform for Catalonia, induced the municipal authorities to revoke the building permit and change the site to one near an industrial park outside of town.38 In other instances, residents have strewn pig’s blood and pork meat over potential mosque sites in a deliberate attempt to permanently contaminate them in the eyes of Muslims.39 While revealing a measure of grassroots fear in some areas, these acts have the potential to alienate the moderate Spanish Muslim community, even turning some towards radicalization and retribution.

Yet simultaneously, Spanish society has shown remarkable openness to the victims of the 2015 refugee crisis, regardless of their religious affiliation. Under the EU’s redistribution plan, Spain agreed to accept 15,000 resettled refugees to ease the load on Greece and Italy—a departure from the administration’s original figure of just under 3,000, likely due to the pressure of Spanish grassroots organizations urged on by Prime Minister Mariano Brey’s left-wing political rivals.40 Unlike their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, Spanish groups professing a complete rejection of Islam and Muslim immigrants—including Plataforma x Catalunya, Spain 2000, and the newly arrived PEGIDA (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident,” a German movement that launched its Spanish branch in 2015)—have been unable to gain significant traction.41  

It is vital to note that the majority of Spanish Muslims reject the use of violence and consider themselves well integrated into the broader Spanish community.42 However, for the minority that does not share these feelings, the blend of isolation and xenophobia that they experience is dangerous. Since the Muslim community in Spain is primarily made up of immigrants, it encounters many obstacles to integration: unfamiliarity with the Spanish language, lack of documentation, an unusually high percentage of unmarried men, and frequent unemployment. All of these factors have the potential to increase frustration and estrangement, consequentially increasing the risk of radicalization.43 As the Spanish government struggles economically, the resulting social chaos will likely cause increased perceptions of deprivation and insularism among each community—promoting more xenophobia, which will in turn promote more isolationism—which may only make the fractures between the two communities worse. 

 

Islamism and the State: 

One of Spain’s more unique counter-terrorism strategies has been to expel suspected jihadis from Spanish territory, even in cases when people’s trials had not concluded, or when people had been acquitted of the charges against them. The Ministry of the Interior has expelled over a hundred alleged jihadis who had not been convicted of a crime since the 3/11 attacks.44 One prominent example is Nouh Mediouni, an Algerian allegedly involved in an AQIM cell. After ten months in prison, Mediouni was released due to a lack of incriminating evidence. The Secretary of State then expelled Mediouni from Spain, citing national security concerns. Mediouni’s lawyer appealed, but the Supreme Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to ban Mediouni, if not convict criminally.45  

Another tool in Spain’s counter-terrorism efforts is the close diplomatic relationship that the nation maintains with Morocco. Morocco is undeniably a significant source of the jihadists that threaten Spain. However, Morocco has committed to working with Spain to prevent terrorist attacks and to jointly track and arrest suspected jihadists. This joint work allows Spanish authorities and Moroccan authorities to merge their capabilities and be more effective on the whole.  

In spite of the effects of economic crisis, potential Catalan secession, and paralyzing political deadlock, the Spanish government under the leadership of Rajoy has nevertheless managed to pursue an effective counterterrorism strategy in terms of immigration and border control. Spain helped found the Global Counterterrorism Forum in 2011 and maintains an inter-ministerial Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) working group, described by the U.S. State Department as “tied closely to the fight against illegal immigration and the integration of existing immigrant communities.”46 Spain has also stepped up its cooperation with other Western countries through mechanisms such as the U.S. Immigrant Advisory Program and increased access to Europol information databases on terrorism and organized crime.47 

While trying to maintain a policy of religious neutrality, the federal government has adopted an assertive stance in pursuit of jihadist cells, with varying degrees of success. In July 2015, the country’s criminal code was updated to “improve its legal framework to more effectively counter the movement of foreign terrorist fighters to conflict zones, better pursue suspected terrorists without clear affiliation to a known criminal organization, and curtail terrorist preparatory activities online.”48 This legal step—which Amnesty International denounced as so vague that they would be not only ineffective but also an infringement on basic human rights49—was likely a response to harsh critiques over the cases described above of multiple terrorist suspects that have been released from Spanish prisons due to excessive punishment or lack of evidence.50 An inability to convict is an unfortunate consequence of the aggressive policies of quick intervention in cases of suspected terrorism, which was a policy established in 2004 after the attacks in Madrid. In many instances, the police arrest a suspect without having the necessary evidence to guarantee a conviction. 

In tandem, Spain has adopted a National Counter Radicalization Strategy, which is promulgated by the national Center for Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Intelligence (CITCO). This strategy recognizes that radicalization occurs at the local level and attempts to directly address the causes for grievance posed by, for example, the closure of almacabras or lack of access to mosques.51

Given the recent attacks in Catalonia, Spain’s relative calm has been shattered. For the first time since the panic surrounding the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, the Spanish government and population are more aware of the potential threat posed by jihadist actors. Given the Iberian peninsula’s significance in Islamic tradition, it is safe to assume that jihadist groups will continue to demonstrate interest in Spain in the future.  

 

Citations: 

[1] The author, Rafael Bardaji would like to express his gratitude to the Strategic Studies Group (GEES) team working on terrorism for sharing the data from their report The Jihadi Threat Against Spain (release forthcoming).
[2] In a post-9/11 broadcast, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri termed the loss of Andalusia a “tragedy.” For more, see Rafael L. Bardaji and Ignacio Cosidó, “Spain: from 9/11 to 3/11 and Beyond,” in Gary J. Schmitt, ed., Safety, Liberty, and Islamist Terrorism: American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2010).
[3] Based on the annual memoir by the State Prosecutor, Justice Ministry, Madrid.
[4] Ferrán Balsells, “El salafismo se hace con el control de cinco mezquitas en Tarragona [Salafism takes control of five mosques in Tarragona],” El País (Madrid), June 21, 2010, 31.
[5] “Un ‘juicio’ islamista condeno a una mujer a morir por adultera en Reus [An Islamist ‘trial’ condemns a woman to death in Reus],” El Periodico.com, December 5, 2009, http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/sociedad/20091205/juicio-islamista-condeno-una-mujer-morir-por-adultera-reus/print-235772.shtml.
[6] See “Marruecos desarticula un grupo terrorista vinculado al 11-M [Morocco arrests terrorist cell connected with the March 11, 2004, attacks],” La Vanguardia (Barcelona), March 3, 2010, 17.
[7] C. Echeverría Jesús, “La conexión paquistaní se consolida también en España [The Pakistani connection also solidifies in Spain],” Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES Analysis, January 23, 2008, www.gees.org.
[8] Aaron Mannes, “El Once de Marzo: A Familiar, Maddening Scene,” National Review Online, March 12, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/node/209873/print.
[9] Jose Maria Blanca Navarro and Oscar Perez Ventura, “Movimientos Islamistas en España [Islamist Movements in Spain],” Insituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, January 11, 2012, http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2012/DIEEEM012012_Movimie....
[10] “Movimientos Islamistas en Espana.”
[11] “El máximo líder de Al-Qaeda llama a reconquistar Ceuta y Melilla,” Diario de Navarra, January 8, 2017, p. 3.
[12] See Centro de Análisis y Prospectiva (CAP) de la Guardia Civil: Yihad: Un análisis de Rumiyah nº 9, 2017, p. 8.
[13] Balance del terrorism en España 2016, Cuadernos Centro Memorial de Las Víctimas del Terrorismo 2016, pp.99-100.
[14] “Un tercio de las detenciones por yihadismo desde 2012 fueron en Cataluña,” [“A third of detentions for jihadism since 2012 were in Catalonia,”] El País, October 18, 2016, https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/10/18/actualidad/1476790225_493925.html.
[15] Melchor Sáiz-Pardo, “La célula de Ceuta captaba niños para convertirlos en ‘carne de cañón,’” [The Ceuta cell captured children to convert them to ‘cannon fodder,’”]Diario Sur, November 10, 2016.
[16] Melchor Sáiz-Pardo, “Los imanes detenidos en Ibiza radicalizaban a niños en un centro autorizado por Justicia,” Diario de Navarra, October 26, 2016, p. 6.
[17] “Detenido en Irún un camionero marroquí que residió en Barañáin,” Diario de Navarra, December 1, 2016, p. 3.
[18] BALÍN, M.: “Primer condenado en España por hacer la ‘yihad mediática,’” Diario de Navarra, December 2, 2016, p. 5.
[19] “La juez envía a prisión a los dos yihadistas detenidos el pasado sábado,” Diario de Navarra, November 22, 2016, p. 6.
[20] “Dos detenidos en Badalona por captación de yihadistas,” 20 Minutos, February 8, 2017, p. 4.
[21] “Otro detenido por difundir propaganda yihadista,” Gente, June 1 2017; Melchor Sáiz-Pardo, “Las aplicaciones para móvil del Estado Islámico llegan a España,” Diario de Navarra, 5 de julio de 2017, p. 5.
[22] “Un detenido por enaltecimiento y apoyo a yihadistas,” 20 Minutos, July 13, 2017, p. 2.
[23] “El yihadista de Gerona es hermano de tres yihadistas,” Diario de Navarra, March 16, 2017, p. 4; Melchor Sáiz-Pardo, “Un yihadista detenido en Gerona tenía tres hermanos terroristas en el Estado Islámico,” Norte de Castilla, March 16, 2017, p. 29.
[24] “Detenido en Melilla yihadista por la captación y envío de combatientes,” La Vanguardia, June 23, 2017.
[25] Melchor Sáiz-Pardo, “Los dos yihadistas arrestados en Ceuta tenían en un zulo un subfusil y tres machetes”, Diario de Navarra, January 14, 2017, p. 5.
[26] “Cárcel para los dos yihadistas,” Diario de Navarra, May 26, 2017, p. 6;“España mantiene su nivel de alerta pese a la riada de detenciones,” Diario de Navarra, May 24, 2017, p. 16.
[27] Melchor Sáiz-Pardo, “El juez sostiene que El Omari buscaba organizar una matanza en Madrid,” Diario de Navarra, June 24, 2017, p. 2.
[28] Melchor Sáiz-Pardo, “La célula de Mallorca planeaba un apuñalamiento masivo en la plaza de Inca,” Diario de Navarra, July 1, 2017, p. 5.
[29] Richard Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees, October 2017, http://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017.pdf.
[30] María Ponte, “La reforma de los delitos de terrorismo mediante la Ley Orgánica 2/2015”, Análisis GESI, 11/2015.
[31] “Detenido en San Sebastián un captador de combatientes para el ISIS,” El País, January 16, 2017.
[32] Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, “Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana,” Observatorio Andalusí, December 31, 2017, http://observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf.
[33] Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, “Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana.”
[34] Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, “Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana.”
[35] Such reports are still unsubstantiated. See Dale Hurd, “Under Siege? Spain resists Islamic invasion,” CBN News, February 12, 2012, http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2012/february/under-siege-spain-resists-islamic-invasion-/.
[36] Alonso, “The Spread of Radical Islam in Spain: Challenges Ahead,” 480.
[37] “Spanish Muslims denounce the ‘exile’ of their mosques,” El País (Madrid), June 3, 2013, http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2013/06/03/actualidad/1370260356_229615.html.
[38] Guy Hedgecoe, “Local mosque row a Spanish problem,” The Irish Times, July 10, 2012, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/local-mosque-row-a-spanish-problem-1.532693.
[39] Alonso, “The Spread of Radical Islam in Spain: Challenges Ahead.”
[40] “Citizens Pressure the Government of Spain to Welcome in More Refugees,” The Local, September 9, 2015, https://www.thelocal.es/20150909/citizens-pressure-spanish-government-to....
[41] “Far-right extremist parties find support across Europe,” Public Radio International, November 30, 2012, http://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/far-right-extremist-parties-find-support-across-europe.html.
[42] Alonso, “The Spread of Radical Islam.”
[43] Kern, “The Islamic Republic of Catalonia.”
[44] Melchor Sáiz-Pardo, “Las expulsiones sumarias, una nueva arma legal contra la yihad,” Diario de Navarra, January 8, 2017, p. 2.
[45] Sáiz-Pardo, “Las expulsiones sumarias, una nueva arma legal contra la yihad.”
[46] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011.
[47] Kern, “The Islamic Republic of Catalonia.”; See also United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf.
[48] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.
[49] “Spain: New Counter-Terrorism Proposals Would Infringe Basic Human Rights,” Amnesty International, February 10, 2015, http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/spain-new-counter-terrorism-pro....
[50] Kern, “Islamic Supremacy Rears its Head in Spain.”
[51] Ministerio del Interior, “Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta [National Plan to Combat Violent Radicalization],” 7-8, 2015, http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/10180/3066463/CM_mir_PEN-LCRV.pdf/b57166c1-aaaf-4c0d-84c7-b69bda6246f5%20