The General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) began its reporting on domestic recruitment for jihad after it became clear that two young Moroccans linked to the al-Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven were killed by Indian troops in Kashmir in January 2002. That December, the AIVD published a memo entitled Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend.¹  In it, the Service concluded that “the phenomenon of recruitments in the west for the violent Islamic war forms an intrinsic part of a globally spreading radical Islamic movement.”²  Based on their investigation, the AIVD deduced that Islamist recruitment in the Netherlands represents the “first tangible illustrations of a tendency, closely related to a stealthy entrance of a violent radical Islamic movement in Dutch society.”³  Finally, the Service concluded that “the Islamists involved are indeed aware of the ‘favorable’ polarizing effect of Islamist-inspired violent activities. Such violent activities promote the prejudices of the Dutch population about all Muslims. As a result thereof Muslims also increasingly get the idea that they are alienated from the Dutch society and the chance that they become susceptible to radical ideas becomes bigger.”⁴  

When Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn was murdered in 2003, the Dutch elite were relieved that the murderer was discovered to be a radical animal rights activist rather than an extremist Muslim. A year on, however, the November 2004 murder of filmmaker, politician and activist Theo Van Gogh revived the specter of Islamist militancy in the Netherlands. However, it was not al-Qaeda or another international Islamist terrorist movement that killed Van Gogh. Rather, the assailant, Mohammed Bouyeri, was a highly educated young man who grew up in the Netherlands and was radicalized there; a true homegrown terrorist. (Bouyeri was given a life sentence, and is now held in a maximum security prison.⁵ ) 

In the days after the murder of van Gogh, the situation in the Netherlands became tense. At least twelve mosques and two Islamic schools were torched; Molotov cocktails were thrown at a mosque and an explosion hit two Islamic schools linked to the radical Fourkaan Mosque in Eindhoven. In response, at least seven churches and six schools were torched.⁶  These disturbances prompted the Dutch government to begin dealing in a new and more serious way with radical Islam in its permutations among the various Muslim communities within the country.

Turks
Turks make up the largest group of Muslims in the Netherlands. The majority are believed to be Sunni Muslims, although recent research suggests that about 40 percent of Turks in the Netherlands may in fact be Shi’ites of the Alevi school.⁷  The main Muslim organizations within the Turkish community are Diyanet, which is run by the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the non-governmental Milli Görüs movement, which has its headquarters in Cologne, Germany.⁸  When surveyed in 2000, Diyanet controlled 130 mosques, and the Milli Görüs 43.⁹  

The Turkish government was for decades hostile to the Islamist and German-based Milli Görüs. The group was never under the control of the secular Turkish government, which historically was suspicious of its Islamist tendencies. Milli Görüs was never explicitly active in Dutch politics but retains a power base within the closed Turkish community, and their influence continues to grow. More recently, Milli Görüs has become more politically active and is participating in pro-Gaza and anti-Israel demonstrations. 

In recent years, and especially since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002, the differences between government-controlled Diyanet and the Milli Görüs have begun to evaporate. Both groups have now been likened to the Turkish version of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the Netherlands, both Diyanet and the Milli Görüs are cooperating in umbrella organizations like the Council for Mosques (Raad voor Moskeeën) or the Contact Body Muslims (with the) Government (Contactorgaan Moslims Overheid).¹⁰  The German leadership of Milli Görüs is now under investigation by German authorities for embezzlement of funds and other criminal charges, and also for support of terrorist organizations.¹¹  This case likely will have spillover implications for the Dutch Milli Görüs organization.

The Kaplan or Tebliğ movement is an offshoot of Milli Görüs. In the Netherlands, it controls three mosques and is headquartered in the southeastern town of Oss. The movement is also called the Kalifat movement—a reflection of its aim to restore the old Ottoman Caliphate. Its tone is far more radical than that of Milli Görüs. The group is known to have received money from Middle Eastern sources, specifically from radical Egyptian cleric Yusuf Qaradawi, who has long been connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.¹²  Tebliğ’s leader, Metin Kaplan, was convicted by a German court for incitement to murder in November 2002, and served a four year sentence. He was subsequently extradited to Turkey, where he was sentenced to life in prison for planning to violently overthrow the Turkish government.¹³  The Tebliğ movement historically has not been strong in the Netherlands, however, and since the imprisonment of its leader the organization has experienced difficulty obtaining financing. 

The radical pan-Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) has its main following among highly educated young Turkish men. The group is especially strong in the Rotterdam area, but its number of followers is assessed to be in the low hundreds. In mid-2009, the country’s National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism reported that the HT was trying to extend its influence in the Netherlands and that their main vehicle was the Amsterdam Islamic student organization Al Furqan.¹⁴  

Moroccans
A number of dynamics may be having a negative effect on the integration of the Moroccan community into Dutch society. In its 2001 annual report, the Dutch National Security Service outlined that “a key question is whether the Moroccan representatives and interest organizations… actually represent the group they claim to represent and whether they are using hidden agendas. Such a hidden agenda might be dictated by the Moroccan government or by certain political, religious or other interests.”¹⁵  “[F]or nationalist and mainly financial reasons,” the report concluded, “the Moroccan government still does not want to loosen its grip on the Moroccans abroad.”¹⁶   

After 9/11, it was determined that a small number of Dutch citizens were willing to actively support or carry out violent terrorist activities, and that most of them were Moroccans. On the surface, this group appeared to have integrated in Dutch society, but “some turn[ed] out to have such radical, anti-Dutch and anti-western ideas that they are willing to participate in violent terrorist activities,” the AIVD wrote in its 2002 Annual Report.¹⁷  The radicalization within the Moroccan community is said to develop not only within mosques but also in homes.

The Moroccan Arrahmane mosque in Amsterdam has become the headquarters of the Tablighi Jamaat in the Netherlands. The Tablighis normally urge others to convert to their ultra-orthodox version of the Islamic faith, and are in principle an apolitical movement. The AIVD saw reasons for concern, however, “because the Jamaat Al-Tabligh Wal-Dawa may further the social isolation and radicalisation of segments of the Moroccan community.”¹⁸  Within the Arrahmane mosque a power struggle is being fought today between the mosque’s executive committee and a group of “moderate Muslims” who object to the Tabigh preaching at their mosque. The executive committee defends the organization’s weekly use of the mosque by arguing that it was bought with money from donors from Saudi-Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates who support the Tabligh.¹⁹  In recent years, the Tabligh has been seen more and more as an incubator for aspirant terrorists. Recruits are rumored to have used the Tabligh to get from European countries into Pakistan, where they were then picked up and disappeared into the Federal Administered Tribal Areas to be trained in jihadi training camps.²⁰ 

Salafis
From the mid-1980s until 2001, Salafism was able to build its infrastructure in the Netherlands largely without hindrance.²¹  40 percent of Dutch mosques are Moroccan, and Salafis are estimated to have access to around 30 percent of those—or around 15 percent of all Dutch mosques.²²  Salafi lectures at these institutions generally draw around 100 people apiece.²³  Salafi centers are the main places of radicalization in the Netherlands and the main centers of Salafism are the el-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam, al-Waqf al-Islami (al-Fourkaan mosque) in Eindhoven, the as-Sunnah mosque in The Hague, and the Islamic Foundation for Education and Transmission of Knowledge (ISOOK) in Tilburg.²⁴  Imams at these mosques preach a radical Islamist creed aimed at young Muslims, according to the AIVD, and “create a climate of intolerance within which these young people may become susceptible to radicalization and even to recruitment for the jihad.”²⁵  

The al-Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven is the oldest Salafi institution in the Netherlands and many prominent orthodox Muslim leaders have emerged from it. Ahmad Salam, the most influential Salafi preacher in the Netherlands (who likewise has a following in Germany) was an imam and trustee of the al-Fourkaan mosque before he founded his own mosque (ISOOK) in Tilburg. Mohammed Cheppih, the founder of the Poldermosque in Amsterdam and chairman of the Dutch chapter of the Muslim World League, also has a connection to the al-Fourkaan mosque, with his father serving as a trustee. Yahia Bouyafa, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Netherlands, was once a trustee of the Foundation for Islamic Elementary Schools in Eindhoven which is linked to al-Waqf al-Islami. One of the influential young Salafi preachers in the Fourkaan mosque is the Dutch convert Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven, who was an inspiration to Jason Walters, one of the members of the Hofstad group, the primary homegrown jihadi group in the Netherlands.

The leaders of the mosques in The Hague, Amsterdam, and Tilburg together form the board of the Foundation for the Islamic Committee for Ahl-Sunnah in Europe. This foundation is part of a European network of political Salafis which is run from Saudi Arabia by the Syrian Salafi leader Adnan al-Arour.²⁶  Arour spoke a few times during “Islamic conferences” at the ISOOK mosque in Tilburg and in the al-Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven. The conferences at the al-Fourkaan mosque were attended in 1999 by half-a-dozen members of the so-called September 11th “Hamburg cell” and their inner circle.²⁷  Another mosque rumored to have been visited by at least three of the 9/11 hijackers—Ramzi Binalshib, Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi—in mid-1999 is the El-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam.²⁸  Two young men who were attending services in the al-Fourkaan mosque were killed in Kashmir in 2002. One was a son of one of board members of the mosque.²⁹  One of the board members of al-Waqf al-Islami which controls the Fourkaan mosque is Adil Hamad Abderrahman al-Husayni, mentioned in the “Golden Chain” document of possible funders to al-Qaeda.³⁰ 

Salafis appear to have made a strategic decision not to undermine their standing in the Netherlands by insisting that potential jihadists not conduct their activities within Europe. Interestingly, the Salafi mosques have a multinational membership base, in contrast to many of the regular Moroccan or Turkish mosques. Muslims from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa and Dutch converts all visit the Salafi centers.³¹ 

In the face of government pressure, a change in tactics is taking place among Salafists in the Netherlands. There is evidence that a new generation of Salafi preachers is being trained, with a clear goal: they emphasize dawa (proselytization) and want to expand the faith among non-practicing Muslims. These young “traveling” Salafi preachers hold frequent lectures in 30-40 mosques and youth centers.³²  And their audience is growing. According to the U.S. intelligence community, “[t]he number of locations, lectures and active preaching at least doubled between 2005 and the first half of 2007.”³³  Salafists also have been known to take over more moderate and loosely organized Moroccan mosques. They are willing to sow discord within the mosque, drive out imams and eventually take over when they are strong enough.³⁴  This new generation of preachers is often born and raised in the Netherlands and preach in Dutch, giving them a large advantage in reaching Dutch converts.

The Muslim Brotherhood
Although not a grassroots movement in the Netherlands, the Muslim Brotherhood is growing in power. Most of this growth can be attributed to its chairman in the Netherlands, Yahia Bouyafa.³⁵  Around 2006, Bouyafa was able to convince authorities in the Slotervaart quarter in Amsterdam to allow him build a mosque.³⁶  This is the first mosque of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in the Netherlands (FION), the umbrella organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Netherlands.³⁷ 

The Muslim Brotherhood in the Netherlands is growing in influence, supported by the organization’s European umbrella, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE). The personal ambitions of chairman Bouyafa appear to be to gain more political influence and take over the representation of the Muslim community in the Netherlands. With the help of the Europe Trust (the European financial vehicle of the Muslim Brotherhood based in Birmingham, England), its Dutch spin-off, the Europe Trust Netherlands, was able to buy its own real estate in The Hague and begin the construction of a mosque in Amsterdam.³⁸  In both cases, the sources of funding for these projects, over two million Euros, went undisclosed. 

As part of his political ambitions, Bouyafa has worked to become chairman of one of the two government-approved organizations that represent Muslims in a dialogue with the government. Bouyafa is currently the chairman of the heterogeneous Contact Group Islam (CGI). This group was created as a counterweight to the Sunni-dominated Contact Body Muslims Government (CMO). The CGI was to represent Shi’a Muslims, Alawites, Ahmadiyya and Sufi groups, but after the Bouyafa took over it too came under Sunni control. The CMO is highly influenced by the Turkish Milli Görüs. Now both organizations that represent Muslims in a dialogue with the Dutch government are Sunni-dominated and highly influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

According to one assessment of Islam in the Netherlands, “Whereas today many of the Dutch majority population support the idea of migrants adopting Dutch norms and values, the migrants themselves aspire to a combination of independent cultural development.”³⁹  But it has become increasingly evident that the value gap between the Dutch majority and the migrant minority is significantly greater than in other countries. While “[t]he majority have developed remarkably uniform, progressive ideals,” a significant conservative Muslim immigrant minority has not—placing it in conflict with broader Dutch society. As a result, the country as a whole “is losing its ability to cope with cultural differences.”⁴⁰  

In 2004, the country’s official statistics bureau estimated that there were nearly one million Muslims residing in the Netherlands, accounting for 5.8 percent of the total population.⁴¹  In 2007, these estimates were revised downward, to 857,000 Muslims or 5 percent of the total population.⁴²  These numbers, however, account only for those Muslims legally in the Netherlands; the illegal population is much harder to quantify, but is believed to be in the thousands.⁴³  

The two largest groups of Muslims in the Netherlands are Turks (nearly 325,000, or 38 percent) and Moroccans (over 260,000, or 31 percent). Other large groups of Muslims come from Suriname (34,000), Afghanistan (31,000), Iraq (27,000), Somalia (20,000), Pakistan (18,000), Iran (12,000), and Egypt (12,000). Lastly, the number of native Dutch that are Muslim stands at around 12,000. This group consists of converts and children belonging to second-generation Muslims with a foreign background.⁴⁴ 

The number of mosques in the Netherlands is estimated to be around 550.⁴⁵  The mosques are identified by nation. The Turkish mosques number 211, followed by the Moroccan mosques with a total of 150. Smaller numbers of mosques are associated with Suriname (35), Pakistan (10), Somalia and Sudan (10), Afghanistan (5), Bosnia (5), the Moluccan islands and Indonesia (5), Egypt (3) and Tunisia (1).⁴⁶  Notably, most Dutch mosques and Islamic organizations are organized by ethnicity, which raises questions about whether there is an organized “Muslim community” in the Netherlands, or in fact several.⁴⁷ 

After the murder of film director and activist Theo van Gogh in 2004, the Dutch government increased its pressure on Salafi centers in the Netherlands. Public prosecutors didn’t find enough evidence to close these centers outright, so the Dutch government launched a program to disrupt them as much as possible.⁴⁸  Three imams of the al-Fourkaan mosque were declared personae non grata and deported from the country. The government strategy remains to isolate dangerous radicals, disrupt radicalization and identify radical activities at an early stage and address them. Another goal of the government is to strengthen the voice of moderate Muslims that resist radicalization, and to strengthen the bonds between Muslim immigrants and Dutch society, particularly its democratic political system.⁴⁹  

The attacks on the Madrid mass transit system in 2004, and the disorganized European approach that followed, were the primary reasons for the Dutch government to jumpstart its policies against terrorism. A new body, the National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (NCTb), was created, tasked with a clear mission: “to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and to take prior measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts. The NCTb is responsible for the central coordination of counterterrorism efforts and ensures that cooperation between the parties involved is and remains of a high standard.”⁵⁰  The main focus of the NCTb became de-radicalization, and one of its first major projects became an operation in which the different government and law enforcement agencies began to “disrupt” the work of the main Salafi centers in the Netherlands.⁵¹ 

This effort was part of the larger project of de-radicalization applied domestically by the Dutch government.⁵²  De-radicalization is also being promoted through the use of law enforcement officials and social workers familiar with local conditions in various towns and villages. Such an approach, however, has proved to have limited utility; most of the radicalization in the Netherlands is known to happen in small study groups at home and through the Internet.⁵³  

According to the latest, December 2009, report of the AIVD, there have been some successes in the fight against Islamism in the Netherlands, but de-radicalization efforts can boast far less progress. A core of motivated potential jihadis in the Netherlands remains, and could become active at any time.⁵⁴  The AIVD also sees signs of a recent stagnation of the Salafist movement in the Netherlands, but it is as yet too early to report a real, sustained change in the trend.⁵⁵