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Historically, the Netherlands has been a country renowned for its religious tolerance. In the Golden Age of the 17th and 18th centuries, the Republic of the United Provinces served as a haven for Jews and Protestants fleeing persecution in other parts of Europe. Muslim immigrants began to join their ranks in the late 19th century. Decades later, as it sought cheap labor during the 1960s, the Dutch government actively encouraged immigration from Indonesia and Suriname, both Muslim-majority countries and former Dutch colonies.  Such days, however, have long since passed; ideological conflicts abroad now serve as magnets for aspiring Dutch jihadists, while xenophobia and the looming threat of Islamic terrorism have driven the adoption of increasingly restrictive immigration and asylum policies. In spite of Dutch efforts to proactively counter radicalization and encourage integration, this social transformation has allowed Islamists to push the political envelope and expose the value gap between the Dutch majority and its immigrant Muslim population.

Level of Islamist Activity: 
Low
Islamist Activity: 

In December 2012, the Office of the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) assessed the national threat level as “limited,” with little chance of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands or on Dutch interests abroad.1 Yet only a few months later, in March 2013, NCTV’s chief Dick Schoof warned of increasing radicalization among Dutch youth. He declared that nearly 100 so-called “jihadi travelers” had departed the Netherlands for Syria, intending to join the civil war there. Their experience in the hostilities was likely to make them “highly radicalized, traumatized and with a strong desire to commit violence, thus posing a significant threat to this country.”2 The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) has also reported that terrorist financing activities and the dissemination of jihadist propaganda is currently taking place in the Netherlands in support of al-Shabaab, rendering Somalia yet another (albeit less popular) destination for would-be jihadists.3 As a result of these trends, in March 2013 the government elevated its terror threat level from “limited” to “substantial.” 

The Dutch government’s fear of individual operators traveling abroad to wage jihad far predates the Syrian conflict. In fact, multiple Dutch nationals traversing Europe were arrested in the early 2000s, allegedly on their way to fight with other radical Muslims on behalf of the separatists in Chechnya.4 In January 2002, Indian troops in Kashmir killed two young, “well-integrated” Dutch-Moroccans with ties to Eindhoven’s al-Fourkaan mosque. The AIVD, alarmed by this proof that Dutch citizens could indeed be lured into jihad, began to investigate domestic recruitment by radical Islamic elements.5 That December, the AIVD published Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incitdent to Trend.This memo concluded that, “the phenomenon of recruitments in the West for the violent Islamic war forms an intrinsic part of a globally spreading radical Islamic movement.”7 Based on its investigation, the AIVD deduced that Islamist recruitment in the Netherlands represents the “first tangible illustrations of a tendency closely related to a stealthy entrance of a violent radical Islamic movement in Dutch society.”8 

It did not take long for the Dutch public to begin sharing these concerns. For many, the brutal murder of filmmaker, politician, and activist Theo Van Gogh in November 2004 finally gave form to the specter of Islamist militancy in the Netherlands. The assailant, Mohammed Bouyeri, was a highly-educated young man who was both raised and radicalized in Dutch society—a true homegrown terrorist. Public anger intensified rapidly in the days that followed van Gogh’s murder. At least twelve mosques and two Islamic schools were torched, another was bombarded with Molotov cocktails, and two more schools linked to Eindhoven’s Salafi al-Fourkaan mosque were victims of explosions. Angry mobs counterattacked, torching at least seven churches and six schools in response.9 Whereas 12 percent of Dutch voters considered terrorism to be a primary threat to the country in the fall of 2004, more than 40 percent did only one year later.10 The chaos prompted the Dutch government to strengthen its anti-terror legislation and build a strategy to counter domestic radicalization, recommending a commitment to judicial intervention in situations that were likely to lead to violence, criminal activity, or a large-scale rejection of the Dutch democratic legal system.11 

A primary target of this new strategy was the Hofstadgrouep, or the Hofstad Network. Counting Mohammed Bouyeri among its most infamous members, the group was an autonomous radical cell formed in the Netherlands in 2002. The AIVD reported that the group never received significant financial support from outside networks, nor did it appear to possess a “coherent strategy.”12 Bouyeri’s arrest and the manhunt that followed swept up eight of the Hofstad Network’s other primary personalities. Many, including Dutch convert Jason Waters (also known as Abu Mujahied Amrik), maintained significant ties to the Salafi preachers of the al-Fourkaan mosque and other radical institutions. Since the jailing of the group’s principal leaders in 2005, the AIVD has regarded the Hofstad Network as in decline, even defunct, but notes that the potential still exists for similar groups to form and foment, further endangering Dutch society.13 

When tied to specific ethnicities or nationalistic causes, small radical groups may appeal to the multiple Muslim minority communities—particularly Turkish and Moroccan—that reside in the Netherlands. One such example in recent years was the Kalifatsstaat movement, headquartered in Cologne, Germany. Its name an invocation to reinstate an Ottoman Caliphate across Europe, Kalifatsstaat dedicated itself to the restoration of an Islamist state in Turkey.14 The group’s most recent leader was Metin Kaplan, a Turkish militant raised in Germany who had reportedly received funding for his organization from Middle Eastern sources. In November 2000, a German court convicted Kaplan for inciting murder, and he served a four-year sentence. He was later extradited to Turkey, where authorities sentenced him to life in prison for his plans to violently overthrow the country’s former, secular government.15 Historically, the movement had only a small presence in the Netherlands, and since Kaplan’s imprisonment, the organization has had difficulties obtaining financing. However, given the large Turkish minority residing in the Netherlands, many fear that the activity of such groups threatens the peaceful integration of minorities into their host culture. Similarly, while some authors dispute the “radical” labeling of the schools and followers of Turkish scholar Fethullah Gülen, the Dutch government investigated the movement’s presence in the Netherlands in 2008. The finding that Gülen-inspired schools promoted “anti-integrative behavior” prompted the government to significantly reduce the level of funding it had previously provided to the movement.16  

The radical pan-Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir also maintains a small presence in the Netherlands. The group is especially strong in the Rotterdam area, where it has gathered a following among highly educated young Turkish men. Although the number of its followers is assessed to be in the low hundreds, the Dutch National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism reported in 2009 that Hizb ut-Tahrir was trying to extend its influence in the country through the Amsterdam-based Islamic student organization Al Furqan.17 

Although the majority of Moroccan immigrants appear to have integrated well into Dutch society, “some turn out to have such radical, anti-Dutch and anti-Western ideas that they are willing to participate in violent terrorist activities,” the AIVD wrote in its 2002 Annual Report.18 The Moroccan Arrahmane mosque in Amsterdam has since become the headquarters of the Dutch Tablighi Jama’at. Although Tablighi Jama’at is in principle an apolitical movement, the Dutch authorities have expressed concern that its ideology may further the “social isolation and radicalization” of vulnerable elements within Moroccan immigrant community.”19 Even within the Arrahmane mosque, the mosque’s executive committee clashed in 2003 with a group of moderate Muslims who objected to the preaching of Tabligh doctrine at their mosque. The executive committee defended the organization’s weekly use of the mosque by arguing that it had been constructed using funds from donors in Saudi-Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, all of which are countries that support Tablighi Jama’at.20 Internationally, in recent years, the movement has come to be seen more and more as an incubator for aspiring terrorists. Many European recruits are rumored to have used Tablighi connections as a pathway into Pakistan, where they then disappeared into the jihadi training camps of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.21   

Salafists
From the mid-1980s until 2001, Salafism was able to grow largely unhindered in the Netherlands.22 Salafists are estimated to have access to around 15 percent of all Dutch mosques,23 with their presence strongest in the el-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam, the al-Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven, the as-Sunnah mosque in The Hague, and the Islamic Foundation for Education and Transmission of Knowledge (ISOOK) in Tilburg.24 Interestingly, Dutch Salafi mosques have a multinational membership base. In contrast to the homogeneous character of the Moroccan or Turkish mosques in the Netherlands, Muslims from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa, as well as Dutch converts, all visit Salafi centers.25 Salafi lectures at these institutions generally draw audiences of at least 100 people,26 and the centers are considered to be prominent sites of radicalization in the Netherlands. As a result, after the 2004 murder of film director and activist Theo van Gogh, the Dutch government increased its pressure on Salafi centers in the Netherlands. Public prosecutors could not assemble enough evidence to close the centers outright, but three imams of the al-Fourkaan mosque were declared personae non grata and deported from the country.27  

Under government pressure, Salafists in the Netherlands now appear to be pursuing different tactics. There is evidence that a new generation of Salafi preachers is being trained to emphasize da’wa (proselytization) and the expansion of the faith among non-practicing Muslims rather than the espousal of violence and jihad. This new generation of preachers is typically born and raised in the Netherlands. They preach in Dutch, giving them a large advantage in reaching potential Dutch converts. These young “traveling” Salafi preachers hold frequent lectures in 30-40 mosques and youth centers,28 and their audience is growing. Sources in the U.S. intelligence community report that “[t]he number of locations, lectures and active preaching at least doubled between 2005 and the first half of 2007.”29 The AIVD, for its part, has noted that the proselytization “create[s] a climate of intolerance within which these young people may become susceptible to radicalization and even to recruitment for the jihad.”30 Salafists also have been known to take over more moderate and loosely-organized Moroccan mosques. They are willing to sow discord within the mosque, drive out imams, and eventually take over when they are strong enough to do so.31 

Many prominent orthodox Muslim leaders have emerged from Eindhoven’s al-Fourkaan mosque (the oldest Salafi institution in the Netherlands). Ahmad Salam, considered by many to be the most influential Salafi preacher in the Netherlands, was an imam and trustee of the al-Fourkaan mosque before he founded the Islamic Foundation for Education and Transfer of Knowledge (ISOOK) in Tilburg in 2000. Mohammed Cheppih, founder of the Poldermosque in Amsterdam and chairman of the Dutch chapter of the Muslim World League, also maintains a connection to the al-Fourkaan mosque, where his father serves as a trustee. Yahia Bouyafa, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Netherlands, was once a trustee of the Foundation for Islamic Elementary Schools in Eindhoven, an organization linked to the al-Waqf al-Islami, a Saudi proselytizing organization. 

The network of connections only grows more complex from there. The leaders of mosques in The Hague, Amsterdam, and Tilburg jointly form the board of the Foundation for the Islamic Committee for Ahl-Sunnah in Europe. This foundation is part of a European network of political Salafis managed from Saudi Arabia by Syrian Salafi leader Adnan al-Arour.32 In the past, al-Arour has been a primary speaker at Islamic conferences held at the ISOOK mosque in Tilburg and the al-Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven. In 1999, several members of the radical Hamburg cell (who later carried out the 9/11 attacks) and their associates attended these conferences.33 That same year, at least three of the 9/11 hijackers—Ramzi Binalshib, Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi—were rumored to have visited the El-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam.34 The two young men (one of whom was the son of one of the mosque’s board members) who were killed in Kashmir in 2002 had regularly attended services in the al-Fourkaan mosque.35 One of the board members of al-Waqf al-Islami (the body that controls the al-Fourkaan mosque) is Adil Hamad Abderrahman al-Husayni, who was mentioned in the infamous “Golden Chain” document that listed possible funders of al-Qaeda.36 The AIVD remains wary of these complex connections, and continues to track them in annual dossiers and reports. 

The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood has gained influence in the Netherlands in recent years, supported by the organization’s European umbrella, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE). In 2006, Yahia Bouyafa, who serves as the Chairman of the Brotherhood in the Netherlands, convinced authorities in the Slotervaart quarter in Amsterdam to allow him build the first mosque of the FIOE in the Netherlands.37 The mosque is now believed to be the overarching organization of the Dutch Muslim Brotherhood.38 With the help of the Europe Trust (the European financial vehicle of the Muslim Brotherhood), its Dutch spin-off, the Europe Trust Netherlands, was able to buy its own real estate in The Hague and begin the construction of another mosque in Amsterdam.39 In both cases, the sources of the two million Euros that funded the construction remained undisclosed.

Some speculate that Bouyafa aspires to gain political influence and take over the representation of the entire Muslim community in the Netherlands. To that end, he worked to become chairman of one of the two government-approved organizations that represent Dutch Muslims in an official channel of dialogue with the government. Bouyafa is now the chairman of the heterogeneous Contact Group Islam (CGI). This group was created as a counterweight to the Sunni-dominated Contact Body for Muslims and Government (CMO). The CGI was to represent Shi’a Muslims, Alawites, Ahmadiyya, and Sufi groups. Yet when Bouyafa took it over, the group fell under Sunni control. The CMO is highly influenced by the Turkish Milli Görüs movement. The leadership shift ensured that both organizations representing Muslims in a dialogue with the Dutch government are Sunni-dominated and highly influenced by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although they cannot compete in size with the Brotherhood, the AIVD deems a number of homegrown radical movements to be threatening as well. Such groups include Behind Bars, Street Daw’ah, and Shariah4Holland. Members of these groups have allegedly joined the ranks of those bound for the Syrian civil war.40 Moreover, they are responsible for hate crimes and public demonstrations, “encourag[ing] anti-democratic and intolerant values… [and] creating a climate in which the use of violence becomes more acceptable.”41 In 2011, for instance, members of Sharia4Belgium invaded a debate between Muslim author Irshad Manji and GreenLeft MP Tofik Dibi, spitting at the speakers and pelting them with eggs while denouncing them for their homosexuality and their liberal views.42 

Islamism and Society: 

Statistics Netherlands (CBS) estimated in 2012 that 951,000 Muslims reside in the Netherlands, accounting for 5.7% of the total population.43 These numbers, however, account only for those Muslims residing legally in the Netherlands; the illegal population is much harder to quantify, but is also quite substantial.44 The two largest groups of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands are Turks (approximately 37 percent of the total Muslim population) and Moroccans (roughly 36 percent).45 Other large Muslims communities come from Suriname, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan and Iran.46 Several thousand native Dutch converts and children of second-generation Muslim immigrants comprise the last piece of the multifaceted Dutch Muslim community.47

According to one assessment of Islam in the Netherlands, “whereas today many of the Dutch majority population support the idea of migrants adopting Dutch norms and values, the migrants themselves aspire to a combination of independent cultural development.”48 While it is certainly possible to debate the truth of this statement, there are several other important factors that create a gap between Muslim immigrant communities and the rest of Dutch society. The average age of the Muslim population is much lower than that of the country in general—25 for Muslims and 38 for non-Muslims.49 This age gap, taken in combination with discrepancies in levels of education achieved and language ability, poses a challenge to the seamless integration sought by the Dutch authorities, potentially even increasing the sentiments of disaffection and alienation that can lead to radicalization. The diverse nature of the Muslim community has also prevented any kind of large-scale, viable political movement from forming in support of their interests.50

Turks make up the largest Muslim community in the Netherlands. Most are believed to be Sunni Muslims, although recent research suggests that about 40 percent may in fact be Shi’ites of the Alevi school.51 The infrastructure that exists to support the Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands is quite sizable. The main Muslim organizations within the Turkish community belong to mosques under the control of Diyanet (the Turkish religious affairs directorate in Ankara) or to the non-governmental Milli Görüs movement, which is headquartered in Cologne, Germany.52 Diyanet maintains significant power over its diaspora community in the Netherlands, including the right to appoint imams for Diyanet-controlled mosques.53 It operates through two larger umbrella organizations: the Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation (TICF, founded in 1979) and the Dutch Islamic Foundation (ISN, founded 1982).54 Traditionally, the government-controlled official nature of Diyanet has kept it distinct from Milli Görüs. For decades, in fact, the Turkish government was openly hostile to the group, suspicious of the multiple Islamist parties that sprang up in its wake.

In the Netherlands, however, both Diyanet and Milli Görüs cooperate in umbrella organizations such as the Council for Mosques (Raad voor Moskeeën) or the Contact Body for Muslims and Government (Contactorgaan Moslims Overheid).55 Milli Görüs has not been explicitly active in Dutch politics but retains a power base within the insular Turkish community, and its influence continues to grow. Many scholars compare the perception of Milli Görüs in the Netherlands as more favorable than its sister chapter in Germany, asserting that the Dutch government’s more tolerant attitude has allowed the organization to establish itself more effectively.56 While Milli Görüs’s image in the Netherlands remains relatively benign, one of its radical offshoots gained international attention in 2008. A cooperative sting spearheaded by France led to the arrest of ten suspects for financing international terrorism. One of the suspects was a Turkish immigrant to the Netherlands, who was accused of collecting funds for Metin Kaplan’s Kalifatsstaat.57 In 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Lodewijk Asscher reportedly initiated an investigation into both Diyanet and Milli Görüs to ascertain whether or not the way the organizations were operating was inhibiting integration.58 The results of the investigation have yet to be announced.

Moroccans constitute the second-largest Muslim community in the Netherlands, controlling a full 40 percent of all Dutch mosques.59 After 9/11, the Dutch authorities assessed that, of the small number of Dutch citizens willing to actively support or carry out violent terrorist activities, most of these potential militants were Moroccan immigrants. In its 2001 annual report, the Dutch National Security Service questioned “whether the Moroccan representatives and interest organizations… actually represent the group they claim to represent and whether they are using hidden agendas. Such a hidden agenda might be dictated by the Moroccan government or by certain political, religious or other interests.” “[F]or nationalist and mainly financial reasons,” the report concluded, “the Moroccan government still does not want to loosen its grip on the Moroccans abroad.”61

Other outside organizations also maintain a footprint in the Netherlands, including the Saudi-funded Muslim World League. In the Netherlands, the MWL has its home in the Islamic Cultural Center located in Tilburg.62 The organization takes responsibility for building mosques, operating cultural centers, and publishing Islamic texts. The Wahhabi brand of Islam of the MWL’s funders has made many non-Muslims skeptical of its influence.63

The famous Dutch tolerance has decreased somewhat in the face of rising xenophobia. As is the case across Western Europe, the presence of large Muslim communities and questions of integration have provoked sentiments of unease and fear among neighbors who blame “multiculturalism” for increased violence and other social ills.64 Indeed, the AIVD has noted how radical elements may attempt to exploit these sentiments:

…the Islamists involved are indeed aware of the “favorable” polarizing effect of Islamist-inspired violent activities. Such violent activities promote the prejudices of the Dutch population about all Muslims. As a result thereof, Muslims also increasingly get the idea that they are alienated from the Dutch society and the chance that they become susceptible to radical ideas becomes bigger.65

Broad surveys of Western European public attitudes towards Islam have not recently included figures from the Netherlands. The most recent study that did, conducted by the Dutch polling organization Maurice de Hond in July 2011, indicated that 63 percent of Dutch voters expressed concern about Islam’s increasing influence in Europe, and that 74 percent believed immigrants should have to conform to Dutch values.66 In spite of these sentiments, the incidence of anti-Muslim violence has remained low outside of major provocations like Theo Van Gogh’s murder. The AIVD’s 2012 report assessed somewhat optimistically that the threat of anti-Islamist activism is “not currently significant.”67

Islamism and the State: 

The 2004 Madrid train bombings and the muddled European response that followed compelled the Dutch government to patch the holes in its own counterterror infrastructure. A new central body, the National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (NCTV), was created and tasked with a clear mission: “to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and to take prior measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts.”68 NCTV immediately focused on the issue of counter-radicalization, launching a joint government and law enforcement operation to “disrupt” the work of the main Salafi centers in the Netherlands.69 To this end, in 2007 the Dutch government pledged $38 million over the next four years to prevent radicalization—both of Islamic fundamentalists and right-wing nationalists, since racially-motivated attacks against Muslims (as occurred increasingly after Van Gogh’s murder in 2004) can spike hate crimes and deepen feelings of alienation and anger.70  

This pledge demonstrated the government’s adherence to its so-called “broad approach” to countering radicalization.71 This preventative stance rests on the idea that “no one is born a terrorist, but first goes through a short or longer process of radicalization before he or she decides to risk the life of other and his or her own for a political objective.”72 Thus, the Dutch government prioritizes attempts to work with Muslim communities, encouraging partnership and integration. For instance, while the government provides educational subsides for the training of imams at Dutch universities, each participant in the program must first complete a yearlong “integration course” to familiarize themselves with local communities and customs.73 Law enforcement officials and social workers familiar with local conditions in various towns and villages are designated as the point people in such approaches. Many skeptics, however, query the utility of the broad approach, given that most of the radicalization in the Netherlands frequently occurs in small study groups or online, under the radar of local authorities seeking to discourage it.74 

Meanwhile, the Dutch political discourse over Islamism further undermines the credibility of the broad approach to countering radicalization. In debates over immigration and asylum, the looming threat posed by potential radicals gains more ground than the constructive attempts to head it off. At the turn of this century, the “leader of the Dutch new right” Pim Fortuyn spearheaded a campaign to restrict Dutch immigration and asylum policies.75 Fortuyn was known not only for his aggressive stance against militant Islam, but for a hardline belief that Dutch borders must be closed to any further Muslim immigration. He charged that the Netherlands was too small to continue to absorb high numbers of immigrants, and that Islamic values clashed irreconcilably with the permissive Dutch society.76 Fortuyn was murdered in 2003 by Volkert van de Graaf. Although van de Graaf was reportedly a radical animal rights activist, he later admitted that he had shot Fortuyn to stop his scapegoating of Dutch Muslims for society’s problems.77  

Fortuyn’s fallen mantle was quickly assumed by Geert Wilders, head of the Freedom Party. Wilders leveraged his party’s crucial position in the ruling Center-right coalition to push through stricter regulations on immigration. He also increased momentum to outlaw burqas in public (a proposal that had been dropped from consideration in 2007)78 and ban dual nationality (which is held by an estimated 1.5 to 2 million Dutch citizens).79 Anders Breivik, perpetrator of the brutal July 2011 children’s camp massacre in Norway, reportedly had “high praise for the Netherlands” for the anti-immigrant policies put forth during this time.80 In May 2012, Wilders authored Marked for Death: Islam’s War Against the West and Me, which expounded further on his views of the threat that Islam poses to Dutch society and to the West. However, in the parliamentary elections only a few months later, Wilders’ Freedom Party lost 9 seats, and with them, Wilder’s unchecked ability to advance his agenda legislatively.81 This perceived backlash was complemented by the 2012 formation of the No Border Network, an alliance of activists and extremists opposed to the restrictive immigration policy of the center-right coalition. These developments may foreshadow wider discontent with Wilders and his ilk, but it remains to be seen how they will affect the political discourse over Islam and Islamism in Dutch society. Otherwise, this already contentious issue may continue to further polarize Parliament and the public debate.82  

For now, the government’s strategy remains to isolate dangerous radicals, disrupt radicalization and identify radical activities at an early stage and address them. In 2012, to prevent jihadists from traveling abroad (or coming into the Netherlands), the AIVD increased its stockpiling and analysis of travel intelligence; as a result, three young men were arrested on their way to Syria in November 2012.83 Another goal of the government is to empower the voice of moderate Muslims that resist radicalization, and to strengthen the bonds between Muslim immigrants and Dutch society, particularly its democratic political system.84 

Citations: 

[1] United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf.
[2] “Netherlands, Germany alarmed over Islamic extremists,” Hurriyet Daily News, March 14, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/netherlands-germany-alarmed-over-islamist-extremists-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=42916.
[3] Ministry of Interior of the Netherlands, AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service), “Annual Report – 2012,” 2012, https://www.aivd.nl/english/publications-press/@2999/annual-report-2012/.
[4] The “Hofstadgroep,” Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law, European Commission 6th Framework Program, April 15, 2007, revised April 2008, http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Hofstadgroep.pdf.
[5] E.S.M. Akerboom, “Ten Years of Dutch Counterterrorism Policy,” National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, September 9, 2011.
[6] AIVD, Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend, Leidschendam, December 3, 2002.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibidem.
[9] Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Crisis Centrum, Situation Report NCC2004/81492/nr.1, November 10, 2004; NCC2004/81492/nr.2, November 11, 2004; NCC2004/81759/nr.3; November 12, 2004; November 13, 2004; NCC2004/81759/nr.4, November 15, 2004; NCC2004/81759/nr.6, November 16, 2004; NCC2004/82039/nr.7, November 23, 2004; NCC2004/82663/nr.11, November 26, 2004; NCC2004/83053/nr.12, November 30, 2004; “Golf van aanslagen sinds dood Van Gogh,” Brabants Dagblad, November 2004, http://www.brabantsdagblad.nl/algemeen/bdbinnenland/terreur//article28503.ece.
[10] The “Hofstadgroep,” Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law.
[11] House of Representatives of the States General, “Letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs & Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice,” Session 2005-2006, No. 30, September 29, 2005.
[12] The “Hofstadgroep,” Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “Profile: The Caliph of Cologne,” BBC (London), May 27, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1705886.stm.
[15] “Profile: The Caliph of Cologne.”
[16] Claire Berlinski, “Who is Fethullah Gulen?” City Journal 22, no. 4, Autumn 2012, http://www.city-journal.org/2012/22_4_fethullah-gulen.html.
[17] NCTb, Tenth Counterterrorism progress report, 5602436/09, June 19, 2009, 3-4.
[18] General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Annual Report 2002, 27.
[19] Ibid., 25.
[20] Jaco Alberts, “Marokkanen willen ‘hun’ moskee terug,” NRC Handelsblad, September 20, 2003.
[21] See, for example, Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My life with Al Qaeda (Cambridge: Basic Books, 2006), 109-115.
[22] National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), Salafism in the Netherlands. A passing phenomenon or a persistent factor of significance? (The Hague, March 2008), 25-26.
[23] Ibid.
[24] National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Salafism in the Netherlands.
[25] Ibid.
[26] NCTb, 7e voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding, November 26, 2007, 5516003/07/NCTb, 5.
[27] NCTb, Derde Voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding, December 5, 2005, 5388583/05/NCTb.
[28] Ibid., 32, 37.
[29] Ibidem, 40.
[30] General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Annual Report 2003, 24.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Chamber of Commerce, dossier number 34153259; NCTb,Salafism in the Netherlands, 31.
[33] Ian Johnson and Crawford, “A Saudi Group Spreads Extremism in ‘Law’ seminars, Taught in Dutch,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2003.
[34] “Official: Terrorists Met in Amsterdam,” Associated Press, September 13, 2002.
[35] AIVD, Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Links between the Salafist mission, radicalisation processes and Islamic terrorism, 2004; Chamber of Commerce, Foundation Waqf, dossier number 41091392.
[36] Chamber of Commerce, dossier number 41091392; Tareek Osama, file number 41 (Golden Chain document).
[37] Moskee Moslim Broederschap in Slotervaart vormt geen gevaar, April 21, 2009, http://allochtonen.web-log.nl/allochtonen/2009/04/moskee-moslim-b.html; “FION announces building of Mosque in Slotervaart (in Arabic),” March 2008, http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/arts/2008/03/01.pdf; “SP wil opheldering ove FION moskee in Slotervaart,” February 16, 2009; http://allochtonen.web-log.nl/allochtonen/2009/02/sp-wil-ophelder.html.
[38] Ronald Sandee, The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Netherlands, NEFA Foundation, December 2007, http://www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefambnetherlands1207.pdf.
[39] Joost de Haas, “MOSLIMBROEDERS RUKKEN OP; Peperduur pand aangekocht voor nieuw ‘hoofdkwartier’ in Den Haag? ‘Achterliggend doel is invoering van sharia’ ‘Ze zien er niet uit als extremisten,’” De Telegraaf (Amsterdam), May 31, 2008; See also Answers of the mayor of Amsterdam to questions of the Amsterdam city council, February 19, 2009, http://biodata.asp4all.nl/andreas/2009/09012f978057b028/09012f978057b028.pdf.
[40] AIVD, Annual Report – 2012, 27.
[41] Ibid.
[42] “Salafists disrupt liberal Islam debate in Amsterdam,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, December 8, 2011, http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/salafists-disrupt-liberal-islam-debate-amsterdam.
[43] United States Department of State, 2012 Report on International Religious Freedom - Netherlands, May 20, 2013, http://www.refworld.org/.
[44] Sheila Kamerman, “Illegal Aliens like Helen can’t hack it in the Netherlands,” NRC Handelsblad, February 11, 2010, http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2481118.ece/Illegal_aliens_like_Helen_cant_hack_it_in_the_Netherlands.
[45] “The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands: Facts and Figures,” Institute for Multicultural Affairs (Utrecht), 2010, http://www.forum.nl/PortalsInternational/english-pdf/Muslims-in-the-Netherlands-2010.pdf.
[46] Ibid.
[47] “More than 850 thousand Muslims in the Netherlands.”
[48] Jan Willem Duyvendak, Trees Pels and Rally Rijkschroeff, “A Multicultural paradise? The cultural factor in Dutch integration policy,” Paper presented at the 3rd ECPR Conference, Budapest, Hungary, September 8-10, 2005, 7.
[49] “The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands: Facts and Figures.”
[50] Barahim and Ostawar, “The Political Participation of Dutch Muslims.”
[51] Anja van Heelsum, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, “Moslim in Nederland: Islamitische organisaties in Nederland,” Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (SCP) werkdocument 106, July 2004, 11-12.
[52] Nico Landman, Van mat tot minaret: De institutionalisering van de islam in Nederland (Amsterdam 1992), 80-82.
[53] United States Department of State, 2012 Report on International Religious Freedom – Netherlands.
[54] Thijl Sunier, et al. “Diyanet: The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs in a Changing Environment.” VU University Amsterdam, Utrecht University, January 2011, http://www.fsw.vu.nl/nl/Images/Final%20report%20Diyanet%20February%202011_tcm30-200229.pdf.
[55] Heelsum, Fennema and Tillie, Moslim in Nederland, 16.
[56] Ahmet Yukleyen, “State Policies and Islamism in Europe: Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, iss. 3, 2010; Gonul Tol, “What Type of Islamism for Europe? Islamism in Germany and the Netherlands.” Middle East Institute Insight Turkey 11, no. 1, 2009, 133-149.
[57] John Leicester, “10 arrested in France, Germany, Netherlands in terrorism probe,” Associated Press, May 17, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2008/05/17/10_arrested_in_france_germany_netherlands_in_terror_probe/.
[58] “Pikant: Asscher steunt Nederlandse krant van omstreden Turkse beweging Gulenbeweging start weekblad voor Turkse-Nederlanders en Vlamingen,” [“Hot: Asscher Supports a Dutch Newspaper for the controversial Turkish Gulen movement in Dutch and Flemish”] Joop.nl, March 30, 2013, http://www.joop.nl/media/detail/artikel/20297_pikant_asscher_steunt_nederlandse_krant_van_omstreden_turkse_beweging/. [59] NCTb, Salafism in the Netherlands, 25-26.
[60] National Security Service (BVD), Annual Report 2001, 17; Landman, Van mat tot minaret, 160-161.
[61] National Security Service (BVD), Annual Report 2001, 17.
[62]“Islamic Cultural Center in Netherlands,” Muslim World League, n.d., http://en.themwl.org/content/islamic-cultural-center-netherlands.
[63] “Muslim World League and World Assembly of Muslim Youth,” Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project, September 15, 2010, http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-muslim-world-league-and-world-assembly-of-muslim-youth/.
[64] Steven Erlanger, “Amid Rise of Multiculturalism, Dutch Confront Their Questions of Identity,” New York Times, August 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/14/world/europe/14dutch.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Soeren Kern, “European Concerns Over Muslim Immigration Go Mainstream,” Gatestone Institute, August 15, 2011, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2349/european-concerns-muslim-immigration.
[67] AIVD, Annual Report – 2012.
[68] National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism of the Netherlands, “About the NCTb,” n.d., http://english.nctb.nl/organisation/about_the_NCTb/.
[69] NCTb, Derde Voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding, December 5, 2005, 5388583/05/NCTb; Minstry of Justice, Nota radicalisme en radicalisering, August 19, 2005; 5358374/05/AJS.
[70] “Netherlands Sets Plan on Extremism,” Associated Press, August 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/world/europe/28dutch.html?_r=0.
[71] Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior, “Operationeel Actieplan Polarisatie en radicalisering 2007-2011,” August 27, 2007, http://www.tweedekamer.nl/images/297540141bijlage01_118-182859.pdf.
[72] Akerboom, “Ten Years of Dutch Counterterrorism Policy.”
[73] United States Department of State, 2012 Report on International Religious Freedom – Netherlands.
[74] Ministry of Justice of The Netherlands, “Court has ruled in case of Hofstad group suspects,” March 10, 2006, http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Gerechten/Rechtbanken/s-Gravenhage/Actualiteiten/Rechtbank+heeft+uitspraak+gedaan+in+zaken+verdachten+Hofstadgroep.htm; Janny Groen and Annieke Kranenberg, Strijdsters van Allah, Radicale moslima’s en het Hofstadnetwerk (Amsterdam: J.M. Meulenhoff, 2006) 69-99, 127-137.
[75] Kirsty Lang, “At home with ‘Professor Pim,’” BBC, May 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/1966979.stm.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Joan Clements, “Fortuyn killed ‘to protect Muslims,’” Telegraph (London), March 28, 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/1425944/Fortuyn-killed-to-protect-Muslims.html.
[78] “Shop an Immigrant,” Economist, February 6, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2012/02/immigration-netherlands.
[79] “Parliament to press ahead with burqa dual nationality ban laws,” DutchNews.nl, May 31, 2013, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2012/05/parliament_to_press_ahead_with.php.
[80]Steven Erlanger, “Amid Rise of Multiculturalism, Dutch Confront Their Questions of Identity,” New York Times, August 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/14/world/europe/14dutch.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
[81] “Dutch election: Pro-Europe VVD and Labour Parties win,” BBC, September 13, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19566165.
[82] National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, “Letter from the Minister of Security and Justice to the House of Representatives of the States General containing a summary of the 33rd edition of the Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands,” July 1, 2013. See also http://www.government.nl/news/2013/07/01/national-coordinator-for-security-and-counterterrorism-nctv-level-of-threat-continues-to-be-substantial.html.
[83] AIVD, Annual Report – 2012.
[84] Ibid.; Minstry of Justice, Nota radicalisme en radicalisering, August 19, 2005; 5358374/05/AJS.