The “Society of the Muslim Brothers” (Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a young primary school teacher from the city of Isma’iliyya in southern Egypt.¹  In its pristine form, the Brotherhood was a religious, youth and educational group which advocated moral reform and a revival of Islam in Egypt and the Middle East, and did so at a time when secular nationalism had gained momentum across the region. Inspired by the thinking of Muslim scholars Muhammad Abdu (1849-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), al-Banna had become convinced that Muslims had been corrupted by a process of “Westernization” and that secular sentiments were among the first reasons for the decline of Islam. He felt that the weaknesses of the Muslim world could only be cured by a return to the original form of faith, its literal prescriptions, derived from the Koran and the prophetic tradition and applicable to all aspects of life, including the political arena. Islam was for him the only solution to the afflictions which had been plaguing Muslim societies, and the only way toward their regeneration. Al-Banna spelled out the pillars of this revolutionary ideology in his manifesto On Jihad,²  in which he explained how Islam had deserted its roots and become dominated by Western influences, and how social revolution and anti-colonial struggle—against the British occupation in Egypt, the corrupt monarchy, and against Jewish presence in Palestinian lands—were the prerequisites of a genuine Islamic revival.

To achieve these goals, al-Banna was the first to promote jihad (the struggle against infidels, in word and in action) as a legitimate tool to fight Western decadence and its impact on the contemporary Muslim world.³  According to him, jihad was, however, not restricted to the struggle against “apostates” (kuffar), but a more comprehensive awakening of Muslim hearts and minds. In the 1930s, Al-Banna’s animosity towards colonialism found expression in an organization that began to recruit numerous followers, who saw appeal in its ideology on issues ranging from poverty, education, nationalism to the nascent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By using support networks of mosques, welfare associations, neighborhood groups, and professional syndicates, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to indoctrinate Egyptians—in particular those from the deprived lower class in search of salvation, and among the middle class, whose aspirations had been largely ignored. The movement’s popularity grew as scores of its leaders came under government repression and were jailed and tortured. As a result, they increasingly became viewed as heroes fighting against British colonial rule. Consequently, the Brotherhood moved beyond charitable and educational activities to become an openly political movement, extending its membership from a thousand members in 1936 to nearly two million in 1948.⁴  It was after al-Banna’s assassination in 1949 by the secret police of King Faruk (who blamed the Brotherhood for anti-government acts such as the murder of Prime minister al-Nuqrashi in 1948) that the movement’s second ideologue—Sayyid Qutb—emerged and reinforced its doctrine and creed.

Through his passionate writings, still cited by Islamists today, Qutb declared that Egyptians had deviated from Islam and that Muslims had the obligation to use jihad as a means to combat Western powers, regarded as morally decadent, idolatrous and intrinsically hostile to the Islamic faith. In his influential manifesto Milestones (Ma‘alim fi-l-tariq),⁵  published in 1964, Qutb expressed his belief that Islam, understood as a complete sociopolitical system, a “way of life,” was the remedy to all problems of contemporary Arab and Muslim societies. In fact, the decline of the Muslim world stemmed from ills directly imported from the West—immorality, secularism, corruption—that had taken Muslims back to a pre-Islamic state (jahiliyya in Arabic). As an antidote, Qutb called for absolute submission to the principles of Islam. In this view, anything non-Islamic was evil by essence, including a political authority said to be “democratic” that ran contrary to a genuine government based on the rule of Islamic law.

Qutb understood early on that he would have to use pragmatic methods to carry out his vision, which led him to ally himself with the Brotherhood to promote his ideas and assert his leadership. Indeed, at that time the movement provided an organizational structure able to stage active jihad and already held great political and intellectual influence in Egypt. It thus constituted the ideal vehicle for establishing an Islamic state, a notion that Qutb had in common with his predecessor, Hassan al-Banna.⁶  Following this alliance, Qutb began to openly endorse violence and advocate jihad, recommending that all pious Muslims isolate themselves from society to fight all manifestations of apostasy and all forms of oppression. In 1954, he was arrested along with other members of the Brotherhood and remained in prison for most of the rest of his life. It was during his incarceration that Qutb endured degrading treatments, like torture, which led him to further radicalize. It is also at that period that he completed his most influential writings,⁷  before finally being executed in 1966 on charges of conspiring against the Egyptian regime.

Throughout the decades, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology has not varied much from al-Banna and Qutb’s primary arguments. However, like a majority of other social movements, the Brotherhood has undergone a number of fundamental transformations. Of all, the most striking has been the continued ideological “de-radicalization” of its leadership and its subsequent abandonment of armed jihad. This dynamic was initiated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when leaders started to increasingly disavow violence in favor of moderation and political participation. Hassan al-Hudaybi, al-Banna’s successor as the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood,⁸  published a book in 1969, Preachers not Judges, in which he justified this rejection of violence and provided a series of theological arguments to counter Qutb’s radical views.⁹  It was under his influence and under that of his successor, Umar al-Tilmisani, that the group distanced itself from the jihadist approach and even went so far as to name Sadat a “martyr” after he was assassinated in 1981.¹⁰  A number of factors were necessary for this de-radicalization to occur, in particular the sustained de-legitimization of Islamist ideas through the use of rational arguments, supported by charismatic former jihadists and the state’s use of repression.¹¹  This process contributed to the increasingly popular characterization of the group as a “moderate” movement, especially in the West.¹²  And to be sure, the Brotherhood is considerably less radical than it was in the days of Qutb.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s efforts to rebrand itself as a moderate group that has renounced jihad has prompted fierce criticism among other Islamist groups. Prominent al-Qaeda leaders, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, have called the movement’s shift and its participation in Egypt’s political debate and elections—a posture contrary to God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya)—a “betrayal.”¹³  Moreover, the Brotherhood’s deradicalization has been tempered by the continued influence of its core beliefs; while many Muslim Brothers now claim to have embraced democracy, the ideology that was initially developed by al-Banna and Qutb, in which Islam must govern all matters, still carries significant resonance. Recent years also have witnessed a relative reversal of this benign trend towards the reaffirmation of more radical discourses within the organization. This is exemplified in the stance of some of the Brotherhood’s offshoots, which still back armed struggle under the banner of “resistance” against “occupation.” For example, the Islamist group Hamas, originally formed by the Palestinian Muslim Brothers, condemned the choice made by the Egyptian Brotherhood to renounce violence and continues to see jihad as the only viable way to rid Muslim lands of infidel presence. Criticism of the Brotherhood’s ideological and political shifts has also emanated from Syria, where the group’s leadership has openly supported attacks against Israel and the U.S. in Iraq and voiced full support for Hamas and the Iranian-backed Shi‘ite militia Hezbollah.¹⁴ 

Even more significant are the endogenous divides that the Muslim Brotherhood’s steps toward moderation have prompted, structured around a growing conflict between the movement’s conservative old guard, longtime reformists, and a younger generation of militants, themselves divided between democrats and a minority of radicals tempted by the resumption of jihad in Egypt.¹⁵  As of 1996, several prominent members of the Brotherhood broke away to form new political factions such as the “Center Party” (Hizb al-Wasat) or the “Movement for Change,” also known as Kefaya—“enough” in Egyptian Arabic. In 2007, the movement released a platform that laid out fairly clearly the inflexible principles that its old guard continues to follow, including the rejection of the civil nature of the state and a call to establish a theocratic government and exclude non-Muslim minorities (Copts) from domestic politics.¹⁶  The debate over this platform has served to highlight the growing schism underway within the movement between moderates and conservatives who have regained influence and been more vocal since the election of their new Supreme Guide, Muhammad Badi, in January 2010.¹⁷  Since then, the Brotherhood seems to have adopted a more radical discourse towards the U.S., which is described as an “infidel” nation that “does not champion moral and human values and cannot lead humanity.” Badi has also stated that America and Israel were “the Muslims’ real enemies,” and that “jihad against both is a commandment of God which cannot be disregarded.”¹⁸ 

In many ways, these evolutions are reminiscent of an early episode in the Brotherhood’s history: by the late 1930s, there had already been great friction between a wing of the organization that wished to pursue armed jihad against the British, and its leadership which was fearful that such a strategy would ultimately damage the Brotherhood’s future. Today, “re-radicalization” of segments of the movement is particularly conspicuous among the youth, influenced by a Salafist doctrine which considers the only true path to be a return to the practices of the first Muslims (sahaba) and rejects as apostasy (kufr) anything deviating from a strict interpretation of the Koran.¹⁹  Although only a few Brothers publicly identify themselves as Salafists, their thinking has been increasingly marked by this puritanical approach to faith. This trend, moreover, is poised to gain currency within the movement itself, since the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, Muhammad Badi, is known to be a hard-line Salafist devoted to the spirit and methods advocated by Qutb, with whom he was jailed in the 1960s.²⁰

Although banned and clandestine, the Muslim Brotherhood has managed to grow over the years and set up branches throughout the Muslim world, especially in Egypt’s neighboring countries—Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Jordan, the Palestinian territories—as well as in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain). The movement has also achieved global status by expanding well beyond its traditional Middle Eastern borders and establishing branches in the West. Although these different offshoots maintain close symbolic and ideological ties with the Egyptian base, they remain largely independent.

In the 1930s, the Brotherhood began to spread its ideology in the Middle East as a response to colonial presence. In Palestine, the movement was established in 1935 by the brother of al-Banna himself, Abd al-Rahman, along with other figures such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam, one of the leaders of the armed resistance against the British.²¹  The Brotherhood’s activities were, at that time, primarily of a social and religious nature, and included the creation of associations, schools and the establishment of mosques intended to “bring an Islamic generation up.”²²  It was in 1987, in the context of the first Intifada (Palestinian uprising), that the Brotherhood politicized by founding the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas),²³  which in turn took on a further military bent. By way of contrast, such politicization occurred earlier in countries like Syria and Jordan, where the Brotherhood became an opposition force to the regime in the first years after national independence.²⁴  A group like the Islamic Action Front (IAF),²⁵  the Jordanian Brotherhood’s political wing, is, for instance, the country’s only established opposition party and has positioned itself as a leading player in the 2011 anti-government protests by denouncing public corruption and poverty.²⁶

As in Egypt, most of the Brotherhood’s offshoots have also been banned and repressed. In Syria, after the 1963 Ba’athist coup, the group became the main (Sunni) opposition force to the (Shi'ite Alawite) Assad clan. The conflict developed into an open armed struggle which culminated in the Hama uprising of 1982, which was famously crushed by the military.²⁷  Since that time, the movement ceased to be actively politically inside the country, but has managed to maintain a support network there. Syrian Brothers have renounced violence and adopted a more reformist approach calling for the establishment of a pluralistic and democratic political system.²⁸  A similar transformation has characterized the Jordanian Brotherhood, which now seeks reform and no longer aspires to revolution.²⁹  In Iraq, where the group’s history remains relatively unknown, the Iraqi Islamic Party, its main manifestation, was banned during the 1960s and forced underground by Saddam Hussein. It reemerged in 2003, and has since displayed an ambiguous posture, voicing harsh criticism against the U.S. while at the same time taking part in the transitional process.³⁰ 

In the Gulf, the Brotherhood possesses branches in several countries, most of which were established by militants driven out of Egypt in the 1950s. Many found shelter in Saudi Arabia, but were seen as a challenge to that country’s official Wahhabi creed. The movement was never allowed to deal with religious issues, and therefore invested its energies in the educational field as a way of disseminating its ideology. This led to the emergence of movements like the “Awakening” (Sahwa), known for its support of rebellion against the Sauds.³¹  But Wahhabism, in turn, influenced the Brotherhood and drew many of its members toward the more conservative Islamic trend. Elsewhere, such as in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, the Brotherhood relied on a strong intellectual and media presence to influence local populations.³²  With the exception of Oman, where the Brotherhood has faced severe crackdowns, the movement also managed to gain seats in parliaments throughout the region; in Kuwait via the Hadas movement;³³  in Yemen through Islah or the “Congregation for Reform;”³⁴  or in Bahrain, where the Al-Minbar Islamic Society has been, since 2002, the largest elected party.³⁵

In North Africa, the Brotherhood’s expansion was also a result of colonial rule. In Algeria, its members took part in the uprising against the French during that country’s war for independence, before being marginalized by the secular FLN party. In the 1990s, the Algerian Brotherhood did not join jihadist factions in their fight against the state; instead, the group favored a peaceful conflict resolution and a return to democracy, even taking part in the coalition backing current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika in the early 2000s.³⁶  In Tunisia, the Brotherhood influenced Islamists, in particular Al-Nahda (the Renaissance Party) founded in 1989, whose leaders advocate democracy and pluralism “within an Islamist framework.”³⁷  Outlawed by the Ben Ali regime, Al-Nahda has made a historic return in the wake of the 2011 “Jasmine Revolution”³⁸  and is now a legalized party likely to benefit from considerable popular support in the upcoming elections.³⁹  In Libya, the Brotherhood has been present since the 1940s when King Idris I offered Egyptian Brothers refuge. However, following his seizure of power via coup, Muammar al-Qadhafi considered the Muslim Brothers a menace, and worked to eliminate them. Despite this repression, the Brotherhood has maintained a vast network of sympathizers in Libya, and notably supports the current anti-Qadhafi insurgency taking place in the North African state.⁴⁰  Finally, in Sudan, the Brotherhood enjoys a significant, though informal, presence, and has launched mass Islamization campaigns which allowed its representatives to infiltrate virtually all state institutions.⁴¹

In addition to its traditional geography, the Brotherhood has gained significant ground in Europe through regional forums such as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, the European Council for Fatwa and Research and others.⁴²  Since the 1960s, members and sympathizers of the group moved to Europe and set up a vast and sophisticated network of mosques and Islamic charities and schools, such as in England (Muslim Association of Britain), France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France), Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland), the Netherlands and Italy (Unione delle Comunita' ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia).⁴³  With considerable foreign funding and the relative tolerance of European governments seeking to engage in a dialogue with Muslim minorities,⁴⁴  Brotherhood-related organizations have gained prominent positions on the sociopolitical scene—presenting themselves as the legitimate representatives of Muslim communities in Europe and “moderate” interlocutors for governments and the media.

In addition to its presence in Europe, the Brotherhood has also reached out to Muslims in the United States, where its members have been present since the 1960s. The movement launched its first long-term strategy there in 1975, focusing on proselytizing efforts and the creation of specific structures for youth and freshly-arrived Muslim immigrants. Seeking to exert political influence at the state and federal levels, Muslim Brothers have been represented within multiple organizations such as the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Muslim American Society (MAS) and a variety of other activist groups. On May 22, 1991, the Brotherhood issued a programmatic memorandum titled “The General Strategic Objective for the [Brotherhood] in North America,”⁴⁵  which highlighted its goal to penetrate American society at its heart. The memorandum stated that all Muslims had to “understand that their work in America [was] a grand jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands so that God’s religion [Islam] is victorious over all religions.”⁴⁶  Over time, the Brotherhood would work to impose Islamic values and traditions from within American society.⁴⁷

In 2005, for the first time in its history and to the surprise of most experts, the Brotherhood won 20 percent of the seats in Egypt’s legislature. This victory was made possible by a more open political climate, and the Mubarak regime’s decision to grant the movement unprecedented freedom to campaign through “independent” candidates.⁴⁸  Nonetheless, thousands of Brothers were arrested and imprisoned for urging political reform and liberalization in opposition to Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). As a result of further constitutional amendments passed in 2007, it became even more difficult for the group to run in either legislative or presidential polls.⁴⁹  In the face of restrictive electoral laws which only allowed registered parties to run and banned all religious forces, the Brotherhood subsequently boycotted the country’s December 2010 polls.⁵⁰ 

Today, however, Egypt’s historic “Lotus Revolution” has emboldened the movement, and propelled it into political prominence. The Brotherhood has already expressed its readiness to provide a remedy to Mubarak’s “corrupt” era by bringing morality back into politics and tackling poverty and unemployment, two promises that have long guaranteed its popularity. In mid-February, Muslim Brothers also announced their willingness to form a party and participate in upcoming elections.⁵¹  With a solid base and recognition for its social achievements and commitment to reform, the Brotherhood will certainly come to play a significant role in the current transition, even though it kept a low profile during the anti-regime demonstrations. The question is more whether the movement will contribute to a true democratic opening in Egypt, or exploit it to further a radical agenda?⁵² 

The ideological fissures and apparent internal fragmentation of opinion within the group only serve to reinforce these concerns. While a number of reformist Brothers have stated that they would not seek to establish an Islamic state if they take control of the next government, the movement as a whole has not publicly renounced its central ideal of setting up an Islamic regime in Egypt. Additionally, the Brotherhood’s new hard-line leadership has called into question the 1981 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and has not ruled out a future embrace of violent jihad.⁵³  Many observers are also divided over what the movement’s rise to power would mean for the protection of religious minorities, human rights and women’s rights in the country.⁵⁴ 

On the one hand, the Brotherhood remains regarded as the country’s best-organized opposition force, and enjoys an image of integrity and piety which fundamentally differs from that of the Mubarak regime. In the eyes of its sympathizers, the defense of Islamic principles and values make it more capable of running a government by effectively implementing long-awaited economic reforms and ensuring greater social justice.⁵⁵  On the other hand, however, many accuse the movement of opportunism and of exploiting the revolution to ultimately seize power.⁵⁶  At this juncture, it is clear that the Brotherhood today confronts the challenge of operating in an open political climate, and that while it has long been the only opposition in Egypt and other countries of the region, it is not the unique political alternative. The prospect of a takeover by the movement is far from a foregone conclusion, in other words, but such an eventuality should not downplayed.⁵⁷