Founded in 1928 in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the world’s oldest, largest and most influential Sunni Islamist groups—and an inspiration for the ideology and actions of a majority of contemporary Islamist movements. In the first decades of its existence, the movement advocated armed struggle (jihad) as a means to impose Islamic law (sharia) at home, while seeking to fight Western colonialism and the State of Israel in the Middle East. Following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s assumption of power in Egypt in 1952, the Brotherhood was formally outlawed and moved into the political opposition, alternatively demonized, repressed or silently tolerated during the decades that followed. Throughout this period, the movement developed a wide network of social and religious charities and programs, expanding its influence across the entire Muslim world, and beyond it. Simultaneously, however, it has gone through key ideological transformations, in particular a de-radicalization embodied in the renunciation of one of the key tenets of its doctrine: violent jihad. This move, however, has prompted deep cleavages within the Brotherhood itself, making it difficult to characterize the Brotherhood as a coherent and homogenous organization. Today, the “Lotus Revolution” and the end of the Mubarak regime have raised fundamental questions about the Brotherhood’s future role in Egypt, and its place in Arab politics writ large.
The “Society of the Muslim Brothers” (Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a young primary school teacher from the city of Isma’iliyya in southern Egypt.1 In its pristine form, the Brotherhood was a religious, youth and educational group which advocated moral reform and a revival of Islam in Egypt and the Middle East, and did so at a time when secular nationalism had gained momentum across the region. Inspired by the thinking of Muslim scholars Muhammad Abdu (1849-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), al-Banna had become convinced that Muslims had been corrupted by a process of “Westernization” and that secular sentiments were among the first reasons for the decline of Islam. He felt that the weaknesses of the Muslim world could only be cured by a return to the original form of faith, its literal prescriptions, derived from the Koran and the prophetic tradition and applicable to all aspects of life, including the political arena. Islam was for him the only solution to the afflictions which had been plaguing Muslim societies, and the only way toward their regeneration. Al-Banna spelled out the pillars of this revolutionary ideology in his manifesto On Jihad,2 in which he explained how Islam had deserted its roots and become dominated by Western influences, and how social revolution and anti-colonial struggle—against the British occupation in Egypt, the corrupt monarchy, and against Jewish presence in Palestinian lands—were the prerequisites of a genuine Islamic revival.
To achieve these goals, al-Banna was the first to promote jihad (the struggle against infidels, in word and in action) as a legitimate tool to fight Western decadence and its impact on the contemporary Muslim world.3 According to him, jihad was, however, not restricted to the struggle against “apostates” (kuffar), but a more comprehensive awakening of Muslim hearts and minds. In the 1930s, Al-Banna’s animosity towards colonialism found expression in an organization that began to recruit numerous followers, who saw appeal in its ideology on issues ranging from poverty, education, nationalism to the nascent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By using support networks of mosques, welfare associations, neighborhood groups, and professional syndicates, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to indoctrinate Egyptians—in particular those from the deprived lower class in search of salvation, and among the middle class, whose aspirations had been largely ignored. The movement’s popularity grew as scores of its leaders came under government repression and were jailed and tortured. As a result, they increasingly became viewed as heroes fighting against British colonial rule. Consequently, the Brotherhood moved beyond charitable and educational activities to become an openly political movement, extending its membership from a thousand members in 1936 to nearly two million in 1948.4 It was after al-Banna’s assassination in 1949 by the secret police of King Faruk (who blamed the Brotherhood for anti-government acts such as the murder of Prime minister al-Nuqrashi in 1948) that the movement’s second ideologue—Sayyid Qutb—emerged and reinforced its doctrine and creed.
Through his passionate writings, still cited by Islamists today, Qutb declared that Egyptians had deviated from Islam and that Muslims had the obligation to use jihad as a means to combat Western powers, regarded as morally decadent, idolatrous and intrinsically hostile to the Islamic faith. In his influential manifesto Milestones (Ma‘alim fi-l-tariq),5 published in 1964, Qutb expressed his belief that Islam, understood as a complete sociopolitical system, a “way of life,” was the remedy to all problems of contemporary Arab and Muslim societies. In fact, the decline of the Muslim world stemmed from ills directly imported from the West—immorality, secularism, corruption—that had taken Muslims back to a pre-Islamic state (jahiliyya in Arabic). As an antidote, Qutb called for absolute submission to the principles of Islam. In this view, anything non-Islamic was evil by essence, including a political authority said to be “democratic” that ran contrary to a genuine government based on the rule of Islamic law.
Qutb understood early on that he would have to use pragmatic methods to carry out his vision, which led him to ally himself with the Brotherhood to promote his ideas and assert his leadership. Indeed, at that time the movement provided an organizational structure able to stage active jihad and already held great political and intellectual influence in Egypt. It thus constituted the ideal vehicle for establishing an Islamic state, a notion that Qutb had in common with his predecessor, Hassan al-Banna.6 Following this alliance, Qutb began to openly endorse violence and advocate jihad, recommending that all pious Muslims isolate themselves from society to fight all manifestations of apostasy and all forms of oppression. In 1954, he was arrested along with other members of the Brotherhood and remained in prison for most of the rest of his life. It was during his incarceration that Qutb endured degrading treatments, like torture, which led him to further radicalize. It is also at that period that he completed his most influential writings,7 before finally being executed in 1966 on charges of conspiring against the Egyptian regime.
Throughout the decades, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology has not varied much from al-Banna and Qutb’s primary arguments. However, like a majority of other social movements, the Brotherhood has undergone a number of fundamental transformations. Of all, the most striking has been the continued ideological “de-radicalization” of its leadership and its subsequent abandonment of armed jihad. This dynamic was initiated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when leaders started to increasingly disavow violence in favor of moderation and political participation. Hassan al-Hudaybi, al-Banna’s successor as the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood,8 published a book in 1969, Preachers not Judges, in which he justified this rejection of violence and provided a series of theological arguments to counter Qutb’s radical views.9 It was under his influence and under that of his successor, Umar al-Tilmisani, that the group distanced itself from the jihadist approach and even went so far as to name Sadat a “martyr” after he was assassinated in 1981.10 A number of factors were necessary for this de-radicalization to occur, in particular the sustained de-legitimization of Islamist ideas through the use of rational arguments, supported by charismatic former jihadists and the state’s use of repression.11 This process contributed to the increasingly popular characterization of the group as a “moderate” movement, especially in the West.12 And to be sure, the Brotherhood is considerably less radical than it was in the days of Qutb.
However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s efforts to rebrand itself as a moderate group that has renounced jihad has prompted fierce criticism among other Islamist groups. Prominent al-Qaeda leaders, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, have called the movement’s shift and its participation in Egypt’s political debate and elections—a posture contrary to God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya)—a “betrayal.”13 Moreover, the Brotherhood’s deradicalization has been tempered by the continued influence of its core beliefs; while many Muslim Brothers now claim to have embraced democracy, the ideology that was initially developed by al-Banna and Qutb, in which Islam must govern all matters, still carries significant resonance. Recent years also have witnessed a relative reversal of this benign trend towards the reaffirmation of more radical discourses within the organization. This is exemplified in the stance of some of the Brotherhood’s offshoots, which still back armed struggle under the banner of “resistance” against “occupation.” For example, the Islamist group Hamas, originally formed by the Palestinian Muslim Brothers, condemned the choice made by the Egyptian Brotherhood to renounce violence and continues to see jihad as the only viable way to rid Muslim lands of infidel presence. Criticism of the Brotherhood’s ideological and political shifts has also emanated from Syria, where the group’s leadership has openly supported attacks against Israel and the U.S. in Iraq and voiced full support for Hamas and the Iranian-backed Shi‘ite militia Hezbollah.14
Even more significant are the endogenous divides that the Muslim Brotherhood’s steps toward moderation have prompted, structured around a growing conflict between the movement’s conservative old guard, longtime reformists, and a younger generation of militants, themselves divided between democrats and a minority of radicals tempted by the resumption of jihad in Egypt.15 As of 1996, several prominent members of the Brotherhood broke away to form new political factions such as the “Center Party” (Hizb al-Wasat) or the “Movement for Change,” also known as Kefaya—“enough” in Egyptian Arabic. In 2007, the movement released a platform that laid out fairly clearly the inflexible principles that its old guard continues to follow, including the rejection of the civil nature of the state and a call to establish a theocratic government and exclude non-Muslim minorities (Copts) from domestic politics.16 The debate over this platform has served to highlight the growing schism underway within the movement between moderates and conservatives who have regained influence and been more vocal since the election of their new Supreme Guide, Muhammad Badi, in January 2010.17 Since then, the Brotherhood seems to have adopted a more radical discourse towards the U.S., which is described as an “infidel” nation that “does not champion moral and human values and cannot lead humanity.” Badi has also stated that America and Israel were “the Muslims’ real enemies,” and that “jihad against both is a commandment of God which cannot be disregarded.”18
In many ways, these evolutions are reminiscent of an early episode in the Brotherhood’s history: by the late 1930s, there had already been great friction between a wing of the organization that wished to pursue armed jihad against the British, and its leadership which was fearful that such a strategy would ultimately damage the Brotherhood’s future. Today, “re-radicalization” of segments of the movement is particularly conspicuous among the youth, influenced by a Salafist doctrine which considers the only true path to be a return to the practices of the first Muslims (sahaba) and rejects as apostasy (kufr) anything deviating from a strict interpretation of the Koran.19 Although only a few Brothers publicly identify themselves as Salafists, their thinking has been increasingly marked by this puritanical approach to faith. This trend, moreover, is poised to gain currency within the movement itself, since the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, Muhammad Badi, is known to be a hard-line Salafist devoted to the spirit and methods advocated by Qutb, with whom he was jailed in the 1960s.20
Although banned and clandestine, the Muslim Brotherhood has managed to grow over the years and set up branches throughout the Muslim world, especially in Egypt’s neighboring countries—Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Jordan, the Palestinian territories—as well as in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain). The movement has also achieved global status by expanding well beyond its traditional Middle Eastern borders and establishing branches in the West. Although these different offshoots maintain close symbolic and ideological ties with the Egyptian base, they remain largely independent.
In the 1930s, the Brotherhood began to spread its ideology in the Middle East as a response to colonial presence. In Palestine, the movement was established in 1935 by the brother of al-Banna himself, Abd al-Rahman, along with other figures such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam, one of the leaders of the armed resistance against the British.21 The Brotherhood’s activities were, at that time, primarily of a social and religious nature, and included the creation of associations, schools and the establishment of mosques intended to “bring an Islamic generation up.”22 It was in 1987, in the context of the first Intifada (Palestinian uprising), that the Brotherhood politicized by founding the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas),23 which in turn took on a further military bent. By way of contrast, such politicization occurred earlier in countries like Syria and Jordan, where the Brotherhood became an opposition force to the regime in the first years after national independence.24 A group like the Islamic Action Front (IAF),25 the Jordanian Brotherhood’s political wing, is, for instance, the country’s only established opposition party and has positioned itself as a leading player in the 2011 anti-government protests by denouncing public corruption and poverty.26
As in Egypt, most of the Brotherhood’s offshoots have also been banned and repressed. In Syria, after the 1963 Ba’athist coup, the group became the main (Sunni) opposition force to the (Shi'ite Alawite) Assad clan. The conflict developed into an open armed struggle which culminated in the Hama uprising of 1982, which was famously crushed by the military.27 Since that time, the movement ceased to be actively politically inside the country, but has managed to maintain a support network there. Syrian Brothers have renounced violence and adopted a more reformist approach calling for the establishment of a pluralistic and democratic political system.28 A similar transformation has characterized the Jordanian Brotherhood, which now seeks reform and no longer aspires to revolution.29 In Iraq, where the group’s history remains relatively unknown, the Iraqi Islamic Party, its main manifestation, was banned during the 1960s and forced underground by Saddam Hussein. It reemerged in 2003, and has since displayed an ambiguous posture, voicing harsh criticism against the U.S. while at the same time taking part in the transitional process.30
In the Gulf, the Brotherhood possesses branches in several countries, most of which were established by militants driven out of Egypt in the 1950s. Many found shelter in Saudi Arabia, but were seen as a challenge to that country’s official Wahhabi creed. The movement was never allowed to deal with religious issues, and therefore invested its energies in the educational field as a way of disseminating its ideology. This led to the emergence of movements like the “Awakening” (Sahwa), known for its support of rebellion against the Sauds.31 But Wahhabism, in turn, influenced the Brotherhood and drew many of its members toward the more conservative Islamic trend. Elsewhere, such as in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, the Brotherhood relied on a strong intellectual and media presence to influence local populations.32 With the exception of Oman, where the Brotherhood has faced severe crackdowns, the movement also managed to gain seats in parliaments throughout the region; in Kuwait via the Hadas movement;33 in Yemen through Islah or the “Congregation for Reform;”34 or in Bahrain, where the Al-Minbar Islamic Society has been, since 2002, the largest elected party.35
In North Africa, the Brotherhood’s expansion was also a result of colonial rule. In Algeria, its members took part in the uprising against the French during that country’s war for independence, before being marginalized by the secular FLN party. In the 1990s, the Algerian Brotherhood did not join jihadist factions in their fight against the state; instead, the group favored a peaceful conflict resolution and a return to democracy, even taking part in the coalition backing current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika in the early 2000s.36 In Tunisia, the Brotherhood influenced Islamists, in particular Al-Nahda (the Renaissance Party) founded in 1989, whose leaders advocate democracy and pluralism “within an Islamist framework.”37 Outlawed by the Ben Ali regime, Al-Nahda has made a historic return in the wake of the 2011 “Jasmine Revolution”38 and is now a legalized party likely to benefit from considerable popular support in the upcoming elections.39 In Libya, the Brotherhood has been present since the 1940s when King Idris I offered Egyptian Brothers refuge. However, following his seizure of power via coup, Muammar al-Qadhafi considered the Muslim Brothers a menace, and worked to eliminate them. Despite this repression, the Brotherhood has maintained a vast network of sympathizers in Libya, and notably supports the current anti-Qadhafi insurgency taking place in the North African state.40 Finally, in Sudan, the Brotherhood enjoys a significant, though informal, presence, and has launched mass Islamization campaigns which allowed its representatives to infiltrate virtually all state institutions.41
In addition to its traditional geography, the Brotherhood has gained significant ground in Europe through regional forums such as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, the European Council for Fatwa and Research and others.42 Since the 1960s, members and sympathizers of the group moved to Europe and set up a vast and sophisticated network of mosques and Islamic charities and schools, such as in England (Muslim Association of Britain), France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France), Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland), the Netherlands and Italy (Unione delle Comunita' ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia).43 With considerable foreign funding and the relative tolerance of European governments seeking to engage in a dialogue with Muslim minorities,44 Brotherhood-related organizations have gained prominent positions on the sociopolitical scene—presenting themselves as the legitimate representatives of Muslim communities in Europe and “moderate” interlocutors for governments and the media.
In addition to its presence in Europe, the Brotherhood has also reached out to Muslims in the United States, where its members have been present since the 1960s. The movement launched its first long-term strategy there in 1975, focusing on proselytizing efforts and the creation of specific structures for youth and freshly-arrived Muslim immigrants. Seeking to exert political influence at the state and federal levels, Muslim Brothers have been represented within multiple organizations such as the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Muslim American Society (MAS) and a variety of other activist groups. On May 22, 1991, the Brotherhood issued a programmatic memorandum titled “The General Strategic Objective for the [Brotherhood] in North America,”45 which highlighted its goal to penetrate American society at its heart. The memorandum stated that all Muslims had to “understand that their work in America [was] a grand jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands so that God’s religion [Islam] is victorious over all religions.”46 Over time, the Brotherhood would work to impose Islamic values and traditions from within American society.47
In 2005, for the first time in its history and to the surprise of most experts, the Brotherhood won 20 percent of the seats in Egypt’s legislature. This victory was made possible by a more open political climate, and the Mubarak regime’s decision to grant the movement unprecedented freedom to campaign through “independent” candidates.48 Nonetheless, thousands of Brothers were arrested and imprisoned for urging political reform and liberalization in opposition to Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). As a result of further constitutional amendments passed in 2007, it became even more difficult for the group to run in either legislative or presidential polls.49 In the face of restrictive electoral laws which only allowed registered parties to run and banned all religious forces, the Brotherhood subsequently boycotted the country’s December 2010 polls.50
Today, however, Egypt’s historic “Lotus Revolution” has emboldened the movement, and propelled it into political prominence. The Brotherhood has already expressed its readiness to provide a remedy to Mubarak’s “corrupt” era by bringing morality back into politics and tackling poverty and unemployment, two promises that have long guaranteed its popularity. In mid-February, Muslim Brothers also announced their willingness to form a party and participate in upcoming elections.51 With a solid base and recognition for its social achievements and commitment to reform, the Brotherhood will certainly come to play a significant role in the current transition, even though it kept a low profile during the anti-regime demonstrations. The question is more whether the movement will contribute to a true democratic opening in Egypt, or exploit it to further a radical agenda?52
The ideological fissures and apparent internal fragmentation of opinion within the group only serve to reinforce these concerns. While a number of reformist Brothers have stated that they would not seek to establish an Islamic state if they take control of the next government, the movement as a whole has not publicly renounced its central ideal of setting up an Islamic regime in Egypt. Additionally, the Brotherhood’s new hard-line leadership has called into question the 1981 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and has not ruled out a future embrace of violent jihad.53 Many observers are also divided over what the movement’s rise to power would mean for the protection of religious minorities, human rights and women’s rights in the country.54
On the one hand, the Brotherhood remains regarded as the country’s best-organized opposition force, and enjoys an image of integrity and piety which fundamentally differs from that of the Mubarak regime. In the eyes of its sympathizers, the defense of Islamic principles and values make it more capable of running a government by effectively implementing long-awaited economic reforms and ensuring greater social justice.55 On the other hand, however, many accuse the movement of opportunism and of exploiting the revolution to ultimately seize power.56 At this juncture, it is clear that the Brotherhood today confronts the challenge of operating in an open political climate, and that while it has long been the only opposition in Egypt and other countries of the region, it is not the unique political alternative. The prospect of a takeover by the movement is far from a foregone conclusion, in other words, but such an eventuality should not downplayed.57
 For an overview of the Muslim Brotherhood’s core ideology, see Hassan al-Banna’s writings and memoirs, in particular the Letter To A Muslim Student, which develops the main principles of the movement. For the English translation, see http://www.jannah.org/articles/letter.html; see also Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942 (New York; Ithaca Press, 1998) and Richard Paul Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
 “The Way of Jihad: Complete Text by Hassan Al Banna founder of the Muslim Brotherhood,” Militant Islam Monitor, January 16, 2005, http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/379; See also Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949): A Selection from the Majmu‘at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid, Charles Wendell, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
 Hassan al-Banna, “On Jihad,”n.d., http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/jihad.
 According to Robin H. Hallett in Africa Since 1875: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), p. 138.
 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Kazi Publications, 2007).
 One of his first manuscripts, Dirasat islamiyya, a collection of articles written from 1951 to 1953, contains clear references to Qutb’s commitment to the Muslim Brotherhood.
 In addition to Milestones, one can cite Qutb’s other important volume In the Shade of the Qur’an, which he began in 1952.
 Barbara H. E. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hassan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (London: Routledge, 2008).
 Umar al-Tilmisani, Days with Sadat [Ayam Ma‘a al-Sadat] (Cairo: al-Itissam Publishing House, 1984).
 See the Egypt chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62453/robert-s-leiken-and-steven-brooke/the-moderate-muslim-brotherhood.
 Ayman al-Zawahiri’s videotape, released on January 6, 2006; see also Lydia Khalil, “Al-Qaeda & the Muslim Brotherhood: United by Strategy, Divided by Tactics,” Terrorism Monitor 4, no 6, Jamestown Foundation, March 23, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=714&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1; Jean-Pierre Filiu, “The Brotherhood vs. Al-Qaeda: A Moment Of Truth?,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 9, November 12, 2009, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-brotherhood-vs-al-qaeda-a-moment-of-truth.
 A recent poll also shows that nearly half of the Egyptians support Hamas, and call for a strong Islamic government in Egypt. See Richard Auxier, “Egypt, Democracy and Islam,” Pew Research Center, January 31, 2011, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-protests-democracy-islam-influence-politics-islamic-extremism; See also “Syria: Muslim Brotherhood Chief Urges Assad to Learn From Egypt and Tunisia,” AKI (Rome), February 14, 2011, http://www.adnkronos.com/IGN/Aki/English/Politics/Syria-Muslim-Brotherhood-chief-urges-Assad-to-learn-from-Egypt-and-Tunisia_311681506741.html.
 Sarah A. Topol, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Fractures,” Newsweek, February 23, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/wealth-of-nations/2010/02/23/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fractures.html.
 Amr Hamzawy, “Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s platform?” Daily Star (Beirut), November 1, 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19686.
 On the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal factionalism, see the excellent analysis by Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak,” Foreign Affairs, February 3, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67348/carrie-rosefsky-wickham/the-muslim-brotherhood-after-mubarak.
 “Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide: 'The U.S. Is Now Experiencing the Beginning of Its End'; Improvement and Change in the Muslim World 'Can Only Be Attained Through Jihad and Sacrifice,'” Middle East Media Research Institute Special Dispatch no. 3274, October 6, 2010, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4650.htm.
 On the Salafist trend in Egypt, see Chris Heffelfinger, “Trends in Egyptian Salafi Activism,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Report, December 2007, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/publications/pdf/Egyptian-Salafi-Activism.pdf.
 Fawaz Gerges, “The Muslim Brotherhood: New Leadership, Old Politics,” Guardian (London), January 20, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/20/muslim-brotherhood-egypt; Liam Stack, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood To Name New Conservative Leader Mohamed Badie,” Christian Science Monitor, January 12, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0115/Egypt-s-Muslim-Brotherhood-to-name-new-conservative-leader-Mohamed-Badie; Myriam Benraad and Mohamed Abdelbaky, “Transition In Egypt: Radicals On The Rise?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policywatch 1588, September 24, 2009, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3126.
 Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).
 Ziad Abu-Amr, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no 4, Summer 1993, 5-19.
 See the Palestinian Authority chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
 Robin Wright, Dreams and Shadows: the Future of the Middle East (New York: Penguin Press, 2008); Olivier Carré and Gérard Michaud, Les Frères musulmans: Egypte et Syrie (1928–1982) [The Muslim Brothers: Egypt and Syria (1928-1982)] (Paris: Gallimard, 1983).
 Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 Heather Murdock, “Muslim Brotherhood Sees Opportunity in Jordan,” Washington Times, March 1, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/1/muslim-brotherhood-sees-opportunity-in-jordan/.
 See the Syria chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
 Radwan Ziadeh, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and the Concept of Democracy,” Paper presented at CSID’s 9th Annual Conference, May 14, 2008, https://www.csidonline.org/9th_annual_conf/Radwan_Ziadeh_CSID_paper.pdf.
 Curtis R. Ryan, “Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy and Democracy,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 12, no 2, June 2008, 1-13, http://www.meriajournal.com/en/asp/journal/2008/june/ryan/1.pdf.
 See the Iraq chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism; for further details, see “Iraqi Islamic Party,” globalsecurity.org, n.d., http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/iip.htm.
 Toby Craig Jones, “The Clerics, the Sahwa and the Saudi State,” Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights 4, no 3, March 2005, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/34006/ichaptersection_singledocument/90678113-7f09-49dc-8c77-e546acacb75a/en/jonesmar05.pdf.
 See the United Arab Emirates and Qatar chapters of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
 See the Kuwait chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
 See the Yemen chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism; Amr Hamzawy, “Between Government and Opposition: The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Carnegie Papers no. 18, November 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemeni_congragation_reform.pdf.
 “MB in Bahrain Urges Bahrainis to Engage in Dialogue,” IkhwanWeb, March 17, 2011, http://ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=28237.
 “Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report no. 29, July 30, 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/029-islamism-violence-and-reform-in-algeria-turning-the-page.aspx.
 See the Tunisia chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism; Rajaa Basly, “The Future of al-Nahda in Tunisia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Arab Reform Bulletin, April 20, 2011, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=43675.
 “As Tunisians Cheer Egypt, Islamist Leader Returns,” NPR, January 30, 2011, http://www.gpb.org/news/2011/01/30/as-tunisians-cheer-egypt-islamist-leader-returns?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+GPBNewsFeed+%28GPB+News%29.
 “Tunisia's Islamists to Form Party,” Al-Jazeera (Doha), March 1, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/03/201131132812266381.html; David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “More Officials Quit in Tunisia Amid Protests,” New York Times, January 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/world/africa/19tunis.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=More%20officials%20quit%20in%20tunisia&st=cse.
 Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Energized Muslim Brotherhood in Libya Eyes a Prize,” CNN, March 25, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-25/world/libya.islamists_1_moammar-gadhafi-libyan-regime-benghazi?_s=PM:WORLD.
 Gabriel R. Warburg, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan: From Reforms to Radicalism,” Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, August 2006, http://www.e-prism.org/images/Muslim_BROTHERS.PRISM.pdf.
 Lorenzo Vidino, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe,” Middle East Quarterly XII, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 25-34, http://www.meforum.org/687/the-muslim-brotherhoods-conquest-of-europe.
 Douglas Farah, Ron Sandee and Josh Lefkowitz, “The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: A Brief History,” NEFA Foundation, October 26, 2007, http://www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaikhwan1007.pdf.
 For additional details, see the United States chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
 “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integration?” International Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report no. 76, June 18, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Egypt/76_egypts_muslim_brothers_confrontation_or_integration.ashx.
 Myriam Benraad and Mohamed Abdelbaky, “Transition In Egypt: Radicals On The Rise?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policywatch 1588, September 24, 2009, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3126.
 Kristen Chick, “Egypt Election Routs Popular Muslim Brotherhood from Parliament,” Christian Science Monitor, December 1, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1201/Egypt-election-routs-popular-Muslim-Brotherhood-from-parliament.
 Yasmine Fathi, “Muslim Brotherhood Expected To Win Legality, Lose Popularity,” Al-Ahram (Cairo), February 20, 2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/5956/Egypt/Politics-/Muslim-Brotherhood-expected-to-win-legality,-lose-.aspx; “Muslim Brotherhood To Form Party At Appropriate Time,” Al-Masry Al-Youm (Cairo), February 19, 2011, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/muslim-brotherhood-form-party-appropriate-time; “Muslim Brotherhood Ready For Transition In Egypt,” Press Trust of India, February 4, 2011, http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_muslim-brotherhood-ready-for-transition-in-egypt_1503081.
 Daniel Byman, “Egypt 2012: What If the Muslim Brotherhood Comes to Power?” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/ideas-market/2011/02/04/egypt-2012-what-if-the-muslim-brotherhood-comes-to-power/.
 Eli Lake, “Muslim Brotherhood Seeks End to Israel Treaty,” Washington Times, February 3, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-end-to-israel-treaty/.
 Rana Moussaoui, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Splits Opinion,” Agence France Presse, February 10, 2011, http://www.zawya.com/Story.cfm/sidANA20110210T132912ZRAI46; Rhonda Spivak, “Head Of Egypt Human Rights Group Fears Brotherhood Takeover,” Jerusalem Post, February 14, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=208104; Mounir Adib, Mohamed Talaat Dawod and Hany ElWaziry, “Muslim Brotherhood: Copts And Women Unsuitable For Presidency,” Al-Masry Al-Youm (Cairo), February 20, 2011, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/muslim-brotherhood-copts-and-women-unsuitable-presidency.
 “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Promotes Moderate Path,” BBC, February 20, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12504820.
 Kerry Picket, “Egyptian protester: We Don’t Want Muslim Brotherhood to ‘Hijack’ our Protests,” Washington Times, February 3, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/watercooler/2011/feb/3/egyptian-protester-we-dont-want-muslim-brotherhood/
Kerry Picket, “Egyptian protester: We Don’t Want Muslim Brotherhood to ‘Hijack’ our Protests,” Washington “Phone Survey of Cairo and Alexandria,” Pechter Middle Polls, February 5-8, 2011, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/pollock-Egyptpoll.pdf.