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Overview: 

Founded in 1928 in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the world’s oldest, largest and most influential Sunni Islamist groups—and an inspiration for the ideology and actions of most contemporary Islamist movements. In the first decades of its existence, the movement advocated armed struggle (jihad) as a means by which to impose Islamic law (sharia) at home, while seeking to oppose Western colonialism and the state of Israel in the Middle East. Following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s assumption of power in Egypt in 1952, the Brotherhood was formally outlawed and, as a vehicle of political opposition, was alternatively demonized, repressed or silently tolerated during the decades that followed. Throughout this period, the movement developed a wide network of social and religious charities and programs, expanding its influence across the entire Muslim world and beyond. Simultaneously, however, it has undergone key ideological transformations, particularly a de-radicalization embodied in the renunciation of one of the key tenets of its original doctrine: violent jihad. This move, however, has split the Brotherhood itself, creating deep-seated grievances that resurfaced in the wake of the Arab Spring. While the movement did not play a prominent role in the origins of the 2011 Egyptian uprising, it initially benefited most by translating its traditional social influence into tangible political power and regional influence. However, little over a year after assuming power, the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government led by Mohammad Morsi was ousted by the Egyptian military amid widespread public dissatisfaction with the Morsi regime. The resulting (and ongoing) crackdown on the Brotherhood has severely degraded the group’s leadership and capabilities inside Egypt.

History & Ideology: 

The “Society of the Muslim Brothers” (Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a young primary school teacher from the city of Isma’iliyya in southern Egypt.1 In its pristine form, the Brotherhood was a religious, youth and educational group. It advocated moral reform and a revival of Islam in Egypt and the Middle East at a time when secular nationalism had gained momentum across the region. Inspired by the thinking of Muslim scholars Muhammad Abdu (1849-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), al-Banna was convinced that the process of “Westernization” had corrupted his fellow Muslims, and that secular sentiments were among the principal reasons for the decline of Islam. He felt that the weaknesses of the Muslim world could only be cured by a return to the original form of faith, applying its prescriptions derived literally from the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition to all aspects of modern life – including the political arena. To al-Banna, Islam was the only solution to the afflictions that plagued Muslim societies and the only way toward their regeneration. Al-Banna spelled out the pillars of this revolutionary ideology in his manifesto On Jihad,2 in which he illustrated Islam’s desertion of its roots, its subsequent domination by Western influences, and how social revolution and anti-colonial struggle—against the British occupation in Egypt, the corrupt monarchy, and against Jewish presence in Palestinian lands—were the prerequisites of a genuine Islamic revival.

To achieve these goals, al-Banna was the first to promote jihad (the struggle against infidels, in word and in action) as a legitimate tool to fight Western decadence and its impact on the contemporary Muslim world.However, al-Banna believed that jihad was  not restricted to the struggle against “apostates” (kuffar), but was in fact a more comprehensive awakening of Muslim hearts and minds. In the 1930s, Al-Banna’s animosity toward colonialism found expression as his organization began to recruit followers who saw appeal in its ideology on issues ranging from poverty and education to nationalism and the nascent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By using support networks of mosques, welfare associations, neighborhood groups, and professional syndicates, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to indoctrinate Egyptians—in particular those from the deprived lower class in search of a better life, and among the middle class, whose aspirations had been largely ignored by the elite. The movement’s popularity grew even as scores of its leaders suffered government repression, jail, and torture. As a result, the Muslim Brothers increasingly became viewed as heroes fighting against British colonial rule. Consequently, the Brotherhood moved beyond charitable and educational activities to become an openly political movement.  As it transformed, it extended its membership from a thousand members in 1936 to nearly two million in 1948.4 It was only after al-Banna’s assassination in 1949 by the secret police of King Faruk (who blamed the Brotherhood for anti-government acts such as the murder of Prime minister al-Nuqrashi in 1948) that the movement’s second ideologue—Sayyid Qutb—emerged to reinforce its doctrine and creed. 

In his passionate writings, still cited by Islamists today, Qutb declared that Egyptians had deviated from Islam and that Muslims were obliged to use jihad as a means to combat Western powers, which he regarded as morally decadent, idolatrous and intrinsically hostile to the Islamic faith. In his influential manifesto Milestones (Ma‘alim fi-l-tariq),5 published in 1964, Qutb expressed his belief that Islam, understood as a complete sociopolitical system, a “way of life,” was the remedy to all problems of contemporary Arab and Muslim societies. In fact, the decline of the Muslim world stemmed from ills directly imported from the West—immorality, secularism, corruption—that had taken Muslims back to a corrupt, pre-Islamic state (jahiliyya in Arabic). As an antidote, Qutb called for absolute submission to the principles of Islam. In this view, anything non-Islamic was inherently evil, including any political authority said to be “democratic” that ran contrary to a “genuine” government based on the rule of Islamic law.

Qutb understood early on that he would have to use pragmatic methods to carry out his vision.  He allied himself with the Brotherhood to promote his ideas and assert his leadership. Indeed, at that time the movement provided an organizational structure able to stage active jihad, and it already exerted great political and intellectual influence in Egypt. It thus constituted the ideal vehicle for establishing an Islamic state, a notion that Qutb shared with his ideological predecessor.6 Secure in his new alliance, Qutb began to openly endorse violence and advocate jihad, recommending that pious Muslims isolate themselves from society to fight all manifestations of apostasy and oppression. In 1954, he was arrested along with other members of the Brotherhood, and he remained in prison for most of the rest of his life. It was during his incarceration that Qutb endured degrading treatments, like torture, which led him to even more radical views. It was also during this time that he completed his most influential writings7 before his execution 1966 on charges of conspiring against the Egyptian regime.

Throughout the decades, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology has not varied much from al-Banna and Qutb’s primary arguments. However, like many other social movements, the Brotherhood has undergone a number of fundamental transformations. Arguably, the most striking of all has been the continued ideological “de-radicalization” of its leadership and its subsequent abandonment of armed jihad. This dynamic was initiated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when leaders started to increasingly disavow violence in favor of moderation and political participation. Hassan al-Hudaybi, al-Banna’s successor as the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood,8 published a book in 1969, Preachers, Not Judges, in which he justified this rejection of violence and provided a series of theological arguments to counter Qutb’s radical views.9 It was under his influence and under that of his successor, Umar al-Tilmisani, that the group distanced itself from the jihadist approach and even went so far as to name Egyptian president Anwar Sadat a “martyr” after he was assassinated in 1981.10 A number of factors enabled this de-radicalization, particularly the sustained de-legitimization of Islamist ideas through the use of rational arguments, bolstered by charismatic former jihadists and the state’s use of repression.11 This process contributed to the increasingly popular characterization of the group as a “moderate” movement, especially in the West.12 To be sure, the Brotherhood is considerably less radical today than it was in the days of Qutb.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s efforts to rebrand itself as a moderate group that has renounced jihad prompted fierce criticism from other Islamist groups. Prominent al-Qaeda leaders, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, have called the movement’s shift and its participation in Egypt’s political debate and elections a posture contrary to God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya) and a “betrayal.”13 Moreover, the Brotherhood’s de-radicalization has been tempered by the continued influence of its core beliefs; while many Muslim Brothers now claim to have embraced democracy, the ideology that was initially developed by al-Banna and Qutb, in which Islam governs all aspects of life, still carries significant resonance. Recent years also have witnessed a relative reversal of this benign trend towards the reaffirmation of more radical discourses within the organization. This is exemplified in the stance of some of the Brotherhood’s offshoots, which still back armed struggle under the banner of “resistance” against “occupation.” For example, the Islamist group Hamas, originally formed by the Palestinian Muslim Brothers, condemned the choice made by the Egyptian Brotherhood to renounce violence, and it continues to see jihad as the only viable way to rid Muslim lands of infidel presence. Criticism of the Brotherhood’s ideological and political shifts has also emanated from Syria, where the group’s leadership openly supported attacks against Israel and the U.S. in Iraq and voiced full support for Hamas and the Iranian-backed Shi‘ite militia Hezbollah.14  

Even more significant than this external criticism are the endogenous divides that the Muslim Brotherhood’s steps toward moderation have prompted.  Conflict has long festered between the movement’s conservative old guard, longtime reformists, and a younger generation of militants, who are themselves divided between democrats and a minority of radicals tempted to resume jihad in Egypt.15 As of 1996, several prominent members of the Brotherhood broke away to form new political factions, such as the “Center Party” (Hizb al-Wasat) or the “Movement for Change,” also known as Kefaya—“enough” in Egyptian Arabic. In 2007, the movement published a platform that clearly laid out the inflexible principles of the oldguard, including the rejection of the civil nature of the state and a call to establish a theocratic government and exclude non-Muslim minorities from domestic politics.16 The “re-radicalization” of segments of the movement has been particularly conspicuous among the youth.  This segment of the Brotherhood is influenced by a Salafist doctrine that considers the only true path to be a return to the practices of the first Muslims (sahaba) and rejects as apostasy (kufr) anything deviating from a strict interpretation of the Qur’an.17  

Global Reach: 

Although banned and clandestine for most of its history, the Muslim Brotherhood has managed to grow throughout the Muslim world, especially in Egypt’s neighboring countries—Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories—as well as in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, and Bahrain). The movement has also achieved global status by expanding well beyond its traditional Middle Eastern borders and into the West. For decades, these different offshoots have remained largely autonomous from their Egyptian base and independent among one another, making it difficult to characterize the Brotherhood as a coherent and homogenous organization. But the recent upheavals in the Middle East and the political transition of Muslim Brothers from persecuted opposition movements to influential forces in the nascent political systems could signal an approaching deepening of their mutual ties, if not attempts at unification in the longer run.

The Brotherhood first began to spread its ideology in the Middle East in the 1930s, essentially as a response to the Western colonial presence. In Palestine, the movement was established in 1935 by the brother of al-Banna himself, Abd al-Rahman, along with other figures such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam, who was one of the leaders of the armed resistance against the British.18 At the time, the Brotherhood’s activities were primarily of a social and religious nature, including the creation of associations, schools and the establishment of mosques intended to “bring an Islamic generation up.”19 It was in 1987, in the context of the first Intifada (Palestinian uprising), that the Brotherhood politicized itself by founding the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas),20 which in turn acquired a greater military bent. In contrast, such politicization occurred earlier in countries like Syria and Jordan, where the Brotherhood became an opposition force to the regime in the first years after national independence.21 The Islamic Action Front (IAF),22 the Jordanian Brotherhood’s political wing, is, for instance, the country’s only established opposition party. 

In Syria, after the 1963 Ba’athist coup, the group became the main (Sunni) opposition force to the (Shiite Alawite) Assad clan. The conflict quickly developed into an open armed struggle, culminating in the Hama uprising of 1982 that was famously crushed by the military and nearly wiped out the movement when thousands of its members were killed.23 After that, the movement ceased to be active politically inside the country, but managed to maintain a support network there. Most Syrian Brothers renounced violence and adopted a more reformist approach by calling for the establishment of a pluralistic and democratic political system.24 Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011, the Brotherhood has joined the anti-regime movement.25 Led by former leader in exile Ali Sadreddine al-Bayanouni,26 its members have held the most seats within the Syrian National Council (SNC), one of the main opposition groups arrayed against Assad.  Moreover, Syrian Brothers led the relief committee that distributes aid and money to the rebels. Like in Egypt, the Syrian Brotherhood continues to declare that it espouses a moderate, “Turkish-style” Islamist agenda – a manifesto unveiled in April 2012 does not mention the word Islam and contains pledges to respect individual rights – and will not seek to take over the future political system or establish any form of Islamist government. While playing down their real influence within the SNC to reduce Western fears and earn the trust of Syria’s ethno-religious minorities, the Muslim Brothers finally announced, in July 2012, their intention to create their own party.27 As the civil war continues unabated, the Muslim Brotherhood comprises a large part of the coalition of rebels fighting the Syrian government.28 

In Jordan, the Brotherhood has also sought reform by positioning itself as a leading player in the 2011 anti-government protests and denouncing public corruption and poverty.29 Contrary to its presence in other countries, however, the movement also seeks to change the system from within.30 In Iraq, where the group’s history remains relatively unknown, the Iraqi Islamic Party (the Brotherhood’s primary manifestation) was banned during the 1960s and forced underground by Saddam Hussein. It reemerged after 2003, and has since displayed an ambiguous posture, voicing harsh criticism against the U.S. and Iraq’s new political elites while still choosing to take part in the transitional process.31  

In the Gulf, the Brotherhood enjoys branches in several countries, most of which were established by militants driven out of Egypt in the 1950s. Many found shelter in Saudi Arabia, but their doctrine was seen as a challenge to that country’s official Wahhabi creed. The movement was never allowed to deal with religious issues, and therefore invested its energies in the educational field as an alternate way of disseminating its ideology. This led to the emergence of movements like the “Awakening” (Sahwa), known for its support of rebellion against the Sauds.32 But Wahhabism, in turn, influenced the Brotherhood and drew many of its members toward the more conservative Islamic trend. Elsewhere, such as in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, the Brotherhood relied on a strong intellectual and media presence to influence local populations.33 With the exception of Oman, where the Brotherhood has faced severe crackdowns, the movement also managed to gain seats in parliaments across the region: in Kuwait via the Hadas movement;34 in Yemen through Islah or the “Congregation for Reform;”35 and in Bahrain through Al-Minbar, although this group has lost its prominence since the rise of Shiite opposition.36 

In North Africa, the Brotherhood’s expansion was also fueled by resentment of colonial rule. In Algeria, its members joined the uprising against the French during that country’s war for independence before being marginalized by the secular FLN party. In the 1990s, the Algerian Brotherhood did not join jihadist factions in their fight against the state; instead, the group favored a peaceful conflict resolution and a return to democracy, even taking part in the coalition backing current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika in the early 2000s.37 In Tunisia, the Brotherhood influenced Islamists, in particular Al-Nahda (the Renaissance Party) founded in 1989, whose leaders advocate democracy and pluralism “within an Islamist framework.”38 Formerly outlawed by the Ben Ali regime, Al-Nahda made a historic return in the wake of the 2011 “Jasmine Revolution”39 and became a legalized party, benefiting from considerable popular support in the parliamentary elections and winning 40 % of the votes. It is now the most influential political force of Tunisia. In Morocco, the Justice and Development party also won the largest number of seats in the 2011 parliamentary election, gaining 27% of the votes and becoming the country’s major opposition party. In Libya, the Brotherhood has maintained a presence since the 1940s when King Idris I offered Egyptian Brothers refuge from persecution. However, after seizing power in a coup, Muammar al-Qadhafi considered the Muslim Brothers a menace and actively worked to eliminate them. Despite this repression, the Brotherhood maintained a vast network of sympathizers in Libya.40 The Party of Justice and Construction (the political arm of the Muslim brotherhood in Libya)  has gained seats in the legislative body since Qadhafi’s death.41 Finally, in Sudan the Brotherhood enjoys a significant, though informal, presence, and has launched mass Islamization campaigns that have allowed its representatives to infiltrate virtually all state institutions.42 

In addition to its traditional geography, the Brotherhood has gained significant ground in Europe through regional forums like the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, and the European Council for Fatwa and Research.43 Starting in the 1960s, members and sympathizers of the group moved to Europe and set up a vast and sophisticated network of mosques and Islamic charities and schools, such as those in England (Muslim Association of Britain), France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France), Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland), and Italy (Unione delle Comunita' ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia).44 With considerable foreign funding and the relative tolerance of European governments seeking to engage in a dialogue with Muslim minorities,45 Brotherhood-related organizations have gained prominent positions on the sociopolitical scene, presenting themselves as the legitimate representatives of Muslim communities in Europe and “moderate” interlocutors for governments and the media. 

In addition to its presence in Europe, the Brotherhood has also reached out to Muslims in the United States, where its members have been present since the 1960s. The movement launched its first long-term strategy there in 1975, focusing on proselytizing efforts and the creation of specific structures for youth and newly arrived Muslim immigrants. Seeking to exert political influence at the state and federal levels, Muslim Brothers have been represented in multiple religious organizations such as the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Muslim American Society (MAS) and a variety of other activist groups. On May 22, 1991, the Brotherhood issued a programmatic memorandum titled “The General Strategic Objective for the [Brotherhood] in North America,”46 which highlighted its goal to penetrate the heart of American society. The memorandum stated that all Muslims had to “understand that their work in America [was] a grand jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands so that God’s religion [Islam] is victorious over all religions.”47 Over time, the Brotherhood has worked to carry out this message to Muslims in the U.S.48  

Recent Activity: 

The Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of Hosni Mubarak’s ouster in Egypt to support their own political ambitions. The movement promised to provide a remedy to the previous “corrupt” era by bringing morality back into politics and tackling poverty and unemployment—two promises that have long guaranteed its popularity among the poorest and most deprived. The Muslim Brothers formed the “Freedom and Justice” party and participated in the three rounds of the 2011-2012 elections, winning in both the legislative and presidential polls.49 In the elections, Salafist parties received 24.9% of the vote, and the Muslim Brotherhood received nearly 44% of the vote, leaving Islamists in control of 70% of parliament.50 This success owes much to the recognition that the Brotherhood enjoys for its long-term social achievements and commitment to change, as well as its image of integrity and piety that fundamentally contrasts with that of the former regime. In the eyes of its sympathizers, the Brotherhood’s defense of Islamic principles and values renders it more capable of running a government, implementing long-awaited economic reforms, and ensuring greater social justice.51 However, the Brotherhood’s rise to power also prompted concerns regarding its readiness to contribute to a true democratic opening rather than exploiting its victory to enforce the radical agenda of its hard-line members. These concerns led to protests and demonstrations against former President Morsi.52  

The Egyptian military, backing anti-Morsi protestors, removed Morsi from power and dissolved his government. In 2013, an Egyptian court ruling outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and ordered that all of the organizations’ assets be confiscated in what the Muslim Brotherhood called a deliberate attempt to exclude them from political participation. Another upcoming court decision will have a profound effect on the political future of the Muslim Brotherhood under the military government.53 

Much uncertainty remains over the nature of the government that the Muslim Brotherhood would ultimately seek to establish, both in Egypt and in other Arab countries. While a number of reformist Brothers have preserved their moderate front and stated that their intention was not to install an Islamic regime, the movement as a whole has not yet renounced its ideal of recreating an Islamic caliphate. Many Muslim Brothers in Egypt have advocated a rapprochement with the Salafist trend and relied on the strength of Islamist parties in parliament to limit the role of the army and influence the constitution toward reinforced relations between religion and state. This evolution has raised serious doubts regarding the protection of religious minorities, women, and basic human rights—all of which are concerns that drove the mass protests against the Morsi government.54  

Since the Muslim Brotherhood defines Morsi’s ouster as a military coup, its leaders have called for anti-coup protests in response.55 Officially, Brotherhood leaders have only called for peaceful protests, but many Islamist supporters have reacted violently to the coup, most vividly in a series of attacks against Coptic Christians.56 However, Brotherhood leaders like Dr. Murad Ali assert that the Muslim Brotherhood condemns attacks against the Copts and reaffirm that they wish the backlash against the military to be peaceful.57  

The Brotherhood’s undefined foreign policy is another yet cause for concern. While regionally (in Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) and internationally (in United States, Russia, China, Europe) the Brotherhood wishes to preserve Egypt’s interests, its belligerent rhetoric may well endanger regional stability. Here again, internal division threaten the clarity of the Brotherhood’s message.  On one hand, seeking to reinstate Egypt’s traditional regional “centrality,” a number of Muslim Brothers have cast doubt upon the 1981 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, as well as Egypt’s strategic partnership with Washington.58 The Palestinian group Hamas has, on the other hand, has strengthened its ties with the Brotherhood and its leadership.59 Alarmingly, in June 2013, the Brotherhood called for jihad in Syria in support of the Sunni rebellion using plainly sectarian, anti-Shiite terms.60  

While recent events in Egypt may have drained the Muslim Brotherhood of its influence for now, it is unlikely that the movement will disappear from the political scene entirely. In the past, the Brotherhood has survived under hostile regimes, and it has potential to expand its influence in the uncertain political terrain that has ensued since the Arab Spring. The Brotherhood may have a chance to be the forefront of a new government in Syria if the opposition proves capable of unseating Bashar al Assad.  Meanwhile, its more moderate regional affiliates continue to rack up political successes throughout the Middle East and North Africa. 

Citations: 

[1] For an overview of the Muslim Brotherhood’s core ideology, see Hassan al-Banna’s writings and memoirs, particularly the Letter To A Muslim Student, which develops the main principles of the movement. For the English translation, see http://www.jannah.org/articles/letter.html; see also Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942 (New York; Ithaca Press, 1998) and Richard Paul Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
[2] “The Way of Jihad: Complete Text by Hassan Al Banna founder of the Muslim Brotherhood,” Militant Islam Monitor, January 16, 2005, http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/379; See also Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949): A Selection from the Majmu‘at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid, Charles Wendell, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
[3] Hassan al-Banna, “On Jihad,”n.d., http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/jihad.
[4] According to Robin H. Hallett in Africa Since 1875: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), p. 138.
[5] Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Kazi Publications, 2007).
[6] One of his first manuscripts, Dirasat islamiyya, a collection of articles written from 1951 to 1953, contains clear references to Qutb’s commitment to the Muslim Brotherhood.
[7] In addition to Milestones, one can cite Qutb’s other important volume In the Shade of the Qur’an, which he began in 1952.
[8] Barbara H. E. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hassan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (London: Routledge, 2008).
[9] Ibid.
[10] Umar al-Tilmisani, Days with Sadat [Ayam Ma‘a al-Sadat] (Cairo: al-Itissam Publishing House, 1984).
[11] See the Egypt chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
[12] Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62453/robert-s-leiken-and-steven-brooke/the-moderate-muslim-brotherhood.  
[13] Ayman al-Zawahiri’s videotape, released on January 6, 2006; see also Lydia Khalil, “Al-Qaeda & the Muslim Brotherhood: United by Strategy, Divided by Tactics,” Terrorism Monitor 4, no 6, Jamestown Foundation, March 23, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=714&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1; Jean-Pierre Filiu, “The Brotherhood vs. Al-Qaeda: A Moment Of Truth?,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 9, November 12, 2009, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-brotherhood-vs-al-qaeda-a-moment-of-truth.  
[14] A recent poll also shows that nearly half of the Egyptians support Hamas and call for a strong Islamic government in Egypt. See Richard Auxier, “Egypt, Democracy and Islam,” Pew Research Center, January 31, 2011, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-protests-democracy-islam-influence-politics-islamic-extremism; See also “Syria: Muslim Brotherhood Chief Urges Assad to Learn From Egypt and Tunisia,” AKI (Rome), February 14, 2011, http://www.adnkronos.com/IGN/Aki/English/Politics/Syria-Muslim-Brotherhood-chief-urges-Assad-to-learn-from-Egypt-and-Tunisia_311681506741.html.
[15] Sarah A. Topol, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Fractures,” Newsweek, February 23, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/wealth-of-nations/2010/02/23/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fractures.html.
[16] Amr Hamzawy, “Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s platform?” Daily Star (Beirut), November 1, 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19686.
[17] On the Salafist trend in Egypt, see Chris Heffelfinger, “Trends in Egyptian Salafi Activism,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Report, December 2007, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/publications/pdf/Egyptian-Salafi-Activism.pdf.
[18] Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).
[19] Ziad Abu-Amr, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no 4, Summer 1993, 5-19.
[20] See the Palestinian Authority chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
[21] Robin Wright, Dreams and Shadows: the Future of the Middle East (New York: Penguin Press, 2008); Olivier Carré and Gérard Michaud, Les Frères musulmans: Egypte et Syrie (1928–1982) [The Muslim Brothers: Egypt and Syria (1928-1982)] (Paris: Gallimard, 1983).
[22] Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[23] See the Syria chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
[24] Radwan Ziadeh, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and the Concept of Democracy,” Paper presented at CSID’s 9th Annual Conference, May 14, 2008, https://www.csidonline.org/9th_annual_conf/Radwan_Ziadeh_CSID_paper.pdf.  
[25] Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood rise from the ashes,” Reuters, May 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/06/us-syria-brotherhood-idUSBRE84504R20120506.
[26] Youssef Sheikho, “The Syrian Opposition’s Muslim Brotherhood Problem,” Al-Akhbar (Cairo), April 10, 2013, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15492.
[27] “Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to launch political party,” Agence France Presse, July 20, 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/48236/World/Region/Syrian-Muslim-Brotherhood-to-launch-political-part.aspx.
[28] Terrance, Jeffery. “Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Leader: We’ll Take Golan Back From Israel—‘By All Means Possible’ http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/syrian-muslim-brotherhood-leader-we-ll-take-golan-back-israel-all#sthash.ZIwtYLcn.dpuf
[29] Heather Murdock, “Muslim Brotherhood Sees Opportunity in Jordan,” Washington Times, March 1, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/1/muslim-brotherhood-sees-opportunity-in-jordan/.
[30] Curtis R. Ryan, “Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy and Democracy,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 12, no 2, June 2008, 1-13, http://www.gloria-center.org/2008/06/ryan-2008-06-01/.
[31] See the Iraq chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism; for further details, see “Iraqi Islamic Party,” globalsecurity.org, n.d., http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/iip.htm.
[32] Toby Craig Jones, “The Clerics, the Sahwa and the Saudi State,” Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights 4, no 3, March 2005, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/34006/ichaptersection_singledocument/90678113-7f09-49dc-8c77-e546acacb75a/en/jonesmar05.pdf.
[33] See the United Arab Emirates and Qatar chapters of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
[34] See the Kuwait chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
[35] See the Yemen chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism; Amr Hamzawy, “Between Government and Opposition: The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Carnegie Papers no. 18, November 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemeni_congragation_reform.pdf.
[36] Katzman, Kenneth, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy”. Congressional Research Service. 13 September, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf
[37] “Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report no. 29, July 30, 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/029-islamism-violence-and-reform-in-algeria-turning-the-page.aspx.
[38] See the Tunisia chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism; Rajaa Basly, “The Future of al-Nahda in Tunisia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Arab Reform Bulletin, April 20, 2011, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=43675.
[39] “As Tunisians Cheer Egypt, Islamist Leader Returns,” NPR, January 30, 2011, http://www.gpb.org/news/2011/01/30/as-tunisians-cheer-egypt-islamist-leader-returns?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+GPBNewsFeed+%28GPB+News%29.
[40] Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Energized Muslim Brotherhood in Libya Eyes a Prize,” CNN, March 25, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-25/world/libya.islamists_1_moammar-gadhafi-libyan-regime-benghazi?_s=PM:WORLD.
[41] “Libya Muslim Brotherhood mulls Cabinet Withdrawal” September 12, 2013. AFP. Al-Arabiyya. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/12/Libya-Muslim-Brotherhood-mulls-Cabinet-withdrawal-.html
[42] Gabriel R. Warburg, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan: From Reforms to Radicalism,” Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, August 2006, http://www.e-prism.org/images/Muslim_BROTHERS.PRISM.pdf.
[43] Lorenzo Vidino, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe,” Middle East Quarterly XII, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 25-34, http://www.meforum.org/687/the-muslim-brotherhoods-conquest-of-europe.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibidem.
[46] Douglas Farah, Ron Sandee and Josh Lefkowitz, “The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: A Brief History,” NEFA Foundation, October 26, 2007, http://counterterrorismblog.org/upload/2007/12/nefaikhwan1007%5B1%5D.pdf.
[47] Ibid.
[48] For additional details, see the United States chapter of the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism.
[49] Yasmine Fathi, “Muslim Brotherhood Expected To Win Legality, Lose Popularity,” Al-Ahram (Cairo), February 20, 2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/5956/Egypt/Politics-/Muslim-Brotherhood-expected-to-win-legality,-lose-.aspx; “Muslim Brotherhood To Form Party At Appropriate Time,” Al-Masry Al-Youm (Cairo), February 19, 2011, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/muslim-brotherhood-form-party-appropriate-time; “Muslim Brotherhood Ready For Transition In Egypt,” Press Trust of India, February 4, 2011, http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_muslim-brotherhood-ready-for-transition-in-egypt_1503081.
[50] “Egypt: 2011/2012 People's Assembly elections results,” Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. January 2013.  http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/egy2012results1.htm
[51] “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Promotes Moderate Path,” BBC, February 20, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12504820.
[52] “Egypt hit by pro and anti-Mohammad Morsi protestors.” BBC News- Middle East , September 13, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24089038.
[53] Kirkapatrick, David D. “Egyptian Courts Shut Down the Muslim Brotherhood and Seizes Its Assests”. New York Times. September 23, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/world/middleeast/egyptian-court-bans-muslim-brotherhood.html.
[54] Rana Moussaoui, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Splits Opinion,” Agence France Presse, February 10, 2011, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=44255; Rhonda Spivak, “Head Of Egypt Human Rights Group Fears Brotherhood Takeover,” Jerusalem Post, February 14, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=208104; Mounir Adib, Mohamed Talaat Dawod and Hany ElWaziry, “Muslim Brotherhood: Copts And Women Unsuitable For Presidency,” Al-Masry Al-Youm (Cairo), February 20, 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/taxonomy/term/99470.
[55] “Anti-Coup National Alliance Calls 'Coup Does Not Represent Egypt’ Protest Tuesday”. Ikhwan Web. The Muslim Brotherhood Official Website. September 21, 2013. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=31324.
[56] Fahim, Kareem. “Islamists Step Up Attacks on Christians for Supporting Morsi’s Ouster”. New York Times. August 20,2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/world/middleeast/attacks-rise-against-egypts-christians.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
[57] “FJP Reiterates Denounces of Attacks on Copts, their Churches and Property”. Ikwan Web.  August 16, 2013. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=31246&ref=search.php
[58] Tony Karon, “As U.S. Explores Dialogue with Muslim Brotherhood, Israelis Urge a Tougher Line Against Islamists’ Rise,” Time, January 5, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/01/05/as-u-s-explores-dialogue-with-muslim-brotherhood-israelis-urge-a-tougher-line-against-islamists-rise/; Eli Lake, “Muslim Brotherhood Seeks End to Israel Treaty,” Washington Times, February 3, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-end-to-israel-treaty/.
[59] Ramzy Baroud, “Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood,” Al-Ahram (Cairo), no. 1079, January 5-11, 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1079/op8.htm.
[60]Dan Murphy, “Is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood backing a jihad in Syria?” Christian Science Monitor, June 14, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2013/0614/Is-Egypt-s-Muslim-Brotherhood-backing-a-jihad-in-Syria-video.