In recent years, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has faced a growing threat to its stability from extreme, violent and political Islamist groups. The Jordanian regime had for some time waged a wide-scale and determined ideological struggle against radical Islamic organizations on its soil. In this struggle, the Jordanian regime sought to de-legitimize jihadi Salafi ideology while disseminating a brand of moderate traditional Islam as a religious "vaccine" against it. The threat to Jordan has escalated since the “Arab Spring,” however. Jordan is perceived as the most vulnerable of the monarchies (none of which have yet been toppled by the wave of uprisings in the Arab world). The large and easily radicalized Palestinian component of the country’s population, the combined influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood through its offshoot in Jordan, and jihadi Salafi trends from Iraq and Syria, pose a real and imminent threat to the stability of the Kingdom. The likely breakup of Syria, and an increase in the presence and activity of jihadi-Salafi groups there will likely exacerbate the threat to Jordan.
Political Islam is not a new phenomenon in Jordan. Since the British created the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921 and placed King Abdallah I on its throne, Islam has served as one of the cardinal building blocks of the regime’s legitimacy. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet Muhammad’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been in the Hijaz. King Abdallah and his grandson Hussein took care to present themselves as believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs. The Jordanian constitution of 1952 established Islam as the official religion of the kingdom and mandated that the king must be a Muslim born of Muslim parents. The country’s constitution defines sharia as one of the legal foundations of the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the sharia courts. However, in contrast to other Muslim countries where Islam plays a pivotal role, the Jordanian regime has steered a middle course. It never declared sharia to be the sole source of legislation, nor did it ever attempt to implement the hudud (Islamic penal law).1
The radical Islamic camp in Jordan is composed of two separate—though frequently overlapping—wings. The first is the main body of Jordanian Islamists, which identifies with the Muslim Brotherhood movement that originated in Egypt. The second is the radical jihadi-Salafi movement embodied by al-Qaeda and its ideological fellow-travelers within Jordan.
The radical Islamic camp in Jordan largely draws its strength from diverse and significant sources. Foremost among them are: its own organizational and ideological infrastructure inside the country; indirect influence and public sympathy from the wider Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has deep roots in the Jordanian public (both Trans-Jordanian and Palestinian); the inflammatory influence of the war in Iraq; the ongoing Arab conflict with Israel; and the rise of Islamism across the region following the Arab Spring. Confronting all of these factors is a weak official religious establishment that lacks popular support and is incapable of mobilizing those with religious authority to defend the regime’s views.
The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood movement is deeply rooted in Jordan, manifested in the country’s political arena through the Islamic Action Front (IAF) party and parliamentary faction, and in civil society (in mosques, schools, labor and trade unions and universities). Since the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan in the 1940s, internal struggles have occurred between a “moderate” faction that aspires to co-exist and maintain sound relations with the regime, and an “extremist” wing that draws its ideology from the takfiri doctrine of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb, and as a result attempts to confront the regime both politically and ideologically.
Throughout most of the movement’s history in Jordan, the Trans-Jordanian faction led the Brotherhood, and tended to work in cooperation with the regime, which for its part allowed the movement to be the only organized political force in the country and to establish a wide da'wah network of civil society organizations and charities.2 The extremist wing has usually been identified with leaders of Palestinian origin, whose identification with the Hashemite regime was weaker than that of their Trans-Jordanian compatriots.3
In the past, this extremist wing was relatively marginal in the overall operations of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. In the 1980s and 1990s, it devoted most of its energies to the jihad in Afghanistan, and subsequently in Chechnya, Bosnia and other places. More recently, however, this faction has gained in strength and daring, as reflected by the results of the internal leadership elections carried out by the Brotherhood in early 2006, and manifested in particular in the composition of the IAF. The Muslim Brotherhood’s religious rulings, or fatwas, express its identification with the Salafi worldview, identifying with the jihads in Iraq and Israel/Palestine, calling on Arab leaders to raise the flag of jihad and determining that any Muslim who provides support to the "occupying forces" commits an act of treachery (khiyyana) and war against Allah and his Prophet—an act tantamount to apostasy and abandonment of the nation of Islam.4 It is also worth noting that in June 2006, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood paid a condolence visit to the family of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian who became “emir” of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. These leaders insisted, though, that this visit was humanitarian rather than political in nature.5
Developments in the Palestinian theater have exerted influence over Islamism in neighboring Jordan, and specifically in the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in its attempts to rally support within its constituency. These attempts, however, have inevitably drawn the movement into greater conflict with the Jordanian government and other political parties. For example, the movement leveraged protests by Hamas over the Egyptian fence, built to prevent smuggling of weapons to and from Gaza, into a domestic political issue, with the “fatwa committee” of the IAF issuing a religious decree prohibiting the construction of what it called the "Egyptian-Israeli-American wall."6 Two key arguments served as the basis for the prohibition: 1) humanitarian arguments – that the fence would strengthen the blockade of Gaza, undermine the lives of its inhabitants, damage their health, and halt Gaza's reconstruction; and 2) a political argument – that the fence would undermine the jihad for the liberation of Palestine, because it would prevent the transfer of weapons to the mujahideen in Gaza. Therefore, the fatwa implies that by turning to the Americans and Israelis for its protection, Egypt becomes one of them, and hence the Egyptian government should be considered “apostate.” This religious ruling by the IAF incorporates two central tenets of the Salafi jihadist ideology embraced by al-Qaeda. It accepts the approach that liberating all occupied Islamic territories, especially Palestine, is the “individual duty” of every Muslim, which must be carried out either by actively participating in the jihad or by providing the weapons and money needed for it. It also promulgates the view that a Muslim regime that works with the Jews and the Christians should be seen as “apostate.”
In March 2006, the IAF’s Shura Council elected Zaki Bani Irsheid as its Secretary General after receiving the approval of the Muslim Brotherhood. Zaki Irsheid is an Irbid businessman, born in al-Zarqa’ in 1957. Irsheid’s election was anathema to the regime, due to his close ties with Hamas and his militant record. However, the Brotherhood leadership balanced Irsheid's election by elevating (in March 2006) two relatively-moderate leaders to senior leadership positions: Sheikh Salim al-Falahat as Inspector General and Hamza Mansour as head of the IAF's Shura Council.7
The regime's early concerns regarding Irsheid’s political and militant approach, as well as his radical support of Hamas, were validated, as he quickly became a prominent oppositionist and a harsh, extremist critic of the regime's domestic and foreign policies.8 Irsheid’s radicalizing effect on the IAF's political doctrine was rapidly apparent: in July 2006, the party's Religious Sages Committee issued a religious ruling, stating that "it was obligatory to assist Hezbollah's mujahideen against Israel" in the Second Lebanon War.9 At the same time, the Committee condemned Saudi religious sages, who characterized Hezbollah as heretical, and called for the group to be ostracized.
Irsheid similarly spearheaded the transformation of the IAF's platform for the country’s November 2007 parliamentary elections. The new platform emphasized that the IAF's views and objectives stemmed from "Islamic religious law”. On domestic issues, the new platform outlined a series of proposed constitutional reforms, including a new election law loosening regime control of mosques and restrictions on religious preaching. In foreign policy, the platform rejected Israel's existence and called on Jordan and Egypt to annul the peace treaties with Israel in favor of “active resistance” to any kind of normalization of relations. It also called for "providing comprehensive assistance, including military assistance, to the Jihad forces and the Resistance" which are acting against Israel in order to "fully liberate the land." At the same time, it attacked the United States, accusing it of "striving to gain control over the Arab countries and the Islamic world," and calling on Muslims to act to liberate countries “occupied” by the United States—specifically Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.10
In the subsequent parliamentary elections, however, the IAF had a poor showing, with the number of its seats plummeting from 17 (out of 110) to a mere seven. The loss contributed directly to the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council later the same month.11 In its statement regarding the dissolution, the Brotherhood accused the Jordanian government and its agencies of rigging the elections and defaming the movement through biased state media.12
Subsequently, in February 2008, the Brotherhood held elections for a new Shura Council, choosing Abd al-Latif Arabiat, a moderate, as Council head. The internal power struggles associated with the election moderated the movement’s drift toward radicalization, and eventually brought about a balanced division of power in the Muslim Brotherhood's institutions. The "hawkish" faction and the "Fourth faction," which is affiliated with Hamas, gained control over the Council and won a combined 28 Council seats, while the "dovish" faction won 22 of the Council's 50 seats. Subsequently, the "hawks" accepted three seats in the Executive Bureau, which is in charge of conducting organizational policy, while the moderates won the remaining five.13
However, this balance proved only temporary. On April 30, 2008, the Brotherhood’s new Shura Council elected a radical Islamist and longtime power broker, Dr. Hamam Sa'id, as the organization's fifth Inspector General. The election of Sa'id, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, was the product of a coalition between hawkish factions within the organization.14 With Sa’id’s appointment, and the earlier appointment of Zaki Bani Irsheid as IAF Secretary General, the Brotherhood’s internal issues and overall policy directions became dominated by charismatic, activist leaders with the most uncompromising views.
In the years that followed, the two leaders steered the organization onto a more confrontational course with the Jordanian regime. Sa’id, for example, supported a militant approach that advocates turning Jordan into “a country where military force is to be concentrated and a military outpost for the war against the unbelievers.”15 In other words, Sa’id not only advocates the central demand of his party and the Muslim Brotherhood that the regime abrogate the peace agreement with Israel, but goes as far as embracing the Takfiri jihadist approach that demands Jordan be transformed into a launch-pad for military confrontation against nearby Israel. This opinion, voiced publicly on broadcast media, depicts the Palestinian issue as a Jordanian one.
On May 30, 2009 Zaki Irsheid was forced to resign his post as IAF's Secretary General. The 120 members of the IAF’s Shura Council accepted his resignation, and those of eight members of the party's Executive Bureau (responsible for formulating party policies). Thereafter, they unanimously elected Dr. Ishaq al-Farhan as the party's new Secretary General, and approved the list of eight new Executive Bureau members proposed by him.16 Al-Farhan fulfilled the Brotherhood’s pressing need for a transitional Secretary General; he was acceptable to many circles and on good terms with the government. Al-Farhan, in turn, promptly outlined a transitional plan to prepare the party for its next internal elections. He underscored the need for a pacific settlement of internal disputes, and vowed to take steps to harmonize relations with the government.17 Nevertheless, serious disputes between the two factions continue, and are expected to do so as long as Islamism advances in the Middle East in the post Arab Spring period—and as Hamas continues to gain power in the Palestinian arena. As of early 2013, Hamam Sa’id serves as the Brotherhood’s Inspector General, and Zaki Irsheid as his deputy.
The rise to power of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has galvanized its Jordanian counterpart. Similar to the role that Nasserist Egypt played in the 1950s and 1960s, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood now wields its influence both as an ideological movement in its own right and for the benefit of the Egyptian state in the region. This process is, over time, likely to strengthen the radical faction of the Jordanian Brotherhood. The Egyptian regime, meanwhile, could conceivably play a role in “mediating” between the Jordanian regime and its “domestic” opposition.
The institutional infrastructure of Salafi-jihadi Islamism in Jordan is diverse. It includes popular mosques not under the regime's supervision and bookstands that propagate a radical, exclusionary religious worldview. The many websites of global jihadist groups provide a means for mass dissemination of this ideology. Jihadist activists arrested by authorities have been found to be indoctrinated via these outlets. A prominent example is Abed Shahadeh, nicknamed Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi, who was imprisoned for three years in 2005 and arrested several times since. Al-Tahawi is considered a source of religious law among extreme Islamic groups in Irbid, and preaches the takfir doctrine in mosques in the Irbid region.18 This indoctrination, in turn, has been facilitated by the presence of what anecdotal evidence suggests is a significant minority within Jordanian society that supports Salafism, and facilitates the recruitment of members by jihadist organizations—a proclivity illustrated in public opinion surveys conducted in recent years in Jordan.19
The Muslim Brotherhood movement in general, and its extremist wing in particular, plays a pivotal role in the dissemination and acceptance of the Salafi-jihadi message in Jordanian society, especially among the younger generation of citizens. Outbreaks of violence between Israel and the Palestinians, particularly in the Gaza Strip, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, likewise have served to strengthen Salafi sentiment in Jordan. Extremist organizations, chief among them al-Qaeda, appear to enjoy both support and admiration among a considerable percentage of the Jordanian public, which sees the group and its broader ideology as the principal standard-bearer in the war against the enemies of Islam.20
The ebb and flow of jihadist activity in Iraq profoundly affected Islamist organizations in Jordan. The 2006 killing of the Iraqi al-Qaeda’s “emir,” Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Coalition successes against the group thereafter (as a result of the “surge” strategy adopted by the Bush administration), along with local Jordanian pressure, all served to create fissures in the Jordanian jihadist movement. The result was the emergence and rise of a more “pragmatic” wing of the movement, led by the prominent Salafi cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Since his release from Jordanian prison in 2008, al-Maqdisi has consistently criticized the school of thought epitomized by al-Zarqawi, which sanctioned intra-Muslim conflict due to ideological and political differences. Al-Maqdisi did not change the principles of takfir, the declaration of Muslims as heretics or apostates. However, he made a case against jihadist attacks inside Jordan, thus revising his own views about the permissibility of collateral casualties among Muslims (or even their direct targeting) if necessary in order to kill “infidels”.21
The rise of Islamism in the Arab Spring seems also to encourage Salafi and Salafi-jihadist movements, and helps widen jihadi networks, especially with the continuation of fighting in Syria. In mid-December 2012, Salafis in Jordan announced a new “emir” to the Syrian rebel group Jabhat Al-Nusra. The new “emir,” Mustafa Abdul Latif Al-Saleh, nicknamed Abu Anas Al-Sahabi, was born in the city of Zarqa, and is the brother-in-law of the late Zarqawi.22 The U.S. claims that Jabhat Al-Nusra is acting on behalf of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and has designated the group as a terrorist organization. For their part, al-Tahawi and other supporters of jihad in Syria have reportedly claimed that at least 150 Jordanians are fighting in Syria with Jabhat Al-Nusra.23 Jordanian Salafi youngsters also have been reported killed in the fighting.24
The Islamic movement in Jordan enjoys a broad popular base among both the country’s Trans-Jordanian and Palestinian populace. In recent Pew polls, support in Jordan for the enactment of sharia law, including the hudud (stoning and amputation of limbs), was widespread. Some 50 percent of those polled were found to be in support of segregation between men and women in workplaces, while 58 percent of respondents favored stoning for the crime of adultery and 86 percent approved capital punishment for apostates.25
In recent years, Islamic dress—particularly for women—has become more and more ubiquitous. Islamic bookstores selling radical tracts can now be found near almost any mosque in Amman. Furthermore, at 34 percent, favorable attitudes toward al-Qaeda in Jordan are the highest in the Arab world.26
The Palestinian issue ranks high on the agenda of Jordan’s Islamist groups, in particular the Brotherhood and IAF, for a number of reasons:
- The presence of a large number of citizens of Palestinian origin in the Brotherhood leadership.
- The Muslim Brotherhood’s view of Jordan's large Palestinian population as its key constituency, not only for parliamentary elections but also for strengthening its positions in the trade unions and local authorities.
- The Palestinian issue is a perennial issue of interest in Jordan's politics and of major interest to the public.
- Traditional organizational ties with Hamas, stemming from the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its Palestinian counterpart were part of the same organization in the past.27
Moreover, the institutions and membership of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the Palestinian Hamas movement overlap considerably. One of the more obvious links is the existence of offices in the Gulf States that represent both organizations, staffed by officials of Palestinian origin. The bureaus are important to both organizations because they serve as a means of raising funds from wealthy sources in the Gulf.28
The common denominator among the various Brotherhood factions is that the Palestinian issue is an integral part of their agenda in Jordan, and that ongoing consultations with Hamas are only natural. The Brotherhood, one official has explained, “has a religious and national obligation to support the Palestinians and their problem.”29 The current Inspector General, Hamam Sa’id, has gone further, stating that the Brotherhood‘s involvement in the Palestinian arena serves to provide "the Palestinians [with] jihadist assistance and support".30 Like the Palestinian issue generally, the Brotherhood’s relationship with Hamas remains an important element of Islamist expression in Jordan.
Mainly since Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza (2008-2009), the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has been playing a major role in the political struggle against Israel and other Western countries, and boosted political and financial support to Hamas. Brotherhood-affiliated professional syndicates, for example, operate the Anti-Normalization Committee, while the Engineers’ Syndicate in particular has been active in the coalitions and umbrella bodies which lobby for Hamas and initiate “direct actions” against Israel.31 These bodies are mostly directed by Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Europe, and reflect the growing power of the Brotherhood internationally. It is therefore important to understand the central place that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has gradually come to occupy in this global hierarchy.32
Ties between the movement in Jordan and Hamas are the cause of ongoing tensions between the "hawks" and "doves" in the Muslim Brotherhood leadership. The moderate faction of the Brotherhood’s leadership in Jordan demanded the immediate severing of organizational ties with Hamas, claiming that they went against the Brotherhood's rules and regulations as well as against Jordan's constitution and the Political Parties Law.33 The “hawks”, on the other hand, supported a preservation of the status quo. The Brotherhood’s Inspector General, Hamam Sa’id, ultimately took the position that the status quo should endure, but qualified his statement by describing the relationship as one between two independent organizations.34 On December 17, 2012 the popular Saudi-owned and London based daily Al-Hayat reported that a new four-page secret memo written by members of the “doves” trend, was recently presented to the Brotherhood’s Shura Council. The claims it contained concerned the use of “political money” by leading “hawks” figures; the “assassination” of the organization for the benefit of the “hawks” trend; and the promotion of Hamas, a policy which—according to the writers—transformed the disagreement between the Brotherhood’s leadership and the majority into a debate over a regional question. Analysts who spoke with the paper say that it reflected the sharp divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.35
Salafi jihadi organizations in Jordan remain under intense pressure from the Jordanian government, which has succeeded in disrupting numerous attempted terrorist attacks inside the Kingdom in recent years. It has done so through the imprisonment of large numbers of jihadist activists and sympathizers, in the process wreaking havoc on their respective organizations and restricting their activities. A high point was the January 2009 trial of twelve members of a Salafi-jihadi group charged with attacks on a Christian church and cemetery, and with involvement in the shooting of a group of Lebanese musicians performing in downtown Amman.36
Also notable was the December 2009 trial of twenty-four Islamists on criminal charges stemming from their management of the Islamic Centre Society (ICS), which had been dissolved three years previously. Before its dissolution, the ICS had served as the Muslim Brotherhood's financial arm, administering assets worth over a billion dollars, running scores of schools, health establishments and social centers. In 2006, at the height of internal tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF, the government of former Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit dissolved the ICS. The government at that time charged ICS officials with corrupt practices, but Brotherhood leaders contended that the step was designed to deprive the Islamic Movement of the financial backing it had traditionally received. The move was widely believed to have been one of the key reasons behind the IAF’s downturn in the November 2007 elections.37
Jordanian authorities, however, have also seen their fair share of defeats. On December 30, 2009, for example, a suicide bomber killed seven CIA agents at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost Province of Afghanistan. An officer of Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) was also killed in the attack.
The real challenge facing the Brotherhood, moderates and radicals alike, appears to be the far-reaching reforms of the internal political system announced by King Abdallah in late November 2009. The Brotherhood in particular has doubts about the regime’s intention to implement the genuine political reform it promised the public. From the Brotherhood’s point of view, the implementation of a thorough political reform that would introduce the principle of “one person, one vote” and pledge to hold “honest and fair elections” is a basic condition for translating their potential electoral power into a significant quota of parliamentary seats, and subsequently making political and public gains. For several years, the Brotherhood has accused the regime of not holding fair and transparent elections. Leading figures also refer to the political triumph and rise in power of Islamist movements across the region following the Arab Spring as an issue which could be translated into political leverage at home: “We use the results in the other Arab countries to say to our government: look, when the elections are fair, the Islamists win.”38
The Brotherhood boycotted the January 2013 elections, a move which actually seems to have worked against it. The Brotherhood continues to demand the implementations of “reforms” and the limiting of the King's power. In April 2013, it issued a warning letter to the King and the national intelligence services, accusing the regime of corruption and calling on him to change his current policies.39
In its initial stages, at least, the “Arab Spring” did not seriously undermine the Jordanian regime. The vanguard of protests in Jordan appeared to be more the Salafi jihadi movement than the Muslim Brotherhood itself. The violence also exposed divisions between this faction and the larger Salafi movement. However, the fall of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes and the unsettled situation in other countries (such as Syria) encouraged the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood to increase its pressure on the regime. The regime, for its part, accused the protestors of receiving orders from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere. It has also animated the normally quiescent East-Jordanian political leadership; according to various reports, tribal leaders have warned the King that they would not tolerate a light hand in dealing with the threat, which they perceived as a Palestinian attempt to topple the Hashemite entity.40This was expressed in demonstrations under increasingly radicalized slogans, along with the classic demands for an end to corruption and the abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel. These demonstrations escalated in March 2011, resulting in a number of casualties (though far less than in other Arab countries). Demonstrations continue to take place occasionally around the country, usually due to demands for “political reforms” or protests against a rise in food prices. However, chants to overthrow the regime can also be heard.41
Jordan’s King, like his counterparts in the Gulf States, has expressed concern over the emerging Egypt-Turkey-Qatar “axis” that has materialized from the Arab Spring, and which has promoted Muslim Brotherhood influence throughout the region.42 Jordanian officials, too, have worried about the role being played by Qatar via large inflows of money,43 as well as about the possible takeover of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in the event that the Assad regime falls—something which would also bring Syria into this axis.44 The Brotherhood, for its part, has pushed back against these concerns, claiming new discrimination.
Domestically, the King has attempted to promote a wider dialogue between various political forces within the country, including leftist, nationalist and independent figures.45 This was met with approval from the Brotherhood, whose leaders have said that the group “welcomes a serious and responsible dialogue any time…we ask for a modern and fair elections law, a real struggle against corruption and constitutional reforms that will result in elected government, parliament and elders.”46
 See Shmuel Bar, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan,” Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies Data and Analysis, June 1998, http://www.dayan.tau.ac.il/d&a-jordan-bar.pdf.
 These were widely referred to and named in Ibrahim Gharaybah, Jamaat Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin fi al-Urdun 1946-1996, Amman: Markaz al-Urdun al-Jadid lil-Dirasat: Dar Sindibad lil-Nashr, 1997, pp. 169-185; Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. 83-92
 Bar, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, 50-52.
 Website of the Islamic Action Front, August 14, 2004, http://www.jabha.net. Nadwah al-Majali summarizes how the jihad faction, on the one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, have a stranglehold on the state and seek to undermine its foundations: "One faction attacks the regime through violence, confrontation, takfir and bombing attacks, while the other faction gently tunnels below the regime's foundations, penetrates the society and its institutions, mobilizes the street against it and raises doubts about its direction. Al-Rai (Amman), June 27, 2006.
 Muslim Brotherhood main Arabic language portal, June 11, 2006, http://www.ikhwanonline.com
 Website of the Islamic Action Front, January 24, 2010,http://www.jabha.net.
 Al Hayat (London), March 19, 2006.
 Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), March 22, 2006.
 Al-Quds al-Arabi, Al-Ra’i, Al-Ghad, 7 July 2006.
 Website of the Islamic Action Front, October 27, 2007, http://www.jabha.net.
 The Shura Council is the Movement's highest-ranking body, which outlines policies in cooperation with the IAF Shura Council.
 IslamOnline, November 30, 2007. The Brotherhood decided at the last minute not to participate in the local council elections held that year, out of concern that the elections would be biased in the regime's favor.
 Al-Haqiqa al-Dawliya (Amman), April 30, 2008; Al-Hayat (London), May 4, 2008.
 Al-Haqiqa al-Dawliya (Amman), April 30, 2008.
 As cited in Al-Iman, September 24, 2009.
 Al-Farhan had been the IAF’s first Secretary General and had also been the Muslim Brotherhood's Shura Council head. Born in Jerusalem in the mid-1930s, but of Palestinian origins, al-Farhan joined the Muslim Brotherhood while he was still in high school. He obtained an MA in literature from the University of Columbia in the United States and subsequently a Ph.D in Cultural Studies. In 1970, having worked in the Ministry of Culture for about fifteen years, Wasfi al-Tal asked him to join his government as Minister of Culture, Education and Religious Affairs. Al-Farhan later held this office in the governments of Ahmad al-Lozi and Zeid al-Rifa’i. In 1989, he was elected to the Senate for four years and then headed the University of al-Zarqa. Throughout his career, al-Farhan held various political, public, and academic offices.
 Mafkarat al-Islam, May 31, 2009.
 Al-Dustour (Amman), May 23, 2005; Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), June 6, 2005.
 According to a survey conducted prior to the attacks in Amman on November 9, 2005, some 64 percent of the Jordanian public sympathized with al-Qaeda in Iraq led by al-Zarqawi. Al-Hayat (London), December 15, 2005. However, this sympathy dropped sharply after the attacks in Amman. In a survey conducted immediately after these attacks, 72 percent of the sample believed that this organization was a terror organization, 20 percent believed that it was not a terror organization and 15.6 percent believed that it was a resistance organization. But after the killing of al-Zarqawi in June 2006, the percentage of those who regarded the organization as a terror organization dropped to 54 percent, while 20 percent still believed it was not a terror organization. It should be noted that the data shows that 10 percent of those surveyed in 2004 believed that the al-Qaeda organization led by bin Laden was a terror organization, compared to 49 percent in 2005 and 41 percent in 2006. This indicates that there is greater sympathy for bin Laden's organization than for al-Zarqawi’s. Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), July 10, 2006.
 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah,” December 2, 2010, http://pewglobal.org/2010/12/02/muslims-around-the-world-divided-on-hamas-and-hezbollah/; See also Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Osama bin Laden Largely Discredited Among Muslims in Recent Years,” May 2, 2011, http://pewglobal.org/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-largely-discredited-among-muslim-publics-in-recent-years/.
 See al-Maqdisi's website, http://www.tawhed.ws/, and the subsequent debate with other jihadi authorities such as Ma’asari. For a summary of these debates, see Joas Wagemakers, “Reflections on Maqdisi’s Arrest,” Jihadica, October 2, 2010, http://www.jihadica.com/reflections-on-al-maqdisis-arrest/.
 Jordan Times (Amman), December 13, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/jordanian-tapped-to-lead-jihadist-forces-in-syria.
 The Independent (London), October 23, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/jordan-seeks-to-curb-flow-of-fighters-to-syria-8222287.html.
 Al-Hayat (London), December 22, 2012, http://alhayat.com/Details/464995.
 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah.”
 Al-Haqiqa al-Dawliya (Amman), December 29, 2009. According to a senior source in the Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood’s Inspector General, Hamam Sa’id, and two members of the Brotherhood’s Executive Bureau are also members of the Hamas Shura Council and participate in its debates. See Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), September 2, 2009.
 Al-Siyasa (Kuwait), October 23, 2009; Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), September 2, 2009.
 Al-Kifah al-Arabi (Beirut), December 21, 2009.
 For example, both the Anti-Normalization Committee and “Lifeline of Jordan” convoy group were named part of the International Committee to Break/End the Siege on Gaza, the main Muslim Brotherhood-led umbrella body in charge of ‘mobilizations’ against Israel such as convoys, flotillas and marches, http://en.gaza-siege.org/members (no longer available online).
 Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), September 2, 2009.
 Al-Kifah al-Arabi (Beirut), December 21, 2009.
 Al-Hayat (London), January 28, 2009; al-Ghad (Amman), January 28, 2009.
 Al-Hayat (London), December 17, 2012, http://alhayat.com/Details/462727.
 “Two Dozen Islamists Go on Trial on Corruption Charges,” Deutsche Press-Agentur, December 24, 2009, http://monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1521391.php/Two-dozen-Islamists-go-on-trial-on-corruption-charages.
 Jacob Amis, “The Jordanian Brotherhood in the Arab Spring”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 14 (January, 2013), p. 43.
 Ibid., p. 42.
 See, for example, Tim Lister, “Jordanian Tribal Figures Criticize Queen, Demand Reform,” CNN, February 6, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-06/world/jordan.monarchy_1_jordanians-king-abdullah-ii-tribal-leaders?_s=PM:WORLD.
 See, for example, BBC Arabic report on demonstrations held in Amman, November 16, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2012/11/121116_jordan_protest_king.shtml.
 See for example a YouTube clip, published November 14, 2012, featuring a demonstration in Amman,http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dwBOqMVNfk&feature=player_embedded#!.
 Al-Sharq (Saudi Arabia), December 15, 2012, http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/12/15/626813.
 Al-Sabil (Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood magazine), December 16, 2012, http://www.assabeel.net/studies-and-essays/studies/120276-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%85%D9%86-%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%C2%BB%D8%9F.html.
 Al-Hayat (London), December 20, 2012, http://alhayat.com/Details/463972.
 Al-Hayat (London), December 13, 2012, http://alhayat.com/Details/461595.
 Al-Sabil (Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood magazine), December 31, 2012, http://www.assabeel.net/important-topics/122611-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9.html.