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Argentina is home to one of the largest Muslim populations in Latin America.1 A growing percentage of this community is made up of Argentine converts to Islam, a significant number of whom have been recruited and radicalized by Islamist operatives working throughout the country.

The Argentine Muslim community has gone largely unnoticed since its establishment in the 19th century, but questionable financial investments, such as those from Libya and Saudi Arabia tied to Carlos Menem’s administration and bombings in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s—the largest terror attacks in the region at the time—brought it into the national spotlight. Since then, the community has been stigmatized for its connection to radical Islamist networks tied to Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah. Through these networks, Iran has used intelligence operatives to infiltrate Muslim society and recruit members from a community that shows signs of increasing radicalization.  

These networks pose a significant danger to Argentina, whose policy toward Iran and other Arab states has often been ambivalent and inconsistent. Moreover, Argentina’s failing economy and its strained relationships with Western allies during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner made it even more vulnerable to Iranian advances and activities in the region.

Level of Islamist Activity: 
Low
Islamist Activity: 

Radical Islamist activity has been growing throughout Argentina since at least the early 1980s, when the Iranian Revolution was “exported” to the Americas.2 Iranian interest in the American continent at large dates to the 1850s. Then known as Persia and controlled by the Qajar Dynasty, the nation sought U.S. help in constraining European powers. In later years, Persia fostered diplomatic relationships with a variety of other nations such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.3 However, Iran’s political objectives changed with the 1979 Revolution, resulting in a break in ties with the United States and an eventual shift toward Latin America, particularly toward countries antagonistic to “American imperialism.”4 According to Alberto Nisman, the special prosecutor for the AMIA attack, Iran and Hezbollah saw Argentina as a land of opportunity5 for spreading radical Islam due to the large number of Muslim communities in the region, particularly the Tri-Border Area at the crossroads of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.6 Nisman cited documents seized from Iranian operatives identifying high-density areas of Muslim population to be used “as centers of penetration of Islam” throughout South America.7 Since then, Argentina in particular has served as one of the main hubs through which Shi’a radicals have developed an extensive network of terrorists, clergymen and recruiters, money launderers, and other operatives all dedicated to “exporting the revolution” throughout the region.8 

The result of this growing network was the execution of Latin America’s most notorious Islamist terrorist attack—the July 18, 1994 bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), which killed 85 civilians and injured hundreds more. Two years earlier, on March 17, 1992, a similar attack had been carried out against Israel’s embassy in Buenos Aires, murdering 29 people and injuring over two hundred.9 These twin attacks awoke Argentina to the real threat of Islamist activity within and around its borders. 

According to Nisman, Iran’s Islamist terrorist network in Argentina was first established in 1983 with the arrival of Iranian operative Mohsen Rabbani. Originally sent to Argentina under the guise of a commercial representative of the Iranian meat industry,10 Rabbani quickly established himself as a leader within the country’s Shi’ite Muslim community and began leading prayers at the At-Tauhid mosque in the Floresta neighborhood of Buenos Aires.11 In his role as a prayer leader, Rabbani was able to address believers at will, inserting radical political rhetoric into his sermons and developing relationships with young “disciples” who would later become operatives within his evolving terror network. 

The network Rabbani established throughout the Shi’ite Muslim community in Buenos Aires grew to include more than 40 Islamic associations, including schools, media outlets, and charity organizations that are used today as backdoor channels through which the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah perform intelligence and covert operations.12 It spans across state borders, allowing Iran and its proxies to pursue various terror operations in the region as a part of their political expansion. The most well-known of these operations is the 1994 AMIA attack in Buenos Aires, of which Nisman identified Rabbani as “the mastermind.13 Though Rabbani escaped justice in Argentina by leaving the country in 1997, Interpol has since placed him on a “red alert” list, barring his travel to the region. However, the Islamist terror network he established continues to grow under the supervision of his numerous disciples.

According to a recent report by the Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS), Rabbani’s Argentine connections can be broken down into three different types of actors: shadow facilitators, “super fixers,” and “fixers.”14 While prohibited from entering Argentina, Rabbani still acts as a shadow facilitator from Iran, providing guidance and funding to various Islamist activities in Argentina.15 His disciples act as “super fixers,” moving across countries throughout Latin America and acting as point persons for the “fixers,” or local Argentine agents who have access to or knowledge of targeted communities in the country. Perhaps the two most infamous Rabbani disciples and “super fixers” are Abdul Karim Paz and Edgardo Ruben “Suhail” Assad. According to Nisman, Karim Paz is Rabbani’s first convert and has been described as his “right-hand man” and immediate successor as the Imam of the At-Tauhid mosque.16 Similarly, Suhail Assad is known as a prominent leader in the local Shi’a community, with strong connections to the government of former Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.17 Some of these connections come from Suhail Assad’s cousin, Jorge Alejandro “Yussuf” Khalil, who was accused by Nisman of conspiring with the Fernández de Kirchner regime to cover up Iran’s involvement in the AMIA attack through a controversial agreement signed between both countries in 2013. Yussuf Khalil is currently the General Secretary of the At-Tauhid Mosque.18 

Together, Yussuf Khalil, Abdul Karim Paz and Suhail Assad serve as Iran’s “informal ambassadors” in Argentina, continuing to recruit and radicalize Islamic communities to join the revolution.19 Under their supervision, the radical Islamist network in Argentina grows stronger and more expansive behind its façade of Muslim community and religious centers, cultural associations, and seemingly innocuous development of diplomatic and trade relations with Argentine leaders. So does its influence on the local Muslim population, susceptible to radicalization and recruitment to Islamic extremism through proselytizing in mosques, schools, and cultural events in Argentine society.

Rabbani and his disciples have paved the way for other extremist groups to target Argentina, most notably the Islamic State. In September of 2016, Secretary of National Security Eugenio Burzaco mentioned the possibility of ISIS operatives in Corrientes. While he later announced that national security forces had investigated and found no evidence of an ISIS cell in the region, he nevertheless maintained that the Argentine government remained worried that Argentines who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS might return to form terrorist cells within Argentina.20 President Mauricio Macri has also received threats from individuals possibly linked to ISIS, implying that Argentina is under threat of imminent attack.21 In 2017, the Argentine Army’s website was briefly hacked by unknown individuals who displayed a pro-ISIS message that claimed the organization was in the country.22 Argentine World Cup matches and high-profile players have also been the targets of ISIS propaganda.23

While these individuals may be acting independently and an organized threat has so far not materialized, they nonetheless reflect an alarming degree of infiltration and activism by Islamist elements—a level of activity influenced and encouraged by the inroads created by Mohsen Rabbani and his network. 

Islamism and Society: 

The date of Islam’s first appearance in Argentina is unknown. Early records remain unreliable since Muslims were listed as “other,” along with Jews and Catholics, and did not receive a special category. Some believe the first Muslims to arrive in Argentina were descendants from the Moors who came to the Americas with the Spanish conquistadors, though this theory has not been verified.24 The first official data possibility mentioning Arabs in Argentina comes from 1887 when 17 “Ottomans” were listed as arrivals at the port of Buenos Aires.  Later records indicate a wave of Arab/Islamic migration to Argentina, comprised primarily of Syrian and Lebanese immigrants, during the mid- to late-19th century. This population continued to grow through the 20th century to an estimated 700,000 Muslims, mainly of Arab descent.25 In 2010, the Pew Forum estimated Argentina’s Muslim community to have grown to almost 1 million people, or 2.5 percent of the country’s population of approximately 41 million.26,27 Approximately 70% of this population is Sunni, with the Shiite community making up the remaining 30%.28 However, within the Muslim community itself, the Arab population is starting to shrink as immigration from Arab countries like Syria and Lebanon is replaced by increasing immigration from West Africa.29 Furthermore, the current growth of Islam in Argentina owes less to immigration from Arab states than to converts from within Argentina itself,30 thus changing the cultural demographic of the country’s Muslim community from primarily Arab to a more diverse group.

Islam’s spread to populations beyond the Arab community can be credited to the proliferation of Islamic centers and schools that have been established since the late 20th century. Though the Arab immigrant community originally established organizations and centers focused on preserving cultural rather than religious identity (Jews and Christians of Arab origin also participated in these groups), certain centers devoted to religious instruction. The foundation of the Centro de Estudios Islámicos (Center of Islamic Studies), headed by Imam Mahmoud Hussein, initiated the process of “diffusion of Islam” in 1973 and began to attract converts of non-Arab origin.31 Since then, several mosques and Islamic centers have emerged throughout Argentina, though the Islamic community remains overwhelmingly concentrated in Buenos Aires. 

One such mosque is the King Fahd mosque in Palermo, the largest mosque and Muslim cultural center in Latin America. Inaugurated in 2000, the mosque is notable for the fact that the approximately $15 million in building costs were paid for by King Fahd himself, and the land, formerly property of the Argentine state, was donated to King Fahd in the mid-1990s by ex-President Carlos Menem.32 Despite the presence of multiple mosques and Muslim cultural centers in Buenos Aires, the Argentine Congress passed a bill approving the construction of the mosque, which drew criticism from members of the community who cited it as an example of Menem’s tendency to favor pro-Arab or pro-Muslim ventures in Argentina, while failing to support other faiths with donations in cash or land. 

Despite its size and international connections, until Menem’s election as president in 1989, the Muslim population went largely unnoticed by the rest of Argentine society. Though Menem maintained his identity as a Catholic convert, his Arab background and family’s continued ties to Islam brought the Muslim community into the public eye. As Menem raised the Muslim community to political prominence by adding members of the community, including his own family, to high-ranking positions within his cabinet, scandal and controversy also dominated his administration, resulting in a rejection of the Muslim community by certain sectors of Argentine society.33 

After the bombings in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s, anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment within Argentine society intensified. Argentina, which had until then considered itself safe from international terrorism, turned against its Muslim population.34 Muslims and Arabs were stigmatized for their community’s ties to the perpetrators of the AMIA attack,35 most notably the leader of the Shiite Muslim community in Argentina, Mohsen Rabbani. Muslims in Argentina also faced considerable public discrimination following the September 11, 2001 attacks, according to Alexis El-Sayer of the Centro Islámico de la República Argentina (CIRA).36 At that time, Muslims often hesitated to identify themselves publicly, though by 2012 the community had largely overcome this challenge and continued to practice Islam in peace, despite widespread ignorance about the Islamic faith and community in Argentina.37

Though the Islamic community remains a small minority within larger Argentine society, the Arab community continues to grow and is now the third largest community in Argentina, after Italians and Spaniards. Islamic leaders hope that the proliferation of Islamic/Arab cultural centers and increased Islamic influence on society, particularly in Buenos Aires, will help “create a new bond between Islam and Latin America”38 and help spread a positive, unbiased image of Islam. 

The Argentine government also makes an effort to help the Muslim community feel like a part of Argentine society. The Argentine Secretariat of Worship under the Office of Foreign Affairs maintains a close relationship with leaders of the Islamic community and seeks to promote religious harmony by sending government officials to religious celebrations of all faiths.39 The Islamic community has seen the attendance of government officials, including ex-President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, at Muslim celebrations and events as “recognition… of our existence within Argentine society.”40

The familiarity with which the Fernández de Kirchner administration treated the Muslim community can be attributed to the influence of a major cultural organization known as the Federación de Entidades Arabes, or FEARAB. Originally founded in 1972 to represent Muslim immigrant communities in Latin America,41 the organization has offices throughout the region and its leaders maintain strong relationships with local governments. In Argentina especially, FEARAB leadership was successful in developing relationships with the federal government during the Fernández de Kirchner era.42 This access to high-ranking Argentine officials allowed FEARAB to supersede its original social and cultural spheres and become a political entity. This ascent is cause for concern, because at least some of the leaders of FEARAB, the ranks of which include Abdul Karim Paz and Yussuf Khalil, maintain connections with Mohsen Rabbani’s Islamist network.43 A series of Argentine government wiretaps reveal that these individuals took advantage of the organization’s access to top Argentine officials to implement Iran’s political agenda and further extend Iranian influence in Argentine politics—resulting in the Kirchner government’s introduction of a controversial Memorandum of Understanding in 2013, under which the two countries agreed to work together to investigate the perpetrators of the 1994 AMIA attack.44

Islamism and the State: 

Argentina’s policy towards Arab or Middle East states has historically been seen as rather ambivalent, particularly on controversial issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, tacit support for the Arab World among Peronistas can be traced back decades. 

Many scholars continue to interpret Argentina’s decision to abstain from voting on the UN resolution to partition Palestine in 1947 as an unwillingness to pick a side in the conflict. But the vote actually helped the Palestinian cause, and the Arab World recognized the benefit of the vote. The Syrian-Lebanese Society of Santiago de Estero, the Syrian-Lebanese Club of San Juan, and the Arab-Muslim society in the Cordoba province, among other notable Arab civic organizations, forwarded notes of gratitude to government leaders and the Central Arab Committee for Aid to Palestine expressed their gratitude for a position “before the assembly of the U.N., in defense of the Palestine sovereignty.”45 

Syrian leadership awarded Perón the Grand Order of the Umayyads during an Argentine delegation visit to Syria in 1950 and renamed a main street in Damascus after Argentina, explaining that “when Arabs lost friends in the east and the west, Argentina was the first state to answer the call of duty… by sticking to the Arab side in the United Nations.”46  

Yet neutrality in Middle East issues remained a fairly consistent position after the 1950s, with only intermittent support for Palestinian issues. Argentina enacted policies in favor of the Palestinians in order to avoid oil embargos from OPEC nations, but subsequently adopted a more moderate stance toward Israel after public outcry from the Argentine Jewish community. Since then, Argentina has typically sought to balance support for the Palestinians with its backing of Israel.47

This duality of Argentina’s stance toward Arab/Muslim and Jewish/Western issues became even more pronounced during the presidency of Carlos Menem, who offered to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict and extended links to Israel by becoming the first Argentine president to visit the country,48 despite his ties to the Arab/Muslim community both in Argentina and abroad. Official attitudes toward Arab and Islamic elements were further confused by the revelation that Libyan leader Muammar Ghadafi had contributed $4 million to Menem’s electoral campaign49 and of the president’s “donation” of state property, valued at $10 million, to the Saudi Arabian Islamic Affairs Department for the construction of what is today the Fahd center in Buenos Aires.50 Meanwhile, Menem had terminated Argentina’s cooperation with Iran’s nuclear program in 1992,51 the same year that the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed by a group linked to Iran and Hezbollah52 and two years before the 1994 AMIA attack that led to a break in diplomatic ties between Argentina and Iran.

Argentina’s relationship with Iran is one of the longest-standing in the region, beginning in 1902, but the 1992 and 1994 terror attacks in Buenos Aires resulted in a cooling of diplomatic relations between the two countries as Argentina sought the extradition of the high-ranking Iranian officials linked to the attacks.53 With the advent of the Kirchner government (2007-2015), however, Argentine policy shifted dramatically, abandoning its traditional pro-Western, pro-United States orientation in favor of warmer ties with anti-U.S. regional governments such as Cuba, Venezuela and other “Bolivarian” states, as well as with Iran.  

Energy deficits and mounting debt alienated Argentina from its former Western allies, nudging the Kirchner administration toward “friendlier” governments in Venezuela and Cuba. The Chávez administration in particular served as a new political ally and source of economic support to Argentina and provided further incentive for Fernández de Kirchner to distance herself from the U.S.54 

Iran took this shift as an opportunity to re-open relations with Argentina. In 2007, then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad allegedly asked Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez to reach out to Kirchner with the aim of “changing Argentine policy and allowing Iran access to Argentine nuclear technology.”55 The result was a gradual re-establishment of diplomatic ties between Argentina and Iran, a development that allowed Iran to increase its trade opportunities in the region and further strengthen its proxy terrorist network in the country.56 

As part of this process, then-Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman broke with the Argentine Jewish community in 2012 in order to pursue ties with Iran, and Fernández de Kirchner offered to freeze the longstanding federal investigation into the AMIA bombing in exchange for expanded bilateral trade with the Islamic Republic.58  This move was partly motivated by Argentina’s increasing political and economic desperation, and its growing dependence on alternative sources of trade.59 It had the effect of making Argentina one of Iran’s largest trade partners in the hemisphere, providing the Islamic Republic with long sought-after agricultural commodities.60 Meanwhile, Argentina’s dependence on oil and gas, which make up 90 percent of the country’s primary energy sources, intensified its dependence on imports from Iran.61 This warming of ties culminated with the announcement of the 2013 Memorandum of Understanding between Argentina and Iran,62 which further normalized relations between the two countries. 

This normalization proved to be short lived, however. Just half a year later, Argentina voted against Iran at the UN Human Rights Council,63  and in 2014 Fernández de Kirchner announced the abrogation of the Memorandum due to lack of progress and internal opposition. A series of back and forth maneuvers followed, with Kirchner alternately courting the country’s Jewish community and contesting a decision by the country’s Federal Criminal Appeals Court that declared the MOU unconstitutional.64 This inconsistent attitude toward Iran remained in place until the end of her tenure in 2015.  

Meanwhile, under Kirchner’s leadership, Argentina continued to develop relationships with other anti-Western Arab nations. In 2010, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad visited Buenos Aires and was warmly received by the President, who never acknowledged him as a dictator.65 In the years following, Foreign Minister Timerman would make various trips to Aleppo to meet with Syrian officials, arranged by pro-Iran Ambassador to Syria Roberto Ahuad. This rapprochement and Argentina’s reluctance to denounce the Syrian civil war in late 2012 demonstrated an effort to maintain a positive relationship with a Syrian government closely allied to Iran.66

The election of Mauricio Macri to the Argentine presidency in late 2015 signaled yet another change in Argentina’s rather disjointed policy toward Iran. Macri expressed disgust at Iran’s involvement in the AMIA case and the relationship that Fernández de Kirchner’s administration had developed with the Islamic Republic.67 In the first weeks of his presidency, he ordered the withdrawal of the appeal filed by his predecessor’s government regarding the federal ruling of the MOU’s unconstitutionality.68 Additionally, Macri called for the use of Mercosur’s Democracy Clause to expel Venezuela from the economic bloc for its human rights abuses, thus striking another blow to Iranian influence in the region.69 This signified a clear break from the previous administration’s policies towards Iran and its anti-Western allies and set a precedent for Argentina’s realignment with the United States, Europe, and Israel. 

However, Macri’s attitude toward other Middle Eastern and Arab states, particularly the Gulf States, has not been as clear. Since Macri took office in late 2015, his most notable actions toward the Middle East have included the signing of a controversial commercial treaty with Qatar, aimed at encouraging and protecting bilateral investment,70 and the announcement that Argentina would accept at least 3,000 Syrian refugees in cooperation with the European Union.74 

This announcement reflected a continuation of the previous administration’s policy toward the Syrian conflict, which had entailed the creation of Program Siria (Syria Program) by the previous administration, in which Syrians affected or displaced by the country’s civil war were granted residency in Argentina for up to two years. Palestinian nationals that had been residing in Syria were also eligible to participate in this program. Under Macri’s administration, the refugee acceptance program has been augmented by the creation of the Gabinete Nacional del Programa Siria (National Cabinet for the Syria Program), an inter-departmental entity whose main goal is establishing guidelines for the country’s reception of refugees and facilitating their social integration. 

Like his predecessors, Macri has demonstrated a certain level of ambivalence in his policies toward Arab and Muslim nations, attempting to balance criticism of one with support for another The knowledge that Iranian terror agents have been operating within these communities and have used them to gain access to government officials, radicalize and recruit members, and raise funds has made this decision a potential security risk. 

Kirchner’s questionable dealings while in office followed by the still–unsolved murder of Nisman culminated in December 2017 when an Argentine judge issued an arrest warrant for the former President, who had recently won a seat in the Senate. Back in January 2015, authorities had discovered Nisman dead in his apartment from apparent gunshot wound to the head a mere hours before his scheduled testimony to Argentine parliament regarding an alleged conspiracy by government officials to cover-up Iran’s participation in AMIA bombing.75  Nisman’s 300-page dossier contained years of damning wiretap transcripts that revealed “Kirchner and several of her governmental colleagues [had] whitewash[ed] Iranian involvement, in order to secure much-needed oil deliveries.”76  

The judge who issued the arrest warrant cited treason, calling the AMIA attack an “act of war” by Iran and accused now-Senator Kirchner of covering up the role of Iranian leaders and their Hezbollah proxies in favor of a lucrative trade deal. The judge requested Congress vote to remove her immunity as an elected official.77 Macri’s emphasis also resulted in new investigations by the Argentine national police into the death of Nisman, leading to the finding that the prosecutor had been drugged with ketamine before being brutally assaulted and shot.78 

Argentina is not yet free from the threat of radical Islamist terrorism, nor are its Arab and Muslim communities rid of the terror network still operating in their midst today. But Macri’s reversal of a previously pro-Iran agenda and his rapprochement with Israel and Western allies represents a concrete step in this direction.

Citations: 

[1] The Argentine national census does not record religious data, so statistics vary by source, with some reports citing Argentina as home to the largest Muslim population in Latin America (1,000,000 members) and others citing Brazil (35,000 to 1.5 million members). For more information, see the US Department of State International Religious Freedom Report for 2015, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.
[2] As described in the 2013 Nisman Dictum, the “export of the revolution” is Iran’s official policy of extending its political-religious view beyond its borders. Alberto Nisman, Report on Terrorist Networks in Latin America, pg. 10, May 2013, accessed October 12, 2016, http://albertonisman.org/nisman-report-dictamina-on-sleeper-cells-full-text/. 
[3] Stephen Johnson, Iran’s Influence in the Americas (Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2012), accessed October 27, 2016, http://csis.org/files/publication/120223_Johnson_IranInfluence_ExecSumm_Web.pdf.
[4] Johnson, Iran’s Influence in the Americas.
[5] Nisman, 2013 Dictum, op cit., p. 59, 72, 180-181.
[6] Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nisman, Office of Criminal Investigations: AMIA CASE; Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General (Argentina), October 25, 2006, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.peaceandtolerance.org/docs/nismanindict.pdf.
[7] Matthew Levitt, “Exporting Terror in America’s Backyard,” Foreign Policy, June 14, 2013, accessed October 27, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/14/exporting-terror-in-americas-backyard/.
[8] Levitt, “Exporting Terror in America’s Backyard.”
[9] US Department of State. “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992,” accessed October 27, 2016, http://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/chron.html.
[10] Nisman’s report indicates that this role was merely a front; Rabbani was already a member of Iran’s intelligence bureau upon his arrival in Argentina.
[11] Alberto Nisman, 2013 Dictum, op cit., p. 56, 58-59.
[12] Douglas Farah, Back to the Future: Argentina Unravels (Inter-American Institute for Democracy, 2013), 75.
[13] Alberto Nisman, 2013 Dictum, op. cit.
[14] Douglas Farah, Fixers, Super Fixers and Shadow Facilitators: How Networks Connect, (International Assessment and Strategy Center, April 23, 2012), accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20120423_Farah_FixersSuperFixersShadow.pdf. 
[15] Joseph Humire, After Nisman: How the death of a prosecutor revealed Iran’s growing influence in the Americas, (Center for a Secure Free Society, 2016), 17.
[16] Alberto Nisman, Complaint of Criminal Plot, p. 96, 2015, accessed October 27, 2016, http://albertonisman.org/nisman-complaint-denuncia/.
[17] Humire, After Nisman, p. 19-20.
[18] Humire, After Nisman, 17.
[19] Humire, After Nisman, 17.
[20] El Día. “Eugenio Burzaco descartó presencia demiembros de Isis en Argentina,” September 11, 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.eldia.com/el-pais/el-gobierno-detecto-argentinos-formados-por-el-estado-islamico-164431.
[21] Jerry Nelson, “ISIS to Argentina: We’re Coming to See You,” Huffington Post, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/isis-to-argentina-were-coming-to-see-you_us_57dfb7d0e4b0d5920b5b3054.
[22] Demian Bio, “Argentine Army Website Hacked With Alleged Threat From ISIS,” Bubble, June 19, 2017, http://www.thebubble.com/argentine-army-website-hacked-with-alleged-thre...
[23] Marissa Payne, “Pro-ISIS poster threatening World Cup terrorist attack depicts Lionel Messi crying blood,” Washington Post, October 24, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/10/24/pro-isis-poster-threatening-world-cup-terrorist-attack-depicts-lionel-messi-crying-blood/?utm_term=.26c5f5426bff
[24] Pedro Brieger, “Muslims in Argentina,” ISIM Newsletter, June 2000, 33, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17433/ISIM_6_Muslims_in_Argentina.pdf?sequence=1
[25] Chris Moss, “Latin America’s First Mega-Mosque,” Hispanic Muslims, accessed May 16, 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, http://hispanicmuslims.com/articles/other/openseyes.html.
[26] “Table: Muslim Population by Country,” (The Pew Center, January 27, 2011), accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/?utm_expid=53098246-2.Lly4CFSVQG2lphsg-KopIg.0.
[27] The World Bank cites Argentina’s population at 41,222,875 people in 2010. For more information, please see World Bank population data, accessed December 9, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2010&locations=AR&start=2010&view=bar.
[28] “International Religious Freedom Report—Argentina,” (The United States Department of State, November 17, 2010), accessed October 11, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148731.htm. 
[29] The Argentina Independent. “Ramadan Mubarak: Observing the Month-Long Fast in Buenos Aires,” July 20, 2012, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.argentinaindependent.com/life-style/ramadan-mubarak-observing-the-month-long-fast-in-buenos-aires/.
[30] Rosemary Pennington, “Is there Islam in Latin America?,” Muslim Voices, accessed May 16, 2016, http://muslimvoices.org/islam-latin-america/.
[31] Brieger, “Muslims in Argentina,” 33.
[32] Moss, “Latin America’s First Mega-Mosque;” Clarín. “Se inaugura la mezquita más grande de Sudamérica,” September 9, 2000, accessed December 9, 2016, http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2000/09/25/s-03801.htm.
[33] Brieger, “Muslims in Argentina,” 33.
[34] Moss, “Latin America’s First Mega-Mosque.”
[35] Brieger, “Muslims in Argentina,” 33.
[36] The Argentina Independent, “Ramadan Mubarak.”
[37] The Argentina Independent, “Ramadan Mubarak.”
[38] Moss, “Latin America’s First Mega-Mosque.”
[39] “Argentina,” International Religious Freedom Report 2010 (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, November 27, 2010), accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148731.htm.
[40] The Argentina Independent, op.cit.
[41] Jose R. Cardenas and Roger Noriega, The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin America (American Enterprise Institute, October 6, 2011), accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.aei.org/publication/the-mounting-hezbollah-threat-in-latin-america/.
[42] For more information on the FEARAB relationship with the Argentine government, see Humire’s special report After Nisman.
[43] Humire, After Nisman.
[44] Humire, After Nisman.
[45] Delegacion de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas, “Anti-Jewish Activities of the Arabs in Argentine” (Buenos Aires: DAIA, 1958), 9.
[46] Abdel Latif Yunes quoted in Campodónico to Paz, July 4, 1950, División de Política, Syria, 1950, Box 7, Folder “Politíca Interna,” AMREC.
[47] Cecilia Baeza, “América Latina y la cuestión palestina (1947-2012),” Araucaria Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Política y Humanidades 14/28 (2012): 111-131.
[48] Baeza, “América Latina y la cuestión palestina (1947-2012).”
[49] Brieger, “Muslims in America,” 33.
[50] Moss, “Latin America’s First Mega-Mosque.”
[51] Cardenas and Roger Noriega, The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin America.
[52] The United States Department of State, “The Year in Review,” Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992, April 30, 1993, accessed October 11, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/review.html.
[53] Ilan Berman and Joseph M. Humire, Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America (London: Lexington Books, 2014), 35, 81.
[54] Berman and Humire, 82.
[55] Roger F. Noriega, Argentina’s Secret Deal with Iran?, (American Enterprise Institute), accessed May 16, 2016, https://www.aei.org/publication/argentinas-secret-deal-with-iran/.
[56] Berman and Humire, 86.
[57] Ilan Berman, “The Dangerous Iran Flirtation,” The Washington Times, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/27/at-first-blush-argentina-seems-like-an-odd-choice-/.
[58] Jaime Darenblum, “How Argentina and Brazil Help Iran,” The Weekly Standard, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/how-argentina-and-brazil-help-iran/659920.
[59] Berman and Humire, 82.
[60] Johnson, Iran’s Influence in the Americas.
[61] Berman and Humire, 82.
[62] Berman and Humire, 82.
[63] Buenos Aires Herald. “Argentina votes against Irán at UN Human Rights Council,” accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/127012/argentina-votes-against-irán-at-un-human-rights-council.
[64] Buenos Aires Herald. “Appeals Court declares unconstitutional deal with Iran on AMIA attack probe,” accessed October 10, 2016, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/159604/appeals-court-declares-unconstitutional-deal-with-iran-on-amia-attack-probe-. 
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