Overview

Islamism has found fertile ground in Libya, where economic woes and a dictatorial regime have fostered significant popular support for radical groups. Not least of these is the Muslim Brotherhood, whose founders were responsible for importing Islamist ideology from Egypt and whose members have faced prosecution at the hand of Libyan ruler Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi.

Qadhafi, who came to power via military coup d’etat in 1969, possesses a secular militant radical ideology which justifies the use of violence and terrorism in order to promote Libyan interests and Qadhafi’s personal ideology. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Libya provided funds, training facilities, safe haven and logistics for various Palestinian terror groups.¹  It also established and “hired” terror groups, using them to promote its own interests.²  Libya’s sponsorship of terrorist activity was revealed during the investigation of PA 103 bombing over Lockerby, Scotland – an investigation that was followed by the imposition of significant sanctions against Libya on the part of the United Nations.³

With the emergence of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in the late 1980s, Qadhafi faced his biggest radical Islamist threat. With a large amount of public support, the LIFG has plotted, albeit unsuccessfully, to overthrow the authoritarian regime in Tripoli. Recent reconciliation efforts between the LIFG and the regime created a tentative truce, although the real future of radical Islam in Libya remains uncertain.

Islamist Activity

Libya won its independence from Italy by the end of World War II and declared itself a constitutional monarchy under King Idris. On September 1969, Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi staged a military coup d’état in the country, establishing an Arab nationalist regime that adhered to an ideology of “Islamic socialism.” Qadhafi has been the only leader of Libya since that time. It was not long before his regime began to generate resentment among Islamic circles in the country, which led to an Islamist revival beginning in the late 1970s. Today, this resistance continues, encapsulated in a number of Islamist movements:

The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood first appeared in Libya in the 1950s. The Libyan branch was founded by Egyptian cleric Ezadine Ibrahim Mustafa and several others, who were given refuge by former Libyan King Idris after fleeing political persecution in Egypt.⁴  The king allowed them a relative degree of freedom to spread their ideology, and the movement soon attracted a number of local adherents. It gained further momentum through Egyptian teachers working in Libya.⁵  Qadhafi, however, took a less accommodating stance, regarding the Brotherhood as a potential source of opposition.⁶  Soon after coming to power, he arrested a number of the Brothers and repatriated them back to Egypt. In 1973, the security services arrested and tortured members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, who, under pressure, agreed to dissolve the organization. As a result, the Brotherhood remained silent throughout the remainder of the 1970s.

However, in the early 1980s, the Brotherhood (which by then had renamed itself the “Libyan Islamic Group” or Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya al-Libiia) revived its aspirations to replace the existing secular regime with sharia law through peaceful means, and was once again beginning to gather popular support. The group was given a boost by a number of Libyan students who had returned from the United Kingdom and the U.S., and took an active role in helping to spread the Brotherhood ideology. The movement operated covertly in groups of interlinked cells active throughout the country. The group drew much of its popular appeal through the charitable and welfare work of its members. In particular, the movement attracted members of the middle classes and was especially strong in the eastern area of Benghazi, where the main tribes have traditionally opposed Qadhafi's rule.⁷

It was in the 1990s, however, that political Islam found strong popular support in Libya. Economic mismanagement, falling oil prices and the international sanctions (imposed in 1992 as a result of Qadhafi's refusal to hand over two suspects in the 1998 Lockerbie bombing) contributed to chronic socio-economic malaise. With no other political alternative under Qadhafi’s tyranny, the population was ripe for the radical approach of political Islam. Not only did the Brotherhood garner greater support, but a number of new Islamic groups also emerged. These included the Islamic Gathering (Harakat Atajamaa Alislami), founded by Mustafa Ali Al-Jihani. Its support base was almost entirely in the east of the country, and its ideology was very similar to that of the Brotherhood. The global Tablighi Jama'at movement also succeeded in drawing popular support at this time, mainly in the western areas of the country. The Tablighi Jama’at choose, however, to distance themselves from politics, after a number of them had been arrested at the end of the 1980s, and subsequently became co-opted by the regime, with some being given posts as imams or speakers.⁸  At any rate, it seems the number of Tablighi supporters in Libya currently is relatively small, since there is only one known Tablighi center in the country.⁹

By the end of the 1990s, the authoritarian regime had more or less wiped out organized Islamic opposition inside the country. However, Qadhafi has been unable to prevent the growing religiosity that has taken hold among the Libyan population, as it has across much of the Arab world. Increasing numbers of the population support Brotherhood-type ideologies and aspire to the kind of Islamic alternative promoted by the Brotherhood in what could be interpreted as a form of passive resistance to the regime.¹⁰  The Brotherhood itself is able to continue its activities, conducting annual conferences and mainly preserving their political infrastructure and institutions as well as their social and charitable activities among the population.¹¹

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
The dominant Islamist group challenging the Qadhafi regime currently is the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). LIFG did not officially announce its formation until 1995, but the roots of the group can be found in an underground jihadist movement formed in 1982 by Awatha al-Zuwawi. With no official name and under high security, the movement managed to spread and attract many followers throughout Libya over the span of more than a decade.¹²  Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, it advocated launching military operations against the regime in order to overthrow Qadhafi and plotted attacks against senior figures in his government. By 1989, authorities had discovered the insurgency and arrested many of the rebels, including Al-Zuwawi. Those who were not captured were forced to flee to Afghanistan.

The LIFG was engaged in long-term preparation for its military campaign, and to strengthen combat skills many of its members seized the opportunity to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. There, they and other Libyans set up their own camp and underwent military training, at times instructed by al-Qaeda members.¹³  While in exile in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the movement began to morph into an identifiable organization. Besides military training, the Libyan recruits were also indoctrinated in Afghanistan by influential jihadist clerics such as al-Qaeda founder Abdullah Azzam.¹⁴  While the initial goal remained fighting the communist-led forces in Afghanistan, these recruits began to develop fighting skills in anticipation of the day they would return to Libya to fight Qadhafi's regime.

Like other Muslims who fought against the Soviet forces, many Libyans left Afghanistan between 1992 and 1993, following the Soviet withdrawal.¹⁵  While some went on to aid militant groups in Algeria and Bosnia-Herzegovina, others, including LIFG members, became part of Osama bin Laden's Islamic Army Shura (consultative committee), a platform he created in Sudan in order to coordinate the international militant alliance he sought to form.¹⁶  They delivered lectures in Khartoum and maintained regular contact with LIFG members in Libya. It was within this platform that LIFG members formed ties with operatives from various bin Laden affiliates, like the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Egyptian terrorist group Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya.¹⁷

Back in Libya, the LIFG, led by Commander Abu Abdullah al-Sadek, was establishing its structure and developing the leadership skills of those in charge of cells and units throughout the country.¹⁸  Throughout the 1990s, the LIFG continued to conduct military operations against the Libyan regime, including several failed attempts to assassinate Qadhafi himself. The Libyan regime fought relentlessly against the LIFG, which suffered numerous losses, including that of Salah Fathi bin Suleiman (a.k.a. Abu Abdurrahman al-Khattab), one of its founding fathers, who was killed in a battle with Libyan soldiers near Darna in September 1997.¹⁹

Aggressive Libyan government operations throughout the country eventually crippled the LIFG’s infrastructure within Libya and forced most of the remaining members to exit the country and resume their operations in exile. As a result, many LIFG members, such as al-Qaeda associate Abu Anas al-Libi, moved on to political activity in the United Kingdom, where the organization established a robust underground support network.²⁰  Others eventually fled to various Asian, Persian Gulf, African, and European countries, but ultimately Afghanistan became the preferred destination for LIFG members once again.²¹

Upon al-Qaeda’s return to Afghanistan from Sudan, the LIFG ran at least two military training camps. One was the Shaheed Shaykh Abu Yahya Camp, located approximately 20 miles north of the capital, Kabul.²²  The camp included volunteers of several nationalities and was run by an LIFG commander known as Abu Mohammed al-Libi. Some of the training camps were shared by different terror groups and al-Qaeda affiliates, allowing the LIFG to form links with groups like the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM). Past ties between the LIFG and al-Qaeda were strengthened during this time, as the two shared both human and material resources. Over time, those ties appear to have had an ideological effect on the LIFG as well, as its leaders embraced a more radical anti-Western approach affiliated with al-Qaeda.²³

After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks, some LIFG members were captured, while many fled the country, mainly to neighboring Pakistan.²⁴  Simultaneously, several prominent LIFG commanders stepped forward to take over prominent public positions within al-Qaeda’s leadership and infrastructure in Afghanistan.

• Abu Faraj al-Libi became the overall chief of al-Qaeda's military committee (similar to "AQ chief of staff") until his arrest in the spring of 2005.²⁵
• Abu Al-Laith al-Libi was one of the senior military commanders of al-Qaeda, fighting the coalition and Pakistani troops.  He was responsible for the Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces until he was killed by U.S. forces in the spring of 2008.²⁶
• Abu Yahya al-Libi is the current head of al-Qaeda's religious committee.²⁷
• During 2008-2009 Abdullah Sai'd been the head of internal regions (Afghanistan-Pakistan border zone) in al-Qaeda's military committee until he was killed by a U.S. drone attack.²⁸
• Sheikh Atiya Allah is a prominent al-Qaeda senior leader who is considered to be very close to Ayman al-Zawahiri.²⁹

In 2007, the LIFG was officially welcomed into al-Qaeda's fold in a statement released on the Internet by al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and senior commander Abu Laith al-Libi.³⁰  Zawahiri called for the overthrow of the governments of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, while Abu Laith al Libi urged Libyans to join the fight against Qadhafi, the United States "and their brothers, the infidel of the West."³¹

Islamism and Society

Libya is a country of about 700,000 square kilometers and 5.8 million inhabitants, 1.5 million of whom are foreigners. Ninety-seven percent of the population is Sunni Muslim, with the rest belonging to different Christian churches.³²  The dominant school of Islamic thought among the Libyan population is the Malakite School.

Libya does not have a constitution, and hence there is no explicit legal provision for religion-society-state relations. However, a basis for some degree of legalizing these relations is provided in the Great Green Charter on Human Rights³³ of Libya that was adopted in 1988. According to the Charter, the government tolerates most minority religions but strongly opposes militant forms of Islam, which it views as a security threat. Religious practices that conflict with the government's interpretation of sharia are prohibited.

Islam is the equivalent of a state religion, as it is thoroughly integrated into everyday political and social life. As with all other aspects of individuals' lives in Libya, the government closely monitors and regulates Islam to ensure religious life includes no political dimension. Monitoring of mosques and a widespread culture of self-censorship generally ensure that both clerics and adherents stay within well-established lines of acceptable practice. Even mosques endowed by prominent families generally must conform to the government-approved interpretation of Islam. The government also maintains control over religious literature, including Islamic literature;³⁴  for example, the government denies public access to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Internet site.³⁵

The World Islamic Call Society (WICS) is the official conduit for the state-approved form of Islam. With an emphasis on activities outside the country, it operates a state-run university for moderate Muslim clerics from outside the Arab world. To date, WICS has trained 5,000 students in Islamic thought, literature and history. Upon graduation, the government encourages students to return home and promote its interpretation of Islamic thought in their own countries.

A state-run religious endowments (auqaf) authority administers mosques, supervises clerics and has primary responsibility for ensuring that all religious practices within the country conform to the state-approved form of Islam.³⁶  Religious instruction in Islam is required in public schools, but the government does not issue information on the religious affiliation of children in public schools, and there were no reports of children transferring to private schools for alternative religious instruction.³⁷
 
Despite all these measures taken by the state to control and monitor Islamic activity, Libya, like most countries in the region, experienced an Islamist revival from the late 1970s onward. Islamic ideologies continued to gain support among the Libyan population and many Libyan youth find their way abroad to participate in the global jihad wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. When tallied in 2005, Libyan fighters were estimated to constitute 18.8 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq, second only to Saudi Arabia's 41 percent.³⁸

Islamism and the State

During 2009, in a break from its past persecution of the LIFG, the Libyan regime launched a conciliatory policy toward the group and its members. Reports suggest that Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, the son and heir apparent of the current Libyan leader, held a clandestine series of negotiations in an attempt to achieve reconciliation between the Libyan state and the LIFG.³⁹  As a result of these efforts, on September 2009, LIFG leaders in Libya released a new "code" for jihad in the form of a 417-page religious document titled “Corrective Studies.” The new code viewed the armed struggle against Qadhafi's regime as illegal under Islamic law and set down new guidelines for when and how jihad should be fought. It does, however, state that jihad is permissible if Muslim lands are invaded, citing Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine as examples.⁴⁰

Whether the LIFG still poses a major threat to Qadhafi is unclear. While the group may have shifted its policy regarding its internal military operations as a consequence of negotiations with the Qadhafi regime, it still maintains close ties with al-Qaeda, and some of its members hold senior positions within its ranks. This highlights a related threat posed by Libyan “veterans” of the wars currently taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan, who may one day use their experience to either bring the jihad back to their homeland or help other radical elements operating abroad.

The 2009 efforts at reconciliation possess an additional dangerous element. Even though above the surface, the Islamic radicals of the LIFG acknowledge the legitimacy of the Qadhafi regime, the “corrective studies code” legalized different aspects of Islamic (military) activity within the boundaries of the state. According to the code, jihad is allowed in Islamic countries that are invaded, and volunteering to fight in these areas is supported. By this definition, attempts by radical Islamist groups to attract Libyan youth to fight in jihad areas are allowed. In a few years, these activities may create a large infrastructure of radical Islamist elements within Libya that might eventually turn against the Qadhafi regime itself, despite their current tactical accommodation with it. 

Citations

[1]Yonah Alexander et al., Terrorism – The PLO connection (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1989), 58.
[2]   For Libyan involvement with the activity of NAYLP and ANO, see Ariel Merari and Shlomo Elad, The International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press), 1986, 61; See also Yossi Melman, The Master Terrorist: The True Story Behind Abu Nidal (New York: Adama Books, 1986), 93.
[3] Court opinion in Her Majesty’s Advocate v. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, Case No. 1475/99, Court of Edinburgh, Scotland, http://www.pixunlimited.co.uk/guardian/pdf/0131lockerbieverdict.pdf
[4]  Allison Pargete, “Political Islam in Libya,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 3, iss. 6, May 5, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=306.
[5]  Ibid.
[6]   Ibidem.
[7]   Ibidem.
[8]   Ibidem.
[9]  The facility is part of a comprehensive list of Tabligh facilities worldwide available here: http://adressmarkazjemaahtabligh.blogspot.com/  
[10]  Pargete, “Political Islam in Libya.”
[11]  Mohamed Ali, “Libyan MB Chairman: We seek Civil Society-Inspired Reform” Ikhwanweb, n.d., http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=929.
[12]  Pargete, “Political Islam in Libya.”
[13]  Evan F. Kohlmann, Dossier: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, NEFA Foundation, October 2007, 3, www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefalifg1007.pdf.  
[14]  Ibid. 4.
[15]  “Interview with Neoman Bentoman,” Jamestown foundation, March 15 2005. http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id+101.  
[16]  Kohlmann, Dossier: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, 5.
[17]  Ibid. 6.
[18]  Ibidem, 8.
[19]  Ibidem, 8-11.
[20]  Ibidem, 11
[21]  Kohlmann, Dossier: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, 12.
[22]  Ibid., 13
[23]  Ibidem, 12.
[24]  Ibidem, 17.
[25]  U.S. Department of Defense, Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, “Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal – Al Libi, Abu Faraj,” February 8, 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ISN10017.pdf#1. From these allegations, one can conclude that he was at that time the military chief of al-Qaeda.
[26]   Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, “Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Abu Laith al-Libi, Field Commander and Spokesman,” Washington Post, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/laith.html#profile and Claude Salhani, “Jihad Turning Point?” Washington Times, February 7, 2008, http://www.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=29823.
[27]  Yahya Al Libi has emerged as a public face for al-Qaeda, appearing in more than a dozen lengthy Internet videos since 2006. His claim to fame is his successful escape from a high-security U.S. military prison in Bagram, Afghanistan, in July 2005, along with three other al-Qaeda members. He styles himself as a theologian and has offered lengthy commentaries on a variety of political events and hence is probably the new head of the religious committee. See Whitlock and Ladaa, “Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership.” 
[28]  “Qaeda: Signs of Victory Looming Over Afghanistan,” worldanalysis.net, May 12, 2009, http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=629.
[29]   Atiya Allah’s position within al-Qaeda senior leadership was fully exposed through a series of correspondence he held with al-Qaeda Amir of Iraq Abu Mosab al Zarqawi on behalf of the al-Qaeda leadership. See West Point, Combating Terrorism Center, “Letter Exposes New Leader In Al-Qa’ida High Command,” September 25, 2006, http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf.  
[30]  Bill Roggio, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group joins al Qaeda,” Long War Journal, November 3, 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/libian_islamic_fight.php.  
[31]  Ibid.
[32]  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2009, October 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127353.htm.
[33]  An online version of the Charter is available here: http://www.rcmlibya.org/English/Great_Green_Charter.htm.
[34]  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2009, October 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127353.htm.  
[35]  Ali, “Libyan MB Chairman: We seek Civil Society-Inspired Reform.”
[36]   U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2009.
[37]  Ibid.
[38]  Christopher Boucek, “Libyan State-Sponsored Terrorism: An Historical Perspective,” Jamestown foundation Terrorism Monitor 3, iss. 6, May 5, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=305.  
[39]  Nick Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “New Jihad code threatens al Qaeda,” CNN, November 10, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/11/09/libia.jihadi.code/.
[40]  Ibid.